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PREFACE 
/ 
In &n1 list of Reyolutionary War leaders the Dame of John Adams would 
command a prominent position. Immediately would come to aind his role in the 
pre- and early lears of the conflict when he struggled manfully ia Massa-
chusetts and later in the Continental Congress against the wiles of the 
English and the timiditl of his countrymen. Few would fail to recall his 
role as co-negotiator with Franklin and Jal at the peace convention in Paris. 
But strangell enough, his role as American minister plenipotentiary to the 
United Provinces--the work for which he most wished to be remembered and 
through which he believed that he had rendered the greatest service to his 
country--would be recalled but vaguell and fleetingll. 
There are partial explaDations of this. Ad.ams, himself, was prevented, 
b, the needs of his country and its continued claims upon his tille and energy, 
from fulfilling his desire "to collect together in one view my little nego-
tiations." Both his contemporaries and subsequent historians haYe been 
satisfied to acknowledge the immediate benefits of these negotiations without 
delving too deeply for details on their procurement. That indifference 
could, among other things, have been related to an awareness that some ot 
the pertinent Adams correspondence was not available. Although theotficial 
correspondence and many ot the more private letters of his mission to the 
Netherlands had been published, there remained a reasoDable presumption that 
a detailed account of the work he undertook in Holland would require access 
to manl other letters to friends which had not been published. Very recently 
this deficienc was remedied b the releasin of the Adams Famil Pa ers. 
iv 
Investigations show that the securing of recognition for the new re-
public, the suocessful floating of a loan, and the signing of a treaty of 
amity and commerce were tasks to try the hardiest soul. BecaUse of an in-
tricately involved political system and an all-encompassing dependence upon 
commerce, the Dutch were little inclined to embroil themselves in further 
difficulties with England. When Adams arrived in Amsterdam, he discovered 
that the mynheers knew practically nothing of America. He responded by be-
coming a propaganda agent par excellence and pitted his abilities in that 
field against an active and well-organized pro-English propaganda group. To 
complicate his problem the Prince and many of the highest officers of the 
country were pro-English. The remaking of Dutch opinion was time-consuming 
and frustrating. Although aided by La Vauguyon, the French ambassador, in 
developing anti-F~glish sentiment, Adams found that same ambassador deter-
mined to prevent him from undertaking any measure to gain recognition for 
America. In this La Vauguyon was only acting upon orders from the French 
Foreign Minister who thoroughly distrusted Adams. 
From the beginning of his mission Adams was subjected to the machina-
tions of those who should have supported him--Congress, his fellow-minister, 
Franklin. and the ministers of America's ally, France. Because of the 
peculiarities of his character and his stubborn advocacy of a militia style 
of diplomacy which was anathema at Versailles, he alienated both Franklin 
and the powerful French Foreign Minister, Vergennes. Vergennes, indiffer-
ently supported by Franklin, brought strong influence to bear on Congress 
to have Adams recalled or restricted. Congress, badly torn by internal 
strife, was in no position to defend Adams and rather tamely submitted to 
v 
French insinuations. Only the slowness of transatlantic communications per-
mitted Adams the opportunity to achieve his purpose before he learned that 
his powers were severely curtailed. In spite of "the fury or enemies, as 
well as of elements, the subtiety and arrogance of allies, and, what has been 
worse than all, the jealousy, envy, and little pranks of friends and copa-
triots," Adams was successful. His accomplishment is still considered quite 
a feat by the men who have studied it. "A perfect revolution had thus taken 
place in the inner politics of the United Provinces, the English party having 
lost ground completely, and the Prince of Orange being oompelled to yield to 
public sentiment, which had grown decidedly anti-English."l "He managed to 
write a brilliant chapter in Amerioa's diplomatic history.tt2 His militia 
system of diplomacy did secure significant advantages for the United States. 
It is the purpose of this paper to reconstruct those "little negotiations" 
as they unfolded in the two years Adams spent in the Netherlands. 
lFriedrioh Edler, The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution 
("Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," 
Series XIX, No.2; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1911), p. 228. 
2Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American 
Independence (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 131. 
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CHAPTER I 
/ 
MINISTER FOR PEACE, 1 779-JULY, 1780 
"When I go to heaven I shall look down over the battlements with 
pleasure upon the stars and stripes wantoning in the wind at The Hague. tI 
And the fiercely patriotio and oftentimes truculent John Adams could not re-
sist adding, "There is another triumph in the case, sweeter than that over 
our enemies. • • • It is the triumph of stubborn independence. Independence 
of friends and foes."l In these few words Adams summed up his twenty-six 
month sojourn as a militia diplomat in the Netherlands. It vas largely be-
cause of his stubborn independenoe that he first had gone to the Netherlands 
and it was largely his stubborn independence that brought suooess to his 
struggles to win Dutch friendship, a sUbstantial loan, and a treaty of 
commerce. 
For these tasks Adams thought the traditional style of diplomacy 
inadequate. Its acoepted praotice was to dispatch ministers only to those 
foreign oourts at which there was a solid expeotation that they would be 
received. Similarly an application for a loan, other than as part of a 
treaty of alliance, would be made only through the proper business chan-
2 
nels. Adams advocated and, in the Netherlands, practioed the disruption 
of both rules. When oalled to task for his unorthodox methods by Robert 
Livingston, Minister of Foreign Affairs, he baptized his system with his 
retort that diplomatists might "consider us a sort of militia and hold 
us • • • in some degree of oontempt; but wise men know that militia sometimes 
gain victories over regular troops even by departing from the rules.,,3 In 
its simplest terms, militia diplomacy was a system whereby straightforward, 
unequivocating ministers in quest of recognition and financiAl aid ware 
sent uninvited to foreign courts. John Adams proudly remained its principal 
exponent and its chief practitioner. But this penchant for the militia s1s-
2 
tem brought him into conflict with the very men from whom he otherwise should 
have expected the greatest co-operation. These primarily were the Comte de 
Vergennes, the French Foreign Secretary, who tried his utmost to have Adams 
replaced, and Doctor Franklin, the only duly recognized Amerioan minister in 
Europe at the time. 
Franklin, with whom Adams was originally expected to work more or less 
in tandem, viewed this type of diplomacy with a sort of horror. "A virgin 
state should prese·rve its virgin character, and not go about Buitoring for 
alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others.,,4 On 
several occasions throughout the period of Adams' activities in the Nether-
lands some action of the volatile New Englander would spark a verbal exchange 
on their views between the two. Fortunately for Adams' pride, his system 
was sucoessful with the Dutch and did secure both recognition and a loan. 
He very correctly argued that these objects could never have been accom-
plished by the traditional methods. I1If after receiving such advice and 
exhortations as I did, I had suspended operations to request instructions, I 
should have been forbidden to do what has been done.,,5 Indeed if he had 
followed the traditional system, he would not have gone to the Netherlands 
in the first place as that country was not requesting a minister and the 
commission Adams had received was to participate in a peace negotiation. 
3 
Even this commission he held only because Vergennes' diplomatic leverage 
had been insufficient to outbalance militia advocates and sectional interest 
groups in Congress in the summer of 1779. / 
Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes, the French Foreign Secretary and 
presumed co-negotiator with Adams at the awaited peace convention. was, like 
6 Franklin, the embodiment of traditional diplomacy. His previous experience 
with the American commissioners in France,7 of whom too many had been of the 
militia persuasion, convinced him that the security of his own diplomatic 
negotiations. as well as those of his ally, depended on confining the conduct 
of American diplomacy to Franklin's able hands. Accordingly, in the fall of 
1778, when the first possibility of a peace settlement arose. the Comte in-
quired of Franklin whether he possessed full powers to treat with England 
in case of a general pacification. After carefully studying Franklin's com-
mission, the two ministers agreed that it did not confer that power on the 
American plenipotentiary. In December, 1778, Vergennes. therefore, directed 
his ambassador in Washington to secure the requisite authorization for 
8 Franklin. Dutifully, Gerard informed the President of Congress that a 
negotiation for peace was possible and that the king desired Congress to 
crant their plenipotentiary full instructions and extensive powers for taking 
part in the negotiations.9 At the time, however, Congress was so preoccupied 
with internecine conflicts that the request went unheeded. Several weeks 
10 later Gerard submitted a second brief but urgent request. 
Congress then proceeded to draw up instructions but shortly became 
involved in a dispute over the article on boundaries. Gerard reminded them 
that France's guarantees under the alliance applied only to independence 
4 
per !! and not to boundaries. Any decision concerning these could not be 
made unilaterally but must be decided jointly by the allies.ll When his first 
remarks proved ineffectual, Gerard again memorialized congre~ and insisted 
that not only the welfare of the country but the general good of the alliance 
12 
required an immediate appointment. Gerard's anxiety was based on his fear 
that a settlement would soon transpire but that, until they had granted 
Franklin full powers, Congress would neither look kindly upon nor easily ac-
cept any negotiation made by the Doctor. Gerard personally agreed with his 
chief that a proper procedure would be that Franklin negotiate under French 
auspices and then transmit the results for ratification. He was, however, 
firmly convinced that the members of Congress would not view it in that light. 
On the contrary, he wrote, they husbanded power with so much reserve and 
jealousy that they would very probably consider it a crime if Franklin were 
to negotiate prior to authorization. Franklin's reputation in Philadelphia 
did not appear to Gerard strong enough to withstand the Charge.13 
Negotiations plodded on through May and June, 1779. The Congress 
occupied itself with the details of instructions for the peace negotiator, 
and Gerard occupied himself with attempts to secure a s~tisfactory minister 
unbound by detailed instructions. Franklin was the man in mind. In mid-
July, the opportunity arose for Gerard to inject remarks concerning the French 
court's approbation of the Doctor and the insinuation that, with such a per-
son as minister, the court would have no further occasion to withhold any 
14 information which might be of mutual interest. But the struggle to secure 
Franklin's appointment was a losing battle and Gerard knew it. A rew days 
later he informed Vergennes that neither the anti-Galli cans nor his own 
5 
followers had much confidence in the Doctor and a new man would be sent from 
the states as plenipotentiary for peace.15 
Gerard next concentrated on the instructions being dra~ for the future 
minister. Due to his influence, Congress changed from the demand that sover-
eignty and independence must be tracknowledged fl to the lesser stipulation that 
16 they were to be "assured" before the treaty was drawn. He also secured 
provision for a truce under specified conditions and for greater moderation 
in the demands on boundaries and fisheries. B,y August 13, a committee com-
pleted drafting the instructions, and some member furnished Gerard with a 
copy before they were presented to the Congress. The ambassador was not 
completely satisfied but felt that on the whole they were not unfavorable to 
France.l ? Congress debated and then unanimously approved of the instructions 
for negotiating peace. Congress immediately after prepared instructions for 
18 
a minister to negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. A summary 
of these instructions, also, Gerard procured. He forwarded both sets to the 
French Foreign Secretary. Incorrectly, however, he stated t~~t the pleni-
potentiary would communieate his instructions to the French ministry and 
act in concert with it.19 Such a directive was not included in the set given 
to Adams and occasioned one of the first clashes between that minister and 
Vergennes. 
Once the instructions were settled, the choice of a minister invited 
extensive caballing. Gerard and his partisans favored Jay and the anti-
Gallicans supported John Adams. On September 24 a proposal was brought to 
charge Adams and Franklin jointly with the peace commission but too many 
members opposed and the meeting adjourned. The following day Adams and Jay 
6 
were nominated. Franklin was not mentioned by either party. Adams' cause 
was aided when his partisans produced in the assembly hall a courtesy fare-
well letter from Vergennes to Adams on the latter's quitting/France the 
previous spring. Because of this letter some members were inclined to form 
a highly favorable impression of Adams and to believe that he would be ac-
20 
ceptable to Vergennes. Nevertheless, the first ballotings ended in a dead-
lock between Adams and Jay. Then, by secret prearrangement, a resolution 
was passed to appoint a minister to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce 
with Spain. By this maneuver Congress could elect Jay as minister to Spain 
and Adams as minister plenipotentiary for peace and for a commercial treaty 
with England. 21 On October 20, the two commissions and the accompanying 
instructions were transmitted to Adams. Although he had spent the entire 
fall in Boston and Braintree and knew very little of the intentions and 
desires of a goodly number of the members of Congress, he accepted on No-
vember 4 and prepared to sail directly from Boston on November 13, in the 
22 French frigate Sensible. 
The selection of minister was one at which Vergennes could scarcely 
be overjoyed. His p':.)rsonal knowledge of Adams' passion for candor and com-
plete distaste for diplomatic niceties boded ill for future co-operation 
between the two men. Although Vergennes, in 1778-1779, had professed no 
interest in the internal frictions among the American commissioners, he was 
well aware that Adams had favored Arthur Lee23 in the unpleasantness between 
24 Lee and Franklin. Furthermore, the correspondence of Gerard had given him 
a distorted picture of the sentiments of Adams. This for two reasons. 
Gerard received most of his information from his partisans and so forwarded 
biased opinions. Also, he frequently had reference to Sam Adams but used 
only the family name and the resulting ambiguity further discredited Adams 
in the Count's eyes.25 That Vergennes had been prejudiced by these sources 
was evidenced in his original instructions to the Chevalier de la Luzerne 
when dispatching him to replace Gerard in Philadelphia in July, 1779. 
\1e clearly perceive that an opposition party exists in Congress which 
if not sold to England, nevertheless favors the views of that power, 
and which seeks to establish and to bring into credit principles di-
ametrically opposed to those which form the basis and spirit of our 
treaties with the United States ••• 2~ It is indubitable that, among 
them, may be counted Mr. John Adams. 
Adams possibly had some premonition of Vergennes' attitUde. Years 
later when writing his autobiography, Adams noted that he had realized that 
Congress had disappointed the French ministry both by its failure to appoint 
Franklin as minister for peace and by its commission for a commercial treaty 
with England. He evidently did not realize that Vergennes considered him 
pro-English and, thereby, he missed the major point of Vergennes' antipathy 
7 
and a primary cause of that minister's great concern over the Adams' appoint-
mente He quickly "determined to proceed with the utmost caution, delibera-
tion, and prudence; to do nothing which would excite the smallest jealousy 
in the French court •••• ,,27 Consequently, upon his arrival in Paris 
(February 9), he arranged for a formal call upon Vergennes and was cour-
teously received on February 11, 1780. The next day Adams very correctly 
submitted in writing a summary of the nature of his commissions and promised 
to "take no steps of consequence" in fulfillment of these commissions "with-
out consulting his Majesty's ministers." At the same time he requested the 
Count's opinion as to whether he should acquaint the British ministry with 
his commission for peace, publish it in the gazettes, or whether he should 
8 
. 28 
"remain on the reserve" as he had done thus far. At any time these sugges-
tions would have troubled Vergennes. Coming as they did while England was 
secretly fishing for separate negotiations with spain29 and ~e French min-
istry itself was discouraged by the ill-luck of Admiral d'Estaing at 
Savannah, the propositions worried Vergennes in the extreme. Nor was the 
Foreign Secretary mollified by Adams' maladroit wording of a request for 
permission to reside in France. In spite of his good intentions of using 
"caution, deliberation, and prudence," Adams aggravated by informing the 
Comte that neither commission, instruction, nor intimation of Congress dic-
tated his residence in any particular place or country.3D 
On his part, Vergennes thoroughly ruffled Adams' temper. In answer to 
the questions posed by Adams, he insisted th.:"lt the minister keep his mission 
secret, above all to the court of London--a point in which AdalDs tentatively 
acquiesced but later took issue. More immediately he was irritated by 
Vergennes' blunt refusal to speak further of official business until Gerard's 
return as "he is probably the bearer of your instructions and he will cer-
tainly have it in his power to give me explanations concerning the nature and 
extent of your commissions",,3l Incensed at the implication, but determined 
to appear cool, Adams sent copies of his commissions and that of Francis 
Dana, secretary to the American peace commission.32 Nevertheless, the self-
righteous New Englander resented being thought ignorant of the usages of 
diplomacy and determined to prove to Vergennes that he did know what was 
proper and that he was not going to be c~valierly treated. With the pointed 
remark that he presumed Vergennes would "not consider it proper that I should 
corr.municate them,lt he declined to give any information regarding his 
9 
instructions, other than that they did not militate against the treaties with 
France.33 Aside from the insulting nature of Vergennes' remarks, Adams was 
most anxious that the court of France should not know his in'tructions as he 
was dissatisfied with the sections on boundaries and fisheries. He rightly 
surmised that Vergennes would urge him to settle for the very minimum those 
instructions would allow. Even more disastrous, he considered Vergennes 
capable of giving the information to the British negotiators and encouraging 
them to seek more than Adams intended to relinquish. On his part, Adams was 
determined to stretch the instructions to their maximum.34 Thus within a 
fortnight of his arrival a mutual distrust between French and American 
ministers developed. 
On the occasion of transmitting his commissions, Adams called to 
Vergennes' attention the fact that all America knew of his mission, and, in 
all probability, so did England.35 An effort to conceal the information 
appeared to him pointless. Unable to assail the justice of the argument, 
Vergennes promised to publish the peace commission in the official gazette 
when Adams was presented to the king and royal family.36 The American 
minister would then be free to give it greater publicity through the Dutch 
papers. ~Vergennes reserved for himself the right to see the proposed 
article before Adams transmitted it to the gazettes.) The commission to 
negotiate a treaty of commerce was explicitly excluded from any permission to 
publish. Vergennes counselled great precaution that no information relative 
to that commission should reach England. His closing remark on the matter, 
"You will no doubt easily feel the motives which induce me to advise you to 
take this precaution, and it would be needless to explain them," remained in 
10 
the back of Adams' mind for three months before erupting in a far more fiery 
exchange. 
For the time being Adams 8greed to Vergennes' plans ort publication 
although he failed to see the purpose of concealing the commercial treat7 
commission.37 He was of the opinion that the United States had as muoh right 
to form a commercial treat7 as to negotiate a peace.,s On March 7. 1780. he 
was presented to the king, but the promised article in the official Gazette 
de France failed to materialize. As Adams was honor bound to insert no notice 
on his own behalf in &n7 paper prior to the official announcement. he 
searched the columns of every issue until the wait became unbearable. On the 
twenty-first, he inquired of Vergennes whether the omission were an over-
sight or due to a change of plane with which he was unacquainted.39 Ten 
da7s later. Vergennes found time to explain that upon inquiry he had learned 
that placing an article in the Gazette de France was not the custom, and 
that, to avoid singularity, he had not inserted the account of Adams' 
presentation. If Adams desired, Vergennes would have a cop7 of the draft 
article he now enclosed published in the unofficial Mercure de France and 
then Adams could have it repeated in the foreign gazettes.40 Adams would 
have preferrjd the bolder plan of communicating his powers immediately to the 
. ~ 
English but bowed in the name of peace. He immediately forwarded in forma-
tion on the commission to Edmund Jenings at Brussels and suggested to him 
that he have some paragraphs from Dutch gazettes inserted into the English 
papers. In fact, he was to keep the commission in the public mind by ref-
ercense. to it now and then. Jenings was, of course, to avoid using Adams' 
name as the originator of these articles.42 
11 
Dissatisfied with marking time until peace negotiations got underway--
an event of which he saw no immediate indications--Adams began casting about 
for other interests. On the whole these were so difficult t6' find and his 
activities so limited that he inquired of Lovell,43 the most active member 
of the Committee for Foreign Affairs. whether Congress intended to keep him 
in Europe. He complained, ttA situation so idle and iaactive is not agreeable 
44 to my genius." He had very little in common with Franklin and never 
troubled to communicate his commission or very much of his business to his 
older cOlleague.45 For a time Arthur Lee and Ralph lzard46 were in Paris 
and Adams enjoyed his discussions and disagreements with them.47 The pre-
ponderance of his time he devoted to collecting pertinent information for the 
benefit of Congress and to publishing anything he could for the benefit of 
Europe. To the President of Congress he addressed letters by the score, 
48 
sometimes writing three or four in one day. In addition to those things 
which he heard, or read, or surmised and passed on to Philadelphia, he 
clipped any amount of materials from the assortment of papers and pamphlets 
which he procured. Additional information he solicited from whomever he 
could. To La Fayette he e~pressed the view that neither of them could render 
Congress a "more useful service" than to collect intelligence "with precision 
and transmit it without delay ... 49 
A task equally important. to his mind, was the publishing of true 
information to confute· the false within Europe. Adams deplored England's 
ability to give "her fictions the color of probability • • • and to fabricate 
and export large quantities of this merchandise," particularly as fIshe finds 
more customers to take them off her hands than she ought. considering how 
12 
illicit the traffic is. ,,50 He early applied to Edme Genet, editor of the 
Hercure de France and intimate of the court, for the "exact truth" to counter-
act the large quantities of political lies being spread.5l denet"laid the 
request before Vergennes who directed that Adams be invited to seek his in-
formation directly from the Foreign Secretary who would be ready to satisfy 
his inquiries.52 Vergennes apparently saw greater advantages in supplying 
Adams with accurate information than in permitting him to siphon off bits 
from whence he would. Adams in turn sent some pieces to be printed in 
Genet's Mercure but preferred to secure publication in Dutch and English 
papers. Entre to Dutch publications could be managed easily by F. W. C. 
Dulll8.s53 at The Hague as he was personally acquainted with a large number ot 
the editors of the most influential papers in that country. Adams' closest 
collaborator in all this work was Edmund Jenings at Brussels.54 Not only 
did Jenings have Adams' commission published but innumerable other pieces 
which were sent to him for that purpose. Jenings, through a friend in 
London, could secure the printing of many articles in the English papers. 
This appealed greatly to Adams who rejoiced at the good effect it had in 
France and more particularly in America to see such things in English.55 On 
occasion Adams would send some of his reflections to be inserted "in the name 
of a Dutchman, Swiss, Frenchman, Spaniard, or American or whom you will ft just 
80 the sentiments the,. contained would tfreach the eyes of Englishmene".56 
Adams offered apologies for laying burdens on Jenings "without number" but 
excused the imposition because "1 cannot and will not be idle. 1 think: we 
are saving our count~ in this way.,,57 Jenings, in turn, encouraged Adams 
to have his remarks on various topics translated into French and sent to the 
different courts of Europe and- to the leading men of Holland where he was 
sure they would do much goOd.58 
That the irascible but proudly patriotic,;and boundlessly energetic 
Adams could remain in France indefinitely without giving or taking offense 
was too much to expect of either Adams or Vergennes. Congress' resolution 
13 
of March 18, 1780 depreciating loan-office certificates at the rate of forty 
to one occasioned the first outbreak of hostilities. Early in June, t1. de 
Chaumont, friend and landlord of Franklin and respected figure at the court, 
fearing that the resolution of March 18 would seriously affect French com-
mercial interests, called upon Adams to discuss it. Adams contended that the 
policy was "wise and just" and that France had no cause for complaint. 
France. he argued, derived great good from the American Revolution and, 
actually, was under an obligation to the United States as England would be 
too powerful for the House of Bourbon alone. These were hardly sentiments 
calculated to endear him to the persons with whom he was supposed to co-
operate. Chaumont was indignant and forwarded a report of the conversation 
to Vergennes.59 In the meantime the papers published the news of the pro-
jected depreciation and thereby caused a clamor. Adams was invited to the 
\~ai d'Orsay and spent some time in discussion about it with Vergennes and 
60 his under-secretary. Joseph-Matthias de Rayneval. 
After he had returned to his lodgings, Adams enclosed to Vergennes a 
note on the matter from Richard Cranch, Adams' brother-in-law, and also a 
newspaper from Massachusetts which reported that the state legislature had 
61 
adopted the congressional resolution. Vergennes replied that he was not 
concerned with regulations~erica made for her own people but that she should 
14 
except foreigners from the law or make arrangements for their proper indemni-
fication. The bill as it stood would, he insisted, work havoc with French 
commercial interests. He had, therefore, directed Luzerne t6 represent these 
62 facts to Congress in the strongest light possible. Adams begged Vergennes 
to hold up the message until a full explanation of the measure could be pre-
pared.63 He importuned Franklin to support his request for a delay as he 
feared Tory sympathizers and other interested parties could capitalize on 
the situation if Luzerne contested the measure.64 
These requests dispatched, he penned a lengthy explanation to Ver-
gennes oontesting French rights to exchange paper certificates dollar for 
dollar in gold and silver as Vergennes had desired. In what he later 'termed 
"a decent, though, in a few expressions, a gently tingling rejoinder,,,65 he 
maintained that France had little if ,anything to lose. Most produoe shipped 
by European merchants was paid ~ither in cash or in bills of exchange and 
there were certainly not more than $10,000 (he did not aotually know of 
51,000) in certificates held by Frenchmen. Furthermore, the French merchants 
66 had made enormous profits in the United States. He sent a copy of this 
letter to Franklin requesting to be corrected if there were any inaccuracies 
in detail, but asserting his correctness on the underlying principles.67 
Vergennes was more than a little annoyed--though hardly to the point of 
falling "into a passion" or writing a Itpassiona te and ungentlemanly reply" 
as Adams later described it.68 Adams was curtly informed that the explana-
tion had not changed Vergennes' sentiments but that the Comte felt further 
discussion between them on the subject would be superfluous. To the last 
part of the statement at least Adams agreed.69 To Franklin the Comte ex-
plained that he could not revoke the orders to Luzerne as Adams' arguments 
were only "abstract reasonings, hypotheses, and calculations" lacking in a 
70· firm foundation and "not really applicable to French subject..e'." 
Neither man, however, vas quite satisfied to let the matter drop. 
Each apparently felt the necessity of justifying himself to some one. Ver-
gennes naturally chose Franklin. After condemning Adams' point of view, 
Verp:ennes suggested to Franklin that the King was persuaded that Franklin 
held a view different from Adams--at least in the resolution's application 
to foreigners. He intimated that Congress would also differ from Adams and 
"know how to prize the friendship of France. n7l Franklin attempted to oil 
the waters as well as he could. Confessing an inability to understand the 
financial fine points of it, he promised Vergennes that Congress would give 
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the French merchants full justice, and he assured the Foreign Secretary that 
Congress' view differed "widely from those that seemed to be expressed by 
Mr. Adams.,,72 
A very proud and truculent Adams had been trespassing on Franklin's 
territory and he knew it, but he cODsidered himself justified. Informing 
Congress that Vergennes had first solicited his opinion, he sent copies of 
the correspondence directly to Huntington, the President of Congress.73 He 
explained his position and bluntly stated: 
I am determined to give my sentiments to his majesty's ministers 
whenever they shall see cause to ask thom, although it is not within 
my department, until I shall be forbidden by Congress, and to this 
end I shall go to the court often enou~4to give them an opportunity 
to ask them, if they wish to know them. 
He believed that he had demonstrated the "injustice and impracticabUitylt 
of paying France in specie. He, therefore, had resented Vergennes' sarcasm 
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and so returned him "irony for irony, and sarcasm for sarcasm." He fully 
expected that this mode of reply would effect either Vergennes' abandonment 
of that style of negotiation with him or his own recall. Fr0M the perspec-
tive of 1811, he reckoned his recall to have been the motive of Vergennes' 
action. By the recall of Adams, Franklin would probably receive the commis-
sian for peace and Vergennes would have "our fisheries, our limits, and a 
truce secured to his mind.,,?5 
Congress, having received Adams' letter before it heard from Ver-
gennes, resolved to inform its minister of its approval of his "industrious 
attention to the interests of the United states abroad." Lovell, in trans-
mitting a copy of the resolution to Adams, assured him that there was no 
danger of overexpressing the satisfaction of congress.?6 Adams was pleased 
with their approval, especially as he was "prepared in tfiiil own mind to 
receive from Congress resolutions of a different nature.,,7? Indeed, he 
strongly expected to receive in the near future some less laudatory comments 
from Philadelph1a--and with good reason. The agreement of June 30 to end 
their discussion of the redemption of loan-office certificates had sig-
nalled only a truce, not a peace settlement, between Adams and Vergennes. 
Within a fortnight, Adams, with irrepressible zeal, again unneces-
sarily challenged Vergennes while that minister was greatly concerned with 
his own problems of keeping the allies united. 78 Gratuitously Adams penned 
some four thousand words introducing them as "a few observations upon the 
present conjuncture of affairs." Remarking that France's own advantage lay 
in the same direction as America's, he explained the necessity of placing 
the French fleet in Amerioan ooastal waters and he outlined a plan for its 
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deployment. A French fleet cruising the American ooast, he suggested, would 
oounteraot that portion of public opinion which inclined toward England and 
was critical of the laxity of the French efforts. 79 Vergenn~s very cour-
teously gave the plenipotentiary information on de Ternay's and Rochambeau's 
destinations and on their general directives. He assured Adams that the 
king was most mindful of the American cause even without special solioita-
tion from Congress, and he expressed a hope that America would respond with 
80 
suitable sentiments and full co-operation. 
Before Vergennes had the opportunity to send that information, the 
commerce-conscious New Englander had taken another tack. Referring to 
Vergennes' letter of February 24, he reoalled to the Foreign Secretary that 
gentleman's advice to keep the commission for a commercial treaty secret for 
reasons which Adams would readily sense. He now commented that upon the most 
mature reflection he remained firmly convinced that these powers should be 
made known to the British. He thereupon listed eleven reasons that induced 
him to think so. These reasons centered chiefly on his expectations of the 
effect the information would have upon both the English people, who he be-
lieved longed for an honorable peace, and upon the government which would 
81 then be forced to explain "their real intentions concerning America." 
Vergennes had no intention of permitting Adams to make his oommission 
known. lIe, therefore, took time to answer each of Adams' reasons with a 
countervailing reason of his own. "To be solicitous about a treaty of corn-
merce," he introduced his remarks, "before peace is established is like being 
busy about the furnishing of a house before the foundation is laid." An 
offer of a treaty of commerce would be tantamount to an alliance--rather 
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ridiculous "when the war is raging in all its fury." He agreed that England 
might desire peaoe and good commercial relations, but pointed out that very 
few talked of independence, and these few did so more as a ma(tter ot opposi-
tion than ot conviction since not a single motion to grant independence was 
ever made in Parliament. The only sensible retlection he could tind in 
Adams' brief was the eighth which acknowledged that an immediate announcement 
in the tace of the English victory at Charleston would be inopportune. He 
dismissed the arguments for publication as ridiculous since England, once 
independence was recognized, would quickly enough remember to proTide for 
commercial relations. In conclusion Vergennes requested that Adams, it he 
still, in spite of the very solid reasons given him, remained unconvinced, 
should communicate his remarks and Vergennes' answers to Congress and await 
its decision. Vergennes, in the meantime, planned to communicate hie posi-
tion through Luzerne, confident that Congress would hold the official French 
82 position wort~ of attention. To this Adams conceded that Congress would 
beyond doubt agree with Vergennes that the communication should only be made 
in union with France. Although he retained his stated opinions, Adams de-
cided to su8pend any thought of a communication previous to a specific 
authorization f~om Congres8 or the French ministry.83 
In spite of this concession to Vergennes and of the acknowledgment 
that a communication would hold no advantage commensurate to the inconven-
ience of acting without French support, the plenipotentiary could not resist 
contradicting some of the remarks Vergennes had made. The majority of the 
English people, he reasserted, desired peace; motions, if he recalled ac-
curately, had been made in both Lords and Commons to grant independence; 
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granting independence and making a treaty of reciprocity would be an honorable 
84 
and advantageous peace for England. 
Checkmated in that area for the time, Adams moved inteS' another. The 
day after he promised to suspend action on his special commission for com-
merce, he reverted to Vergennes' letter of July 20 and the remark therein 
that the king "without having been solicited by Congress, has taken effectual 
measures to support the cause of America.,,85 Without either prudence or 
necessity, he directly challenged Vergennes' statement by recalling to the 
minister's mind previous congressional solicitation for naval assistance 
from France. Unabashedly, he proceeded to make a further solicitation. On 
the supposition that the Admiral de Ternay might meet the English fleet under 
Admiral Graves and the battle be a draw, he suggested that either de Guichen 
in the West Indies dispatch ships to reinforce de Ternay or that the king 
dispatch additional ships from Europe. If. immediately on top of their 
recent exchange, Vergennes could have borne this piece of gratuitous advice, 
he surely would have decided that the limit had been reached when he read 
the following statement: 
I am so convinced by experience of the absolute necessity of more 
consultations and communications between his majesty's ministers 
and the ministers of Congress, that I am determined to omit no op-
portunity of communicating my sentiments to your excellency upon 
everything that appears to me of importance to the common cause 
in which I can do it with propriety; and the communication shall 
be direct in person or by letter sg your excellency, without the 
intervention of any third person. 
This was militia diplomacy incarnate. With apparently complete unawareness 
of the rebuffs he had already received, Adams went on to offer his "poor 
opinion and advice to his majesty's minister upon anything that relates to 
the United States or the common cause whenever they shall be asked. flB7 
20 
Vergennes, who normally took a week or ten days to answer a communica-
tion from Adams, curtly responded to this message within two days. Not 
troubling to conceal his irritation, he bluntly informed Mr./Adams that 
Franklin alone was the accredited minister from the United states and with 
88 him alone would Vergennes treat of matters concerning the United States. 
Thereupon he informed Franklin of the altercation and sent to him copies of 
the offending correspondence and his replies with the request that they be 
forwarded to Congress. He frankly added that he did not think--and presumed 
Congress would not--that Adams had "that conciliatory spirit which is neces-
sary for the important and delicate business with which he is entrusted.,,89 
Franklin took the side of Vergennes, agreeing with him on this occasion more 
wholeheartedly than on the former. He assured the Foreign Secretary that 
clearly it was Adams' "indiscretion alone. and not from any instructions 
received by him. that he has given such just cause of displeasure." As for 
himself, he disavowed being a party to the correspondence as he knew only 
what he read in the newspapers of Adams' business. He bluntly declared. "I 
live upon terms of civility with him. not of intimacy.,,90 
In compliance with Vergennes' request. Franklin addressed the material 
to Huntington with a few comments of his own. In the first place. Adams 
"having nothing else here wherewith to employ himself, he seems to have en-
deavored supplying what he may suppose my negotiations defective in." Fur-
thermore, the offense Adams had given was one of the expected inconveniences 
of having more than one minister at any court. It was a matter for Congress 
to decide as to who was correct since he and Adams differed. He was deter-
mined to continue his efforts to please the French court and he presumed 
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that both Congress and the majority of people in America would approve of his 
policy. Adams, on the other hand, believed America was too free in expressing 
her gratitude as France was, in the Adams opinion, more obli~ed to the 
United states than the United States to France. Franklin regretted the 
growing opinion in Paris that the Americans were diverging from the alliance 
and envisioning a reconciliation with England. He refrained from naming 
Adams but pointed out that while he himself had been busily fighting this 
opinion, some Americans had been "indiscreet in their conversations. n91 The 
day after writing this lengthy epistle, hearing that a boat was about to 
sail but that it would not be able to take packets, Franklin dashed off a 
brief note to Congress. In it he merely remarked that the court remained 
favorable although "some displeasure" had lately been given. 92 The explana-
tion he left to Luzerne. He did not dispatch his first letter until October 
and then, before sending it, inquired if Adams would care to write something 
to efface the bad impression the correspondence must give. Adams, baving 
long before sent copies of the entire affair to Congress, rejected the 
offer. 93 
Vergennes felt that he had too much at stake to permit the matter to 
quietly fade away. He sent Luzerne copies of the complete correspondence 
and directed that dignitary to confer confidentially with Huntington and the 
leaders in Congress in order to effect a re-evaluation of Adams' abilities. 
For the guidance of Congress, Vergennes sent along his own summation. "This 
plenipotentiary will do nothing but raise difficulties and cause vexations." 
After digressing on Adams' charaoter faults, he concluded that the minister 
was tlincapable of handling political questions and especially of treating 
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with the representatives of great powers, who, assuredly, will not accommo-
date themselves either to the tone or logic of Mr. Adams.,,94 Congress, after 
deliberation upon these representations, directed Huntington/to remonstrate 
with Adams. He did so, but attributing Adams' imprudence to his zeal and 
assiduity, made his rebuke extremely mild.95 
As far as Adams was concerned, however, the tiff with Vergennes left 
him little choice but to leave the country or to forswear further participa-
tion in Franco-American affairs until a peace negotiation did materialize. 
He was not of a temperament to ever achieve the latter. On the other hand, 
he was not the man to forsake a mission and return home without an official 
recall. Fortunately, circumstances were already in progress which would 
provide him with a refuge. For some years, he had rather closely followed 
events in the Netherlands and was very much aware that a group there had long 
desired a closer communication with America. He had been in Paris as a mem-
ber of the American commission when Dumas notified that body of a plan which 
he had received from an Amsterdam official for a treaty between the two 
republics.96 While Adams was still in Paris on that business and in close 
contact with Arthur Lee, another member of the commission and a militia en-
thusiast, Lee declared that Holland would lend America money out of revenge 
if Britain continued interfering with Dutch trade.97 Upon Adams' return to 
the United States in the late summer of 1779,98 his official report to 
Congress dealt with the possibility of closer connections with the Dutch. 
He noted the similarity of manners, of religion, and, to an extent, of con-
stitution between the two republics.99 In general his remarks corroborated 
those of leading Dutch patriots. Like Van der Capellen, he thought it 
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would be well to have a minister in the Netherlands although such a minister 
100 
very probably would not be openly received for some time. However, a 
minister-designate, even while he remained incognito, could acquaint himself 
with the customs of that land and at the same time make America a little 
better kno~~ to the Dutch people. He should also have an opportunity to lay 
the foundations for a future 10an.10l 
Upon his return to France in February, 1780, Adams resumed his inter-
est in the Dutch. Shortly he informed Huntington that English depredations 
on Dutch shipping were changing the attitude both of people and of govern-
mente Repeating his earlier contention that a minister could effect much 
good in that country, he added that such a person sent directly from Congress 
might obtain sizable sums if he applied to well-established Dutch commercial 
102 houses. As though with a premonition of his own forthcoming activity, he 
sought from a friend the names of the principal mercantile houses of Amster-
103 dam which were reputed friendly to the United states. Toward the end of 
March he devoted one of his lengthy reports to Congress exclusively to a dis-
cussion of the rapidly deteriorating relations between England and the 
l~ United Provinces. Interestingly enough, he prefaced the message with the 
comment that he felt it his duty to keep Congress informed relative to events 
in the Netherlands until an official minister arrived.105 In subsequent 
correspondence he endeavored to fulfill his self-appointed task, and, in 
addition to his own comments, he transmitted copies of petitions, memorials, 
and responses in plentiful supply. 
It was largely on the instigation of Van der Capellen, probably 
fortified by Adams' communication, and most certainly by the Adams' party 
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of militia diplomatists, that Henry Laurens had been commissioned in the fall 
of 1779 to negotiate both a loan and a treaty of amity and commerce in the 
Netherlands. l06 Circumstances prevented Laurens from leaving the states for 
several months after he received his commission. Concerned about his de-
layed departure, on June 20, 1780, Congress resolved that, until Laurens 
was enabled to reach the Netherlands, his commission for a loan should be 
transferred to John Adams. The commission to form a treaty of amity and 
commerce was to be held in abeyance until Laurens could inform himself on 
affairs in Holland and advise Congress regarding the terms for the proposed 
107 treaty. Laurens finally embarked on the Mercury but was taken with a 
packet of his private papers on September 3, 1780. He was confined to the 
Tower of London on a charge of treason and only released in 1782. Adams 
had been apprised of Laurens' appointment and subsequent delays, and he 
knew of Congress' interest in negotiations in the Netherlands. When he de-
cided to visit Amsterdam, he knew that Laurens had not yet arrived, but he 
did not know of his capture nor did he know until September 17, 1780 of his 
own interim appointment to that country. loB Consequently, his determination 
to leave France and spend some time in the Netherlands was entirely his own 
choice and the outgrowth of his militia instincts and not the result of any 
intimation from Philadelphia. 
On the other hand, his decision to travel there was not a sudden 
and unpremeditated one. Almost from the time of his arrival in Paris, he 
had intended to go to Holland at his earliest convenience and see if some-
thing could not be transacted there to make Amerioa less dependent on 
109 France for pecuniary aid and for military supplies. Another motive, 
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which he carefully did not broadcast but which made the projected trip more 
enticing, was the realization that for a few weeks at least he could enjoy 
more independence and be less obliged to consult the Comte d'Vergennes and 
Doctor Franklin on his every move. 110 Consequently, already in March, 1780, 
he applied to Veri:';ennes for a traveller's permit to the Netherlands. Ver-
gennes, very concerned about Adams' declaration that he could reside any-
where and troubled by his own belief that the new minister favored separate 
negotiations with England, was loathe to see Adams leave Paris. Therefore, 
requesting that Adams remain nearby where he could be consulted on the mat-
ters of his mission, Vergennes offered the inducements of inviting him to 
attend court on the weekly ambassador's day and even to dine with the 
Comte.lll At intervals Adams repeated his request for a passport but Ver-
Gennes insisted that he wait at least until mid_summer.ll2 During the quiet 
period of early July, between the disagreement over the depreciation of paper 
money and that over the communication of his powers, Adams again proposed a 
few weeks in Amsterdam. This time he was advised to ~it because of poasible 
negotiations as a result of Cumberland's mission to Spain.113 When it became 
known that Cumberland was compelled to await further instructions from the 
Court of St. James, Vergennes decided that Adams could make the much-
postponed journey before negotiations would again be under way.l14 
(iuickly availing himself of the opportunity, Adams arranged his 
travel before Vergennes could retract the permission. ifuen Adams left Paris 
he was headed for a country perplexed by a precarious political situation 
and burdened with an unbelievably complicated governmental struoture. Within 
its confines there existed all degrees of partisanship from the strongly 
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pro-English followers of the Stadholder, William V, to the equally partisan 
pro-French liberals commonly referred to as the Patriots.l15 There was but 
one thing on which all could agree--the need for Dutch neutr'lity in the 
current war. As neutrals the Netherlanders could enjoy the rich carrier 
trade furnished by the belligerent powers and by other neutral countries. 
The moment they joined either side their ships would be fair game to the navy 
of their opponent. They would, thereby, forfeit the trade of one or the 
other belligerent, jeopardize the cargoes of neutrals, and endanger their 
own cargoes. 
Unfortunately for them, as soon as France entered the war in 1778, 
their strategic geographical position and the maritime requirements of the 
two neighboring belligerents, in union with their own inability to defend 
themselves either by land or by sea, made the maintenance of neutrality a 
problem of major proportions. France was in dire need of ship's timbers 
and other naval supplies, normally obtained from Scandinavia and the Baltic 
area, in order to build up her navy and decrease England's superiority on 
the high seas. The Netherlands was the obvious answer to the procurement 
problem and the French ministry determined to utilize to the full the Dutch 
nlerchant fleet.116 England, on the contrary, could ill afford to have the 
French navy increased. This would become especially true after Spain entered 
the conflict as the combined French and Spanish fleets slightly outnumbered 
her own. ll7 Neither could she afford to have the Dutch transporting muni-
tiona of war--which they were doing on a grand scale--to French ports or to 
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st. Eustatius for the use of the American army. English officers, 
therefore, often boarded Dutch vessels and not infrequently haled them into 
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Bnglish ports as prizes 'When cohtraband or naval supplies were found in the 
cargo. The British ministry, in spite of a special treaty of 1674 to the 
ll9 / 
contrary with the Netherlands, determined to confiscate all ship's timbers 
and naval stores carried by the Dutch if the latter could not in some way be 
brought to give up the trade in these. 
The couaencement of French hostilities in June, 1778, rendered Dutch 
neutrality, as England understood t~e word, extremely urgent to the British 
government. To encourage peaceful co-operation from the trade-oriented 
Dutch, in mid-summer of 1778, Sir Joseph Yorke, the English ambassador at 
The Hague, tried to strike a bargain with the merohants of Amsterdam. By an 
ancient treaty, signed in 1678 and never abrogated, a hostile act by any 
country against Great Britain was to be considered a casus foederis and 
entitled England to call upon the United Provinces for assistance. Yorke 
offered to barter England's rigbts to assistance by the treaty of alliance 
and even to discontinue interference with Dutch shipping to the French ~vest 
Indies if the Netherlands would add naval stores to the list of contraband. 
':'he offer came too late; the Dutch had already begun to enjoy the fruits of 
a rich trade and Sir Joseph was turned down. British cruisers then began 
detaining Dutch vessels in the English Channel and neighboring waters. B.y 
September, twenty-nine ships had been taken; in October, another forty-
t 120 woo Resenting this encroachment on their rights as guaranteed by the 
1674 treaty, the Dutch presented a protest to Parliament. Great Britain 
promised to grant the full immunities of the treaty to the Dutch if they 
would simply a.dd nava.l stores to the list of contraband. In addition, the 
English government offered to pay the appraised value of the timbers or 
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supplies taken as well as oompensation for the delay and damages to the 
oarriers oooasioned by their detent10n.121 Under the influence of Dutoh 
merchants, primarily those ot Amsterdam, the Dutch government rejected these 
English proposals.122 
In the meantime the French ministry through their ambassador took 
steps to prevent their supplies being diverted by England. The Duke de la 
vauguyon123 threatened that the French would board Dutoh vessels and treat 
them in the same manner as the English were treating them if the states 
124-General did not take adequate steps to maintain neutrality. This could 
only mean that they must furnish convoys for their trade to Franoe. In an 
effort to maintain their neutral status, the Dutch on November 19, 1778 
provided for convoying most goods including various naval provisions but ex-
cluding ship timbers. The compromise was satisfactory to neither belligerent. 
The British ordered the seizure ot all naval stores; the Duke de la Vaupyon 
warned that the French decree of July. 1778, establishing a six-month trial 
period on the prinoiple" of free ships make tree goods would be suspended 
immediately upon expiration if the States General did not grantunlim1ted 
convoy.125 As the January deadline approached. The Hague made vague provi-
sions for future unlimited convoys to become ettective when means permitted. 
On the strength ot this La Vauguyon granted a brief extension until March 1, 
1779. Since the Dutch continued to proorastinate, the new French decree 
proscribing enemy goods on neutral ships and levying a special tax on Dutoh 
ships entering Frenoh ports went into effect on March 1. However, the ships 
of two Dutch cities--Amsterdam and Baarlem--were permitted to enter French 
ports tax free in return for the eftorts of their citizens to procure 
unlimited convoy. This exemption not only assured France of continued im-
ports from the Netherlands. but served to pressure the merchants of other 
- . 126 Dutch cOllUllercial cities to take measures to secure the same advantage. 
As the year 1779 progressed, measures and counter-measures were taken 
at an ever accelerated pace by both England and France in an effort to con-
trol Dutch shipping policy. Opening French ports to Amsterdam and Saarlem 
while charging the customs tax to others secured for France a resolution 
from the province of Holland to provide unlimited convoy. Paper resolutions 
in Holland meant little to France. Providing for their implementation con-
sumed notoriously long perioda of time. Therefore a French decree of May 1. 
1779 declared an additional tariff of fifteen per cent on all gooda except 
naval supplies.127 The Dutch were caught in the dilemma. If they uaed un-
limited convoy. England was in a position to pounce upon their ships and 
destroy their trade as neutrals, to call for their active assistance under 
the treaty ot alliance of 1678. or to declare all out war upon them. Their 
rich commerce with France would be lost in the event of any one of these 
contingencies. If they refused unlimited convoy, France was in a position 
either to continue her discr1m1nator,y practices and force merchants of all 
but favored cities out of business or to extend her tariffs and taxes and 
decimate Dutch profits. The outlook was dismal and the country became even 
more divided between the Anglomane followers of William V and the Patriots 
who favored France. 
Spain's declaration of war on England in June, 1779 was accompanied 
128 by France's formal declaration of hostilities. England retorted with a 
memorial delivered by Sir Joseph Yorke on July 22 to the States General 
warning that the fulfillment of the alliance might be exacted as France was 
threatening to invade Great Britain.129 A cumbersome national government 
/ failed to make any response to Yorke's memorial even after he renewed his re-
quest on November 26, 1779. This disregard--as it was interpreted--alienated 
Great Britain still fUrther. l3Q The arrival of John Paul Jones on October 4, 
1779, at the Texel (a large harbor some twenty-five leagues from Amsterdam) 
flying the American flag, and with the Serapis and Countess of Scarborough as 
prizes, occasioned still further animosity.131 
Fair trade winds in Christmas week, 1779. permitted not only Jones but 
a large merchant fleet destined for French and Spanish ports to sail. The 
Dutch fleet, under Admiral Bylandt, was forcibly overpowered in the Channel 
by the English Admiral Fielding.132 The people of the Netherlands were 
highly incensed at Fielding's conduct. They were still further aggravated 
when, in early March, 1780, the English Admiralty Court confiscated the con-
voyed ships carrying timbers after that cargo had been purchased.133 
Hardly bad this unwelcome news been received when Sir Joseph Yorke 
presented a third memorial (March 21, 1780) demanding a response to his 
memorials of the previous July 22 and November 26 respecting Dutch obliga-
tions under the alliance of 1678. Weary of Dutch tardiness, he allowed the 
states General only three weeks in which to prepare their answer under 
penalty of being declared neutrals and no longer protected by the Anglo-
Dutch treaty of 1674.134 A request for more time to enable The Hague to 
ascertain the position of the various provinces on the question was re-
jected.135 Through the spring and summer of 1780 the Dutch were becoming 
more antagonistic to England and the majority of the provinoes voted against 
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assisting her. Consequently on April 17, 1789 England declared all:.a.lliances 
and treaties between herself and the United frovinces severed. l36 The com-
manders of English vessels were directed to seize Dutch shipihaving aboard 
aD1 goods belonging to the enemies of England or any goods considered con-
traband by the general law of nations. l37 The results were quickly apparent. 
The States General, no longer having much to gain by concessions to England 
and still rankling from the Fielding-Bylandt episode, resolved almost unani-
mously to grant unlimited convoys. This resolution was followed a few days 
later by another to outfit fifty-two frigates and ships of the line to re-
138 inforce Dutch convoys. 
Franc., never loathe to improve upon a favorable situation. immediately 
removed all the taxes and tariffs imposed on Dutch shipping the previous 
spring. Indeed, the king restored to the Dutch all sums collected during the 
intervening year in virtue of those assessments.139 The promise of convoy 
was exactly what France desired. She did not want to lead the Netherlands 
to join directly in the war effort as this would complicate rather than 
140 facilitate the accomplishment of French objectives. 
Thus, by the time Adams was permitted to undertake his mission to 
discover whether some assistance could not be secured in the Netherlands, 
that country was rapidly drawing away from its ties with England and 
strengthening its trade relations with France. It had largely been brought 
to this position by the peculiarities of its governmental structure. For 
one thing, the processes of deliberation and of enactment of law were cumber-
some and unable to handle situations within a reasonable time limit. This 
had been a major factor in the imposition of the French tariffs on Dutch 
shipping in 1779. It hsd also been a factor in the failure to answer 
Yorke's memorials of June and November, 1779, and of March, 1780, thereby 
losing for the Dutch their privileged status with England. / 
During his two years in the Nethe~lands, Adams similarly discovered 
141 it to be an important factor and a constant problem. The nation was a 
republic composed of seven provinces held together in a confederation in some 
respects analogous to the Confederation established in America in 1781. The 
seven provinces of Holland and West Friesland, Zealand, Utrecht, Guelderland, 
Overyssel, Groningen, and Friesland differed in size, wealth, occupations, 
and sentiment. Holland was the most populous and by far the wealthiest, 
comprising within its boundaries most of the great cities, including Am-
sterdam. This province was literally in a position to control the legisla-
tion of the country as she contributed a large portion of the yearly budget. 
She in turn was controlled by her own main source of supply, Amsterdam. 
At the head of the state was the Stadholder or hereditary Prince of 
Orange. William V enjoyed the disposal of nearly all offices and was captain-
general and admiral-general of the army and navy. By his position he was 
privileged to participate in the sessions of the States General and to ini-
tiate legislation. In most of the provinces he served as president of the 
body of nobles. As he was governor-general of both East and West Indies 
Companies and appointed their directors, and also admiral-general of the Davy 
which operated the customs house, he enjoyed considerable influence. Al-
though personally inclined to be weak and vacillating, he remained quite 
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steadfast in his support of England. In this he was strongly seconded by 
Duke Louis of Brunswick, his former tutor, official counselor, and a strong 
Anglophile. 
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The final sovereignty of the ~~tion was vested in the states General, 
a senate of the several sovereign states in which each state, irrespective of 
size, commanded one vote. All foreign affairs were ultimaterY directed by 
the states General, usually through their secretary of griffier--at this 
period, M. Fagel, a strong Anglophile. Their powers were curtailed considera-
bly as no subject could be voted upon in the states General until it had been 
submitted to the provincial assemblies or states for their decision. This 
process was known as taking the matter ad referendum and was an admirable 
device for indeterminately prolonging the ultimate decision on a piece of 
business. On the other hand, it was almost impossible not to consume con-
siderable time in the disposition of any business. No precise rule apparently 
designated which matters required the unanimous approval of the states and 
which required only a majority in order to be brought again before the states 
General for final decision. 
The provincial assemblies, wherein a more real sovereignty lay, were 
composed of the nobles of the province and deputies of the cities within the 
province. They generally could not act without the majority consent of the 
body of nobles and of the city regencies. Consequently, further delays were 
inevitable while these local groups took the problem ad referendum. 
The cities formed almost independent republics within the nation. 
Burgomasters served as their executives and also as members of their councils. 
In desoribing the position of the burgomaster to Congress, Adams compared 
them to "little kings." The city oouncils or regencies were composed of 
lative authority. The regencies appointed the deputies 
1 , po.,. _ & ~" 
states. In larger cities the deputation consisted of two burgomaster, two 
schepins or councilmen, and a pensionary. The pensionary was the secretary or 
minister of the city and generally the official speaker for the city, even in 
143 the provincial assembly. The secretary or first pensionary of Holland, 
officially known as the Grand Pensionary--Van Bleiswick during the American 
Revolution--was the most powerful figure in the nation, since he served for 
practical purposes as the foreign minister of the nation and as spokesman 
for the province of Holland which comprised half of the population and over 
half of the wealth of the country. 
Because of the unusual dispersal of sovereignty and because of the 
need for unanimous consent on so many levels for any measure of major im-
portance, it was very difficult for the Netherlands to take positive action. 
Needless to say, this very complexity was often used as an excuse for inac-
tion. ;fuenever a matter arose upon which the Dutch preferred not to put 
themselves upon the record, their constitution was admirably adapted. But 
no country can long endure on negatives and events were gradually and inex-
orably becoming such that the United Provinces would eventually need to take 
their stand on one side or the other. Adams, whose militia activities in 
Franklin's bailiwick necessitated a journey elsewhere, was in an excellent 
position to understand the situation and profit by it. Consequently he bade 
;'aris farewell on July 27, 1780, and with his two sons, John Quincy and 
Charles, started for Brussels, the first major stop-over on his way to 
144 Amsterdam. 
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lAdams to Dana~ sept. 17, 1782, Francis Wharton (ed.), The Revolution-
ar Di lomatic Corres ondence of the United states (Washington: Government 
Frinting Office, 1) 9 , v. 732. 
2 ~., It 511. The word "traditional" in reference ¥> diplomacy is 
used in this paper to signify the form of diplomatic exchange prevalent in 
the eighteenth century between countries. From the time of the renaissance, 
international relations gradually assumed a certain methodology which re-
mained operative into' the twentieth century. In referring to this standard 
mode of diplomatic relationship, the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 
(C. Delisle Burns, "Diplomacy," Ene clo aedia of the Social Sciences, ed. 
Edwin R. A. Seligman, (1935), V. 1 7-151 frequently applied the term "tradi-
tional. n In his recent work, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method 
(London: Constable and Co., 1954), Harold Nicolson recognized the dominance 
of certain norms of diplomacy, but he preferred labelling them tlFrencht! 
(Nicolson, p. 53 and passim). 
Early diplo~~tic practice laid stress on the observance of protocol 
and ceremonial. More importantly, there had developed the custom of pre-
serving in state archives the frequent correspondence, reports, and news-
letters exchanged between a representative and his home government (ibid., 
pp. 25-26). French diplomacy retained the devotion to protocol and c;r;-
monial, and attached great importance to style. The Frenc~ also built on the 
system of correspondence and made an art of forwording, with the intention 
that they be carefully implemented, preCise instructions to their ministers. 
Richelieu inaugurated, early in the seventeenth century, a centralized au-
thority for the formation of foreign policy and established a "professional 
service of experts through which that policy could be carried out" (ibid., 
p. 92). A century later, the foremost French writer on diplomacy, Franqois , 
de Callieres, described the diplomatic service of his day. Amateur diplomats 
he considered dangerous. A distinctive professional training for men of the 
highest qualities, a mastery of European history and polity, and a fluency 
in the major European languages were necessary prerequisites for any diplomat 
(De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains, (1716). cited by Lennox A. 
Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin, World Politics in Transition, New York: 
Henry Hol t, 1956, pp. 197-198). France served as the model for all European 
countries through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries 
(Nicolson, pp. 53. 62, 72). 
Militia diplomats, as envisioned by Adams, could not qualify under the 
specifications for diplomatic service sO fenerally accepted in Europe. They 
were to deal with foreign courts in an "entirely unceremonious and unsophis-
ticated mode" (Wharton, I, 513). Furthermore, militia diplomats were chosen, 
not because of training, knowledge of the country to which they were mis-
sioned, or experience, but on the basis of patriotism and a ~jority vote in 
the Continental Congress. They were lacking in another aspect. Wharton 
listed among "the settled rules of diplomacy" the rule that an envoy should 
not be "pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood he will not be 
received" (ibid., pp. 289, 291). Nicolson, in agreement, quoted Calli~res, 
to the effecr-that a minister must be well received in the country in which 
he resides (Nicolson, p. 67). Contrary to these traditionally accepted 
standards, the "militia" diplomats normally set said for countries in which 
they were not wanted. 
'Adams to Robert Livingston, Feb. 11, 1782, ~., V, 196. 
4Franklin to Arthur Lee, Mar. 21, 1777, ibid., II, 298. 
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5Adams to Jenings, Sept. 25, 1782, ,\dams Family Paper(, MSS. (Nassa-
chusetts Historical Society), henceforth cited: Adams Papers. 
dherever direct quotes have been used, spelling and punctuation have 
been modernized in order to facilitate reading. 
6 A good account of Vergennes' European diplomacy, especially his 
sponsorship of a neutral league in the early years of the war, may be found 
in John J. Meng, "The Comte de Ver ennes: Euro ean Phases of his American 
DiJ2lomaclt 1774-1800 ;vashington: Ca.tholic University of Amerioa, 1932). In 
The Peacemakers, Morris has examined Vergennes' diplomaoy through the revo-
lutionary years and the formation of the paace. 
7Immediately after the signing of the Declaration of Independence, 
Congress appointed a committee, of which John Adams and Benjamin Franklin 
were both members, to draw up a model treaty of amity and of commerce to be 
negotiated with European countries. Franklin, Silas Deane and Arthur Lee 
were chosen as the first American cOlU!!lissioners in the fall of 1776 to obtain 
recognition and to secure loans from foreign governments. After the alliance 
with France, they remained in raris as joint ministers. Deane was replaced 
in 1778 by John Adams who attempted to bring a little order to the commis-
sion's affairs. J~t his suggestion the additional commissioners were later 
recalled and Franklin was left as sole minister to France. Adams returned 
home in the summer of 1779 and Lee was commissioned to Spain as envoy. In 
the meantime, William Lee was appointed commercial agent and commissioner 
to Berlin and Vienna. Ralph Izard acted as unacknowledged envoy to the 
court of TUscany. They all, as well as several agents seeking to borrow 
money in the names of the various stutes, spent a good portion of their time 
in Paris and environs. All except Franklin were in varying degrees militia 
diplomats. 
8Vergennes to Gerard, Dec. 25, 1778, Institut Frangais de \~ashington, 
Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gerard, 1778-1800: Co~re-
S ondence of the First French Hinister to the United ;States with the Comte de 
Vergennes, historical introduction and notes J. J. Meng Baltimore: John 
Hopkins Press, 1939) t p. 451. Henceforth cited: Gerard DesJ2a.tches. 
9Gerard to President of Congress (John Jay), Har. 17, 1779, III/barton, 
III, 85. Conrad Alexandre Gerard, the oldest son of a minor French official, 
early entered diplomatic service. He held various offices beginning with 
Secretary of the French legation at Mannheim and advanced to first commis-
sioner of the Foreign Office and secretary to the Council of state in 1776. 
He remained at this post until named minister plenipotentiary to the United 
i~ta tes in Barch t 1778. He lias succeeded in his position at the Foreign 
Office by his younger brother, Joseph Matthias Gerard de Rayneval, commonly 
referred to as Rayneval to distinguish him from Gerard (Gerard Despatches, 
pp. 35-47). 
10 Gerard to President of Congress, Mary 3, 1779, Wharton, III, 159. 
At this time Congress was split into two parties which John Durand (ed. and 
trans.), New Material for the Histor of the American Revolution (New York: 
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Henry Holt, 1 9, pp. 19 , 205, referred to as the National ?arty and the 
states' Rights Party. The former included Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, 
Hamilton, Robert Morris, Madison, and the two Livingstone. They were more 
inclined to see national interests, more centralized control and a closer 
affiliation with France. The States' Rights Party were led by John and Samuel 
Adams, Richard and Henry Lee, and included men like James Lovell and Henry 
Laurens. They were strongly anti-French in the sense of not becoming polit-
ically dependent on France. They thought in terms of state interests rather 
than of national interests. Gerard distrusted them as he believed, completely 
incorrectly, that they desired to treat with England separately. 
By March 10, 1778 there was open confiict in Congress over the manage-
ment of foreign affairs. A committee of thirteen was appointed to investi-
gate the conduct of foreign affairs in general and of the commissioners in 
France in particular. From then until 1781 and Robert Livingston's appoint-
ment as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, practically nothing was heard of the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs. George C. Wood, Congressional Control of 
Forei Relations durin the American Revolution 17 4-1789 (Allentown, 
Penn.: H. R. Hass and Co~, 1919 ,p. .3, has found "evidence that the 
American foreign relations were largely carried on by the French minister 
working through friends and committees in Congress." 
11 Gerard to President of Congress, May 22, 1779, Wharton, III, 175-78. 
12Gerard to President of Congress, May 27, 1779, ibid., pp. 194-95. 
-
l.3Gerard to Vergennes, May 14, 1779, Gerard Despatches, p. 64.3. 
l4Gerard to a Committee of Congress, July 14, 1779, U. S. Continental 
Congress, Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceed s of the United States, 
Vols. II-IV: Foreign Affairs Boston: Thomas B. Wait, 1 20-21 , II, 195. 
Henceforth cited: U. s. Continental Congress, Secret Journals. 
l5Gerard to Vergennes, July 18, 1779, Gerard Despatches, p. 794. 
16 U. S. Continental Congress, Secret Journals, II, 218 (Aug • .3, 1779). 
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l~. S. Continental Congress, Secret Journals, II, 225-28, 230-2.32. 
19Gerard DeSpatches, p. 848. These were marked "received Nov. 6, 
1779" by Rayneval, a full three months before Adams' arrival in Paris. 
20 Gerard to Vergennes, sept. 25, 1779, ibid., p. 895. The letter in 
question (Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 21, 1779, wharton, III, 55) praised Adams 
for his "wise conduct • • • as well as zeal • • • for the cause of your 
country and the support of the alliance. rt 
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Lovell to Adams, sept. 27, 1779; Wharton, III, 340; U. S. Continen-
tal Congress, Secret Journals, lIt 257. 
22~ . 
-President of Congress to Adams, October 20, 1779, Wha(rton. III, 387; 
Adams to President of Congress, Nov. 4, 1779, pp. 399-400; Adams to Franklin, 
DeC. 9, 1779, p. 417. 
Thomas Huntington was the President of Congress from Sept. 28, 1779 
until July 10, 1781. cRe was succeeded by Thomas McKean but Livingston's ap-
pointment to the Foreign Office about the same time caused Adams to address 
his official correspondence to Livingston rather than to the President of 
congress once he learned of the appointment. 
23Arthur Lee quarrelled with his co-commissioners as to whether the 
goods being procured for America were gifts ot purchases. He found some su-
port in Adams when that gentleman replaced Deane in the commission. 
24 Adams thereby became the subject of some unfriendly compositions. 
A copy of one of these, filed in the French archives, in all probability 
came to Vergennes' attention. '!'his document, Renenons politique d'un 
ci toyen. stated that Arthur Le. was English at heart and undoubtedly recei Ying 
pay from England. The au thor continued, "God forbid that I should think Mr. 
Adams like him, but I venture to stat. that Mr. Adams is a very cunning man 
and no friend of Dr. Franklin. so that it may be presumed the te.s and the 
Adams are all so many heads WIder one bonnet." (Durand, p. 28). 
25Durand • pp. 207-208. The complete correspond.nc. betwe.n Vergennes 
and Gerard is printed in Gerard DeSpatch... Selections from this IIIay be 
found in Durand, pp. 198-211. Paul Chrisler Phillips, The West in the Diplo-
macy of the Am.rican Revolution ("University of Illinois Studi.s in the 
Social Scienc.s," Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 3; Urb8.llaJ University of Illinois. 
1913), p. 130. attributed "to the conduct of Gerard is due in large measure 
the irritation which broke out between the French minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the envoys of the United States." He based this on G.rard's champiolliD.$ 
of Spain's claims on boundaries. 
26Vergennes to Luz.rne. July 18, 1779. Durand. p. 215. 
27John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, Seri.s I of Th. Adams Papers, 
edited by Lyman H. Butterfield and others (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 
1961). IV, 242-43. The .ditors of this work have e.tablished that this sec-
tion of the autobiography was written nearly thirty year. after the events 
record.d (note, p. 173). 
28Adams to V.rgenn ••• Feb. 12, 1780, Wharton, III, 492-93. 
29Th• agent Hussey was in Spain trying to arrange an accommodation be-
twe.n that power and England. Th. Fr.nch ministry knew .nough of it to be 
d •• ply concerned. For d.taUa, refer to Morris. pp. 51-56. 
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3OAdaD18 to Vergennes, Feb. 12. 1780, Wharton, III, 492-93. Vergennes 
interpreted Adams' desire to make his mission known to the English as proof 
of his desire to settle American independence directly with England and with-
out consulting France. If further proof were needed, Vergennes felt that 
Adams supplied it by his claim that his powers authorized him/as fully to go 
to London as to go to Paris. Vergennes expressed his irritation over this to 
Luzerne, June .30, 1780 (Henri Doniol Ley, Histoire de la pa,rticipa tion de la 
France a l'etablissement des ~tats-Unis dtAm~ri ue corre ondance 
diplomatique, docllMnts Paris: Imprillerie Nationale, 1 -1 9 ,IV, 414). 
31Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 15, 1780, Wharton, III, 496. Vergennes had 
already received the instructions forwarded in August but possibly thought 
that subsequent additions or alterations may have been made. Gerard's report, 
false though it was, that Adams would communicate his instructions to Ver-
gennes (Gerard DeSpatches, p. 848) perhaps influenced Vergennes' bold state-
ment. Vergennes also concluded after his meeting with Adams that the Ameri-
can had not made known the entire nature and object of his commission (Ver-
gennes to Luzerne, Feb., 1780, Doniol, IV, 441). Adams, on the other hand, 
judged Vergennes so accustomed to obtaining by payment or intrigue the in-
structions of foreign ambassadors that he had become unmindful of its tile-
gality (John Adams, Dian- and Autobiography, IV, 246). 
~ancis Dana. (1743-1811), a native of Charlestown, Massachusetts, 
graduated from Harvard and studied law under his uncle. It was in his legal 
practice that he was first associated with John Adams. When Adams was ap-
pointed commissioner to negotiate for peace in 1779, Dana, who was then a 
member of the Continental Congress, was sent with him as secretary to the 
American legation. When Adams moved to the Netherlands, Dana remained in 
Paris to care for affairs there and await Adams' return. In December, 1780, 
he was commissioned to Russia to offer American accession to the Armed 
Neutrality. While there he was to propose a treaty of amity and commerce with 
Russia. His mission was unsuccessful and he returned to the United States in 
1783 (DAB). 
-
33Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 19, 1780, Wharton, III, 503. 
34John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, IV, 247. Adams was unaware 
that Vergennes had a copy of the instructions and he even doubted that Gerard 
had secured a copy to bring home although ready to concede that it was a pos-
sibility since Vergennes had money and there were fifty members in Congress, 
one of whom might be interested (ibid.). 
-
35Adams to Vergennes, Feb. 19, 1780, Wharton, III, 504. 
36Vergennes to Adams, Feb. 24, 1780, ibid., p. 518. 
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40vergennes to Adams, Mar. 30, 1780. Charles Francis Adams (ed.) 
works of John Adams. Second president of the United states (Bqstoni Little, 
Brown and Co., 1850-56), VII, 139. Henceforth cited: C. F. Adams, Works. 
41 Adams to President of Congress, ¥ar. 30. 1780, ~., p. 138. 
42Adams to Jenings, April 2, 1780 and June 7, 1780, Adams Papers. 
Edmund Jenings (1731-1819) was born in Maryland but eduoated in England. He 
probably never returned to the United states. He lived in London until 1778 
when he removed to the continent, ohiefly Brussels, for the duration of the 
war. Jenings corresponded regularly with the Lees to whom he was related. 
It was probably through Arthur Lee that he met John Adams in 1780 (~). 
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43James Lovell (1737-1814), a Bostonian, was elected to the Continental 
Congress in 1777 and very shortly became a member of the Committee for Foreign 
Affairs. Often he aoted as sole member of this committee due to Congressional 
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ment of Robert Livingston as Seoretary of Foreign Affairs in 1781. Lovell was 
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to strong French influence (~). 
44Adams to Lovell, Mar. 16, 1780, Wharton, III, 551. 
45Franklin to Carmichael. Mar. 31, 1780. Albert Henry Smyth (ed.), 
The writings of Beniamin Franklin (New York: Macmillan Co., 19(6), VIII, 53; 
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welcome in that country, he returned to Paris. Under the impression that as 
a dip10matio representative of the United states he had a right to take part 
in the consultations between France and the United states he aroused a bitter 
antagonism between himself and Franklin. Arthur Lee and, to an extent, John 
Adams supported him against Franklin. Izard was recalled in 1779 (~). 
47John Adams to Sam Adams. March 4, 1780, Wharton, III, 531. His major 
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posed "the style of menace" although advocating both "frankness" and "candor." 
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49Adams to La. Fayette, reb. 18, 1780, \marton, III, 501. 
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51 Adams to Edml Genet, Feb. 18, 1780, ibid., p. 500. ~natt the father 
of the future French ambassador to America, was-tirst secretary for the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs as well as editor of the Mercure and so would have 
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Interpretation and passed on to VerSennes intelligence from England and 
America (Morris, p. 111). 
52Gen8t to Adams, Feb. 20, 1780, ~.Jharton, III, 504. 
53Char1es William Frederick Dumas was a native of Switzerland but spent 
the greater portion of his life in the Netherlands as a man of letters. He 
was learned, spoke several modern languages, was a staunch supporter of liberty 
and an early defender of the American cause. In 1775 the committee ot secret 
correspondence, chaired by Franklin, appointed Dumas special agent in the 
United Provinces. He continued in that office until Adams' arrival after 
which he served as secretary and translator as well as liaison between Adams 
and the Patriots at The Hague. After Adams' return to Paris, Dumas acting 
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as charge d'affairs exchanged ratifications on the treaties of amity and com-
merce between the United Frovinces and the United States (Wharton, I, 603). 
54Adams to J enings, February 25, 178o, Adams Papers. Adams had com-
plete confidence in his loyalty although that loyalty was suspected by Frank-
lin, Jay and Laurens (hbarton, IV, 285 note; John Adams, Diary and Autobiog-
raphy, II, 355-56 note). 
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he used others, e.g. Alex Brett. When he thought it best, he addressed Adams 
as rtF.R.S." for "Fernando Raymon San," a name chosen because it was the name 
of Adams' guide on his trip through Spain. Adams seldom used other than the 
correct name for Digges (C. F. Adams, Works, 167-68 note). 
57Adams to Jenings, July 18, 1780, Adams Papers. Jenings was always 
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Tbis would lead all Europe to question the good faith of America toward her 
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(Horris, pp. 88-111). He was probably also aware that on June 27 a bill for 
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CHAPTER II 
/ 
LIFE AMONG THE MYNHEERS, AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1780 
Arriving in Brussels early in the evening of Saturday, July 29, Adams 
/ deposited Charles and John Quincy at their lodgings, the Hotel de L'Impera-
trice, and immediately set out to find Edmund Jenings, with whom he had fre-
quently discussed America and her proper stance vis~-vis France, England, 
and the Northern Powers. He failed to find Jenings at home but met another 
itinerant American, Ralph liard, on the street and exchanged bits of informa-
tion with him. Later in the evening Jenings came to their hotel and the two 
men spent some hours in discussion. The next four days Jenings devoted al-
most entirely to the entertainment of Adams, while his nephew, Mr. Bordley, 
took more particular charge of showing the Adams boys the sights of Brussels. 
William Lee often attended the Jenings-Adams briefing sessions and by Adams' 
departure time Thursday morning, the three men were convinced that they were 
kindred spirits in the cause of independence. 
The travellers spent a night in Anvers and on Friday, August 4, the 
1 , 
Adams group entered ,the Netherlands and rented rooms at the Hotel du Marecha! 
de Turenne at Rotterdam for the weekend. While on a quick foray about the 
city, Adams became acquainted with Mr. Dubbeldemuts, a Dutch financier. He 
dined with his new acquaintance and several English gentlemen. Later in the 
day the Dubbeldemuts coach picked up the minister and his two sons to take 
them to the financier's country estate for the evening. Sunday they toured 
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the city more extensively. John Quincy Adams noted the great number of 
English churches in Rotterdam and comaented that he had heard that nearly 
half of the inhabitants were Englishmen but that very few Fre~h resided 
there.2 In a note to Jenings, Adams corroborated his sonts findings. He 
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wrote that he had been to hear a "sensible" English sermon and ua very good 
prayer excepting a very unnecessary petition for a certain king that he 
might have health and long life and that his enemies might not prevail against 
him." Adams could have no part in this prayer, so he substituted "an enjacula-
tion which was very sincere that he might be brought to consideration and 
repentance and to do justice to his enemies and to all the world_,,3 This 
preponderance of English in one of the major cities of the Netherlands per-
haps was both a cause and a result of the long friendship existing between 
the Low Countries and England. It also foreshadowed a difficult time for 
anyone who wished to turn Dutch affection in another direction. 
A brief boat trip on Monday morning brought the group first to Delft 
and from there to The Hague, which they reached about one in the afternoon. 
In this city, Dumas showed them the sights, and introduced Adams to various 
persons friendly to America. Tuesday afternoon, they returned to Delft, 
some five miles from The Hague, where Dumas desired to introduce a leading 
gazetteer to Adams. The next morning Dumas and Adams called on the Duc de la 
Vauguyon, the French ambassador at The Hague. The afternoon was devoted to 
a trip to Leyden and contacting friends of Dumas there. Although neither 
John Quincy nor his father made diary mention of meeting Jean Luzac, the 
editor of the Leyden Gazette, they very probably did meet him. At least 
Adams began sending a steady stream of articles almost immediately to Luzac 
for publication and within a few weeks, was writing to his friends that 
4 LUzac's paper was "my vehicle for conveying the news." 
Early Thursday morning the Adamses boarded a boat for the last stage 
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of their trip to Amsterdam. Within the hour they reached Haarlem, where they 
spent the greater rArt of the day, and then around four in the afternoon be-
san the two hour boat trip to Amsterdam. The location of the Amsterdam wharf. 
nearly two miles from their hotel. necessitated a walk which Adams used to 
good advantage in meeting several American gentlemen. Among them was a Mr. 
Bradford who had travelled to America with Adams in 1779 and was then residing 
a t The First Bible Inn with other Americans. The next morning, August 11, 
the restless minister set himself about the business of contacting any and 
all who might be friendly to or innuential in the cause of America. While 
he was gone to visit the various Americans residing at The First Bible, a 
Frenchman named Duneville brought Commodore Gillon to visit. That evening 
Gillon sent word that he and the burgomaster Hooft had combined efforts to 
find more suitable lodgings for the minister and the next day Adams and his 
party moved to Madame Schorn's, a private dwelling near Gillon. This move, 
Adams later wrote. was made because he wished to be "more removed from the 
observation of spies," the Hotel de Ville where he first took rooms being 
the resort of a variety of groups including many Englishmen.5 De Neufville. 
a Patriot banker with whom Adams was to have frequent dealings in the months 
to come, invited the family to his country seat at Haarlem for Sunday. On 
Monday Adams dined with another renowned banker, Staphorst. who eventually 
was one of the partners in a successful loan negotiated by Adams. 
During the succeeding weeks Adams put in very busy days. When he was 
not out visiting other Americans or Dutch merchants, bankers, and publicists, 
he was entertaining them in his own apartments. John '~incy' s diary for the 
remainder of August, until his father put the two boys in a Dutoh boarding 
school, is filled with his father's comings and goings and the names of 
Gillon, Neufv1lle, Staphorst, Hooft the burgomaster, Vischer and Van Berckel 
(p'enaionaries or councilmen), Guild and LeRoy (Americans living in Amster-
dam)--all important connections for a diplomat to cultivate. Gillon accom-
panied Adams on many of his visits as this young man spoke the Dutch language 
6 I 
and could act as interpreter and had special entres because of his Dutch 
relationship. Since Gillon was oonveniently a next-door neighbor, communica-
tion between the two men was not easily supervised by the "spies" of the 
Hotel de Ville. 
While Adams was warily being watched even by his confederates--partial-
ly in hopes that he might be doing good but with trepidation that he might 
"inadvertently do evil as a stranger,f17--the roving minister was taking his 
own measure of the situation. In order to be prepared for whatever oppor-
tunities might arrive, Adams visited the booksellers, bought a grammar, 
dictionary, and history in Dutch and proceeded to learn something of the 
8 language and country. He expressed amusement at the political speculations 
within the country. "Everyone has his prophecy, and every prophecy is a 
paradox." It seemed "as if they had studied for every impossibility and 
agreed to foretell it as a probable future event.n9 After a few weeks in 
Amsterdam he wrote home to assure Abigail that he was spending his time 
agreeably and was very pleased with Holland, a "singular country • • • like 
no other." He admired and wished his countrymen would emulate the frugality, 
industry, and cleanliness he had observed as he believed that these were a 
source of the immense wealth and great prosperity there. 
10 
"very sociable t however, in their peculiar fashion." 
He found them 
/ 
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The "peculiar" way of thinking portrayed by the Dutch never failed to 
attract his attention--sometimes to intrigue him; at other times, to exas-
perate. "The country where I am is the greatest curiosity in the world. 
This nation is not known anywhere, not even by its neighbors. The Dutch 
language is spoken by none but themselves. Therefora they converse with 
nobody, and nobody converses with them.'f He admired them nevertheless. "I 
doubt much whether there is any nation in Europe more estimable than th~ 
Dutch in proportion. Their industry and economy ought to be examples to the 
world. They have less ambition, I mean that of conquest and military glory, 
than their neighbors. but I don't perceive that they have more avarice. And 
they carry learning and arts I think to greater extent. The collection of 
curiosities, public and private, are innumerable."ll Less than three months 
later, when all his efforts to borrow money seemed in vain, a very different 
analysis nowed from the Adams quill: "Such a nation ot idolaters at the 
shrine of Hammon never existed I believe before.,,12 He returned to his orig-
inal kindly regard for the Dutch when his work began bearing fruit. 
Adams arrived in the Low Countries at a time of political indecision. 
The government was divided between those who favored a return to the old 
friendship with England and the comparative safety of the treaty of 1674 and 
those who tavored the growing rapport with France and the lucrative trade 
awaiting them there. The English partisans were busily trying "to perplex. 
delay, and cross everyting." They .were accused--and probably were guilty-
of efforts to "intrigue more here than in all Europe besides."l, By August, 
14 1?80, when Adams arrived on the scene, the Armed Neutrality --approved by 
France, hated by England--was serving to orystallize opinion !n the various 
groups. }~y, but by no means a majority as yet, viewed adhesion to the 
Neutral League as a possible means of retaining both neutrality and trade. 
others, reoognizing their proximity to Great Britain and the vulnerability 
of their far-nung oolonies, feared retaliation and hesitated to join the 
Armed Neutrality without a special guaranty of their colonial pOBsessions.15 
still others were completely averse to any measure known to displease the 
English and thereby risk war.16 Thulemeyer, the Prussian ambassador, probably 
oversimplified the dividing lines but he had the general idea when he informed 
Frederick II that Amsterdamers wanted to accede to the Neutral League without 
the guarantees if necessary; the Anglomanes were for temporizing with Eng-
land, and the Patriots acknowledged the advantages of acoeding but desired 
the guaranty and a treaty of alliance as their conditions for adherence. l ? 
Regardless of what view each individual group or regency entertained toward 
the Armed Neutrality, all had but one ambition, the development of their 
commerce and their own consequent enrichment.18 Their interest centered on 
European affairs, not on the struggle for independence in a republic across 
the ocean. The pro-American journalistic endeavors of the few, !.!S.., Jean 
Luzac and Baron Van der Capellen, round the Dutch populace unresponsive.19 
Even among the most republican, including those who had reted John Paul Jones, 
there were rew who saw a risk at war with England as corollary to sympathy 
with the United Statea.20 
Nor was there any very exciting news from America with which the newly-
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arrived John Adams could hope to break through the national fixation. Eng-
lish victories by Clinton, Cornwallis, and Tarleton in the southern states 
21 
were being "trumpeted throughout Europe." The news of Charleston particu-
larly cast a pall upon the Patriots and animated the Anglophiles to talk of 
demanding unconditional surrender.22 The London journals had a heyday re-
porting the American loss, consequent discouragement, and growing intent to 
return to England.23 ~~at these reports went beyond the truth made little 
difference in their effect, and all of the Adams inganuity was required to 
contradict the impressions fostered by the British press. A complete knowl-
edge or recital of the facts would hardly have been of much assi$tance. 
Actually the loss of Charleston discouraged many stalwart patriots in America 
itself of ever winning the South. If Adams had only known it, more bad news 
was then in the making. General Horatio Gates, appointed by Congress without 
Washington's approval, led a weary, sick, and bedraggled army against Corn-
wallis near Camden, South Carolina,on August 16, 1780. The ensuing battle 
was a rout. C3ltes' mad rush for safety provided poor propaganda material for 
Adams. For the next two months, Cornwallis harried the South Carolina 
countryside until the British defeat at King's Hountain forced him to retire 
for a time. Hopes arose briefly when Rochambeau with six thousand men safely 
disembarked at Newport, Rhode Island, on July 10, 1780, but shortly fell 
when it became all too apparent that Admiral de Ternay with his ten Frenoh 
war vessels was bottlea up in Narragansett Bay and that Rochambeau would not 
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move out from the protection of the fleet. 
Congress was as usual beset with internal problems. The bickering be-
tween the pro- and anti-Gallican forces continued.25 Maryland had not yet 
acceded to the Artioles of Confederation; many states, inoluding the home 
state of delegate Sam Adams, were not complying with the Continental Congress' 
rule of no more than three consecutive terms for any delegate;/foreign affairs 
were conducted by oommittee and frequently controlled by the French ambassador, 
and the sessions of Congress were filled with cabals and schemes to discredit 
both Franklin and washington. 26 One member of Congress rather succinctly 
described Congressional muddling. "I once read of a people who were at times 
led by a cloud; and I have known a people whose Grand Hultiform'd Sanfledrin 
were often times in the midst of a J'Og.,,27 There was little in all this with 
which to enlist a vibrant Dutch interest in America's behalf. Nevertheless, 
that was the motive behind the Adams visit. 
The minister had forewarned Franklin that he planned to see what pos-
sibilities could be discovered in the Low countries28 and he was not the man 
to postpone any objective once he had judged it as good. Consequently he 
surveyed the entire situation with a practiced eye and began a three-pronged 
assault on Congress, the Dutch bankers, and the Dutch people almost immediate-
lYe His minimum objective was a loan for the United 3tates. Dutch reoogni-
tion of Amerioan independence would be a most acoeptable bonus. His political 
intuition plus the information garnered from dozens of interviews with leading 
figures during the early weeks of his sojourn in the Netherlands convinced 
him that if America desired ohanged United ;3ta tea-Netherlands relations, she 
would have to assume the initiative. His oorresp~ndence consequently re-
fleeted his eagerness for the arrival of Henry Laurens, commissioned minister 
plentipotentiary to the Netherlands.29 One of his first letters from sunster-
dam was to Samuel Huntington, the Fresident of Congress, stressing the 
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disappointment Laurena' delay caused and the great need for "80me prudent 
person authorized by Congres8." He candidly admitted tbat the "prudent per-
son" selected for The lfague probably would not be received for some time, but 
he believed the attempt would be amply compensated by the fine position af-
forded for collecting intelligence and dispersing information.30 He was in 
full accord with William Lee who complained that Congress had not paid the 
Dutch the attention that they merited or that American interests required. 
He recounted Lee's complaint almost verbatim to Congress, adding that a min-
ister in Holland would influence public opinion in several nations. Failure 
to have a minister there, according to Lee, was a regretable error since a 
recognition of independence could prcbably be obtained from the Dutch if they 
were properly managed.31 Since Laurens obviously had not arrived, who would 
be more able to manage "properly" than Adams? 
Adams, having decided to substitute in Laurens' absence, notified Dana. 
(with the injunction to keep the information confidential) that he would 
probably remain at Amsterdam at least until the beginning of Noyember.32 
Adams then proceeded to carry out the duties which he presumed would consti-
tute a. minister's obligations; namely, to keep Congres8 informed of the 
latest European developments, to influence public opinion in tavor ot his 
countr,r, and to secure the needed fUnds to successfully carryon the war. 
Among the foremost of these was the business of keeping Congress informed. 
Under his commission as peace negotiator, he had been sending Congress informa-
tion on the foundation and scope of the Armed Neutrality and anything else 
that seemed of general interest. In his newly-assumed role he dispatched a 
plethora of information. No event, inCident, expression, or paper that might 
have political overtones was too insignificant for transmission. Every con-
veyance was utilized and letters, sometimes three or four in a day, were 
penned for the enlightenment and guidance of Congress. In hi~newcenter of 
activity, he was aided by Dumas' access to several important men in govern-
mente .~t the same time his own sources of information were expanded. He 
was enabled to coach Congress on such diverse matters as the capture of a 
large number of the British West India Fleet and Cumberland's peace mission 
o 
to Spain. Regarding the first of these he related that fifty-five ships with 
a large number of soldiers and sailors had been taken and rejoiced that this 
opened the "right vein." He added the gratuitous advice that American priva-
teers should do their share in promoting this "short. eas.,. and infallible 
method of humbling the English.,,33 Cumberland's "errand" he looked upon as 
a "mere finesse of the British Ministry" to promote their own stocks, loans, 
and re-election and to lull the belligerents while actually preparing for 
future campaigns.34 
Another duty that Adams felt a loyal and zealous minister should under-
take was to influence public opinion in favor of his country. Adams had al-
ready assumed this responsibility. Within a fortnight of his arrival he had 
begun showering the editor of the Leyden Gazette and various other gazetteers 
with all manner of articles for publication. Indeed, at times he literally 
jammed the presses. The commission which he soon received to borrow money 
merely increased his persistence and his impatience. 'l'here seemed to be a 
great deal of darkness to be dispelled before he could hope to turn Dutch 
interest toward the United states. On first entering the country, he had 
concluded that the American cause "never suffered from anything more than 
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from tbe faUure of giving and receiving information. ,,3.5 The longer his 80-
journ among the Amsterdamers, who were Itthe most attentive to our affairs 
and the best inclined toward us," tbe greater his surprise at/their lack of 
knowledge of the most fundamental facts concerning America. He bemoaned the 
fact that there were very few "who do not consider the American resistance 
as the desultory rage of a few enthusiasts, without order, discipline. law 
or government. There are scarcely any who have an adequate idea of the num-
bers, the increasing population, or the growing commerce of America.,,36 To 
overoome this deficiency he went to unlimited efforts himself. He also be-
sought Congress to have printed and made available throughout Europe a com-
plete edition of all state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation. 
Publication of such a book he believed would do more to prove the inevitabili-
ty of American independence than any other act short of a complete military 
victory. He envisioned a volume of this nature being so well accepted that 
in a short time it would be translated into every European language; that 
even persona who did not know the English language would learn it purely for 
the sake of reading this work. 37 
Adams was greatly concerned that the sovereigns of Europe would take 
measures inconsistent with American needs for no other reason than for "want 
of l1ght. u38 In the Netherlands in particular, the British ambassador, Sir 
Joseph Yorke, was busily engaged in directing the propagation of false re-
ports. Only the presence of a minister, amply supplied by Congress with 
frequent and correct information, could succeed in negating the effects of 
Yorke's activities or in dispelling the fears of the Dutch sufficiently that 
a loan could be successfully floated. 39 To counter British propaganda that 
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the "rebellious colonies" were suffering great distress and were on the verge 
of submission, Adams dispatched numerous articles for publication in important 
journals. ()ne of the foremost of these journals was the Gazette de Leyde 
edited by Jean Luzac. As soon as he was settled in Amsterdam, Adams sent 
Luzac several items including a copy of an act of the Massachusetts legi8-
lature establishing an Academ,J of Arts and Sciences. He also inclosed a 
copy of the Proceedings of the ?hilosophical Society at Philadelphia and 
suggested that learned societies in Europe might like to exchange notes with 
the American groups. Such articles Adams assured Luzac should convince the 
Dutch that th~eople of major American cities, far from being discouraged to 
the point of submission, felt sufficiently secure to indulge in the pursuits 
of peace.40 Luzac immediately supplied an introduction to this effect and 
published these articles so well calculated to strike a resonant chord in the 
culturally-minded Dutch. Drawing Adams' attention to the good use he had 
made of them, Luzac requested the minister to send more.41 
As soon as Adams received an official copy of the Massachusetts con-
stitution as accepted by the convention, Adams forwarded it to Luzac. He 
appended the explanation that this would be the first European publication of 
it as only the report of the committee had been previously printed in either 
European or English papers.42 He was particularly desirous that Luzac re-
produce it as "many gentlemen here are inquisitive concerning the American 
forms of government. 1I The publication of this document, at least a portion at 
a time. could serve the double purpose of gratifying curiosity and of pro-
moting the American cause. By way of personal note, he pointed out to Luzac 
that he himself had had a not inconsiderable part in the drafting of this 
constitution and that he was particularly "ambitious" to see it translated by 
the editor of the Leyden Gazette, which he esteemed "the best in Europe, both 
in point of style and method.,,43 Luzac, pleased to receive the original 
edition, promised to bave it translated and inserted as soon as place became 
available: "The abundance of material • • • has forced me to delay it in 
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spite of myself." Adams was partially responsible for this shortage of 
space since Luzac had translated and published a number of extracts from 
the American papers Adams forwarded to him.45 Adams also transmittei a copY' 
of the constitution to Edmund Jenings in Brussels. Jenings immediately for-
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warded it to a friend in England for publication there. This became a 
familiar pattern in Adams' propaganda activities--release articles through 
one or more local papers and send them simultaneously to Jenings to be for-
warded for publication in England. 
Following close upon the release of the Massachusetts Constitution, he 
introduced, through the European press, an English publication which appeared 
to give support to the Americans. This was his abridgment of a pamphlet 
written by Thomas Pownall, a former governor of Massachusetts who had returned 
to England.4? In this Pownall pamphlet, Adams found "so many quaint words 
and dark expressions intermixed with so many good thoughts and so much knowl-
edge of America" that he deemed it worth translating--with modifications. 
Consequently, he rewrote the pamphlet, had his version translated into French 
by M. Adenet, and sent it to Luzac.48 After assuring Adams that the brochure 
certainly merited publication and that it would inspire many sentiments fa-
vorable to American interests, Luzac suggested that perhaps the author had 
too vigorously depicted the changes which the American Revolution could make 
in the European commercial system. He feared the oonclusions that might be 
drawn from the pamphlet; American independence would despoil Russia of her 
commerce in ships' timbers and various naval supplies, cause iweden to lose 
her market for iron, and Holland to suffer in her carrying trade. Luzac 
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granted that the author--he had been told only that it was an abridgement of 
a real pamphlet and did not know that Adams had done the revising--had pointed 
out extensive advantages but he felt that the general reaction would be one 
of fear. He therefore requested permission to add a preface which would 
soften the impression these oommercial implioations might oreate.49 
Adams willingly granted the request to add a preface, which he later 
50 commented was worth more than the pamphlet, but he took exoeption to the 
idea that the commercial system of Europe would be significantly affeoted by 
American independence. This argument was not new to him and he had his an-
swers prepared. America was, and for centuries to oome would remain, basic-
ally an agricultural country. He emphasized that Amerioa' s co_erce could 
never increase exoept in proportion to its agricultural growth and that 
oenturies would be required to populate the county's vast agricultural area.51 
This was hardly an accurate prophecy on Adams' part, nor was his next point 
of much greater validity. He reasoned that America would import far greater 
quantities of hemp, sailcloth, cordage, and linens than could be offset by 
any interference on her part in the tar, iron, or timber market--the Atlantic 
was too broad and its passage too difficult to enable Amerioans to oarry 
great quantities of these to Europe. On the contrary, he claimed that trade 
would improve since America would be importing European goods directly from 
the continent rather than from England.52 Adams' most frequent theme was the 
tremendous advantage that trade with an independent America would be to Europe 
in general and the Netherlands in particular. 
Luzac, satisfied with Adams' reasoning and with the pe~ission to add 
a preface according to his own taste, proceeded to get the pamphlet into 
print. This French translation subsequently became known in the Netherlands 
as the Pens'es. The process of publication was altogether too slow for Adams 
who expressed impatience in the same breath as he ordered a dozen or two 
copies.53 Luzac excused the delay on the plea of family affairs and promised 
copies within a few days.54 The promise was not strictly fulfilled as the 
printers were extremely slow and the bookdealer Luzac had first contacted to 
handle the work refused. It was, however, ready for distribution by mid-
November and Luzac dispatched a dozen copies to Adams. The minister quickly 
disposed of them and ordered a "couple dozen moren as that was "the critical 
moment to do good.,,55 
Circumstances shortly presented Adams with a further opportunity to 
propagandize. While dining one evening with a group of merchants, bankerst 
ministers, and lawyers, briefly a group of the Patriot party, Adams was asked 
a number of questions on various American affairs by the eminent jurist. 
Henrick Calkoen. The conversation proved of great interest but rather slow 
and tedious as one spoke no English and the other no Dutch. Someone proposed 
that Calkoen write out his questions and Adams write answers to them. Mr. 
LeRoy, a mutual friend, volunteered to translate for Adams. Accordingly, 
within a few days Adams received a list of twenty-six questions and imme-
diately set himself to the business of answering them through a series of 
letters. Some of these were very lengthy but, as he wrote one or more each 
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day, he produced the complete series between October 4 and October 27, 1780. 
In these letters he emphasized the points most pertinent to the development of 
the opinions and impressions he firmly believed should be pre~lent among the 
commercial class in particular. America's determination to win and to main-
tain independent status, her promisiag financial future once the current 
difficulties were surmounted, and the advantage that aD immediate loan to the 
United states would work to the lender as well as to the borrower were the 
ideas expounded in his IDOst colorful and convincing style. Mr. Calkoen was 
so satisfied with the answers that from the information given he drew up a 
comparison of the revolt of the Low Countries from Spain and that of the 
colonies trom England. He concluded that whereas it required a kind of 
miracle for the former to be successful, it would require a greater miracle 
to prevent the success of the latter. 56 Calkoen's composition stressing the 
inevitability of American independence and financial greatness was read to a 
society of approximately forty men of letters who regularly met at Amsterdam. 
The American minister ever regarded it as an important contribution. "BT 
that means, just sentiments of American affairs began to spread, and prevail 
over.the continual misrepresentations of English and St&dholderian gazettes, 
pamphlets. and newspapers. ,,57 
Shorter items were normally in good supply. on September 20, Adams 
transmitted to Luzac several letters he bad reoently received from America 
with the stipulation that the names of the correspondents be withheld.58 In 
well-regulated doses Luzac dispensed the information that they contained. 
Excerpts on the popular acceptance of the Massachusetts Constitution (S. 
Adams), the revived spirit of 1765 and 1766 with women demonstrating great 
".-
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enthusiasm (Rush), and the friendly relations between the American people and 
the French soldiers in America (Cooper) were excellent as counter-propaganda. 
Franklin in Paris was similarly aware of the need for counter(cting British 
propaganda and of the good effect of a favorable press. Indicating that he 
thought extracts should be published, Franklin sent Dumas and Adams letters 
from two French officers in Rochambeau's army. These letters lauded the 
American troops and spoke well of the good understanding which existed be-
tween American and French troops.59 Adams quickly took the suggestion, re-
quested more extracts, and assured Doctor Franklin that such intelligence was 
essential to dispel "the universal and profound ignorance of America" that 
60 he had enoountered in the United Provinces. 
In the task of spreading the knowledge of America, Adams was delighted 
to enlist the aid of several new-found friends. As he searched the bookstalls 
for authentic information on the constitution and the history of the United 
61 Provinces, a series of volumes by A. M. Cerisier was recommended to him. 
The work was so satisfactory for his purpose that he inquired further about 
the author and, learning that Cerisier resided in Utrecht, he travelled there 
62 to meet him. Shortly the two men were on the most :intimate terms. Cerisier 
introduced Adams to Mr. Wild, the Swiss bookseller with whom he boarded, and 
thus gave Adams a critical supplier of pertinent books and papers.63 Cerisier 
was also a regular contributor to various papers and could thus be of assist-
ance to Adams. As he was conversant with English, French, and Dutch, as well 
as other languages, he frequently served as the translator of English publica-
tions which Adams desired to make available to the French and Dutch reading 
public. Cerisier also turned French and Dutch publications into F~glish that 
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Adams might the better utilize them to enlighten himself, to forward to Con-
gress, or to have republished in the Netherlands and in England. 
By means of the outlets at Cerisier's disposal, Adams ~redhis views 
on the many aspects of America's relations with England and with Europe. In 
a comparison of the American debt with that of England, Adams depicted America 
as being the more solvent. He averred that the United States could undergo 
another hundred years of war without her debt being proportionally greater 
in 1880 than Britain's currently was.64 In regard to finance (one of the 
subjects of greatest interest to the Dutch) he pointed out that at the pre-
vailing exchange rate of forty to one, a one and one-fourth million dollar 
loan would annihilate all the paper bills in circulation.65 These specula-
tions were sent to Cerisier with a gentle suggestion. "Your obser~tions on 
American credit I shall expect with impatience as they will undoubtedly throw 
much light upon our affairs.,,66 His impatience was well founded. The Dutch 
were extremely wary of America's ability to pay her bills.67 When Cerisier's 
enthusiasm for America led him to propose publishing a separate periodical 
68 to serve her cause, Adams was quick to encourage hill. 
Among the first to seek out an acquaintanceship with Adams was the 
Baron Van der C3pellen. He initiated a correspondence with the minister and 
recommended to him several worthy friends, among them--Adrian Valck of Rotter-
dam, the financier, Tegelaar, and Francis Adrian Van der Kemp.69 Both Van der 
Capellen and Van der Kemp wielded extremely influential pens and some of the 
most famous Patriot propaganda pieces during the revolution were the result of 
their indeavors.70 It was largely through these men that Adams could feel 
the pulse of the intellectual groups and key his arguments and his rebuttals 
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accordingly. Bad news from America inevitably produced among the intellec-
tuals a feeling of despondency and the prediction of ultimate failure. 71 This 
reaction, however, was invariably turned to good use by Adams' ready explana-
tion of each misfortune as being of minor importance, or of temporary duration, 
or as being vastly exaggerated and misrepresented.72 Time consumed explaining 
his viewpoint Adams considered well spent since his correspondents were in 
strategic positions to influence the various groups from whom America would 
have to receive support if she ever hoped to borrow money in the United 
Provinces. 
Because Dutch opinion fluctuatjd with every foreign news item, and 
since many items in the fall of 1780 tended to support the Anglophiles, Adams 
used every avenue he could commandeer to counteract the effects of these news 
bulletins. Stories of Cornwallis' victory at Camden, South Carolina, caused 
consternation in the Netherlands. He brushed the victory off as greatly 
exaggerated and of no lasting consequence. 73 Arnold's defection only proved 
that Americans were as firm against bribes as against arms since Arnold had 
led no soldier, sailor, "nor even his own valet" to the English camp.74 It.'hen 
the English gained a temporary advantage in the South, he stressed the 
Southern militia's lack of experience in war--a defect time would remedy as 
it had in the North where the English could do "nothing but show their ill-
will.,,75 IrJhen the English took st. Martin, Adams again dashed off articles 
which Cerisier was free to use as he wished provided he did not mention their 
authorship.76 The unrest caused by the widely publicized English versions 
of each of these misfortunes in conjunction with the shattering disclosure 
of a privately projected Dutch-American treaty imperatively urged Adams to 
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some literary counteroffensive. He discovered an effective weapon in narra-
tives written by Generals Howe and Burgorne to explain their failures in 
Amerioa. In November he sent Cerisier a copy of Howe's Narrative to trans-
late. Although Howe had oarefUlly avoided giving any information either on 
the weakness of England or the strength of America beyond that whioh was 
necessary for the vindication of his own conduot, Adams seized upon the ac-
count. He declared that it contained enough !lto convince ~ impartial reader 
that there was neither light nor integrity in the British ministry; that the 
intent of England was evil."?? It seemed to him that the Howe translation 
made a great impression beoause it presented a convincing argument on the 
impracticability of either subduing or regaining America.78 Pleased with the 
result of that pamphlet, Adams asked Digges to send a copy of Burgorne's 
apologia. This, too, Cerisier translated and published to substantiate fur-
ther the impression made by Howe's Narrative.?9 
Adams was too much of an aotivist. however, to spend all his time 
banishing ignorance by submitting propaganda pieces to the gazettes or reports 
to Congress. Congress would undoubtedly benefit by a steady flow of informa-
tion but it was desperately in need of money. Adams was as aware of this as 
anyone. Further. he believed that complete dependence on France to provide 
finanoial support made America too subservient to her ally. This was a major 
reason, to his way of thinking, why ministers should be sent to a number of 
the foreign courts with the necessary commission to initiate loans.80 Short-
11 after his arrival in the Netherlands Adams had imparted some of these im-
pressions to Franklin. In response, Franklin used the occasion to express 
his opinion of "militia diplomacy." If I have long been humiliated with the 
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idea of our running about from court to court begging for money and friendship, 
which are the more withheld the more eagerly they are solicited, and would 
. ~ . 
perhaps have been offered, if they had not been asked." Tlrlds challenge 
could not go uaanswered. Adams agreed that he, as well as Franklin, felt the 
mortification of soliciting funds but only "because the sol:1.citations bave 
not succeeded." He could see no reason to be ashamed of the need to borrow 
money after six years of successful warfare against a powerfUl nation which 
had been borrowing reauJ.arly from all the countries of Europe. He then de-
li vered a clear de tense of his theo1'1 ot "militia diplomacy" as a justitica-
tion ot his own activity. 
To send ministers to eve1'1 great court in Europe, especially the 
maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of 
America and treaties ot amity and commerce, is no more than becomes 
us, and in mr opinion is our duty to do. It is perfectly consistent 
wi th the genuine system ot American policy, and a piece of respect 
due from new nations to old ones. • •• It is necessary for America 
to have agents in different parts ot Europe to give some information 
concerning our affairs, and to refute the falsehoods that the hired 
emissaries of Great Britain circulate in every corner of Europe, by 
which they keep up their own credit and ruin ours. I have been more 
convinced of this sinoe my peregrinations in this oount1'1 than ever. 
The8~iversal and profound ignorance of America here has astonished 
lie. 
Practically no letter from Adams to Congress tailed to reiterate the 
need for a properly commissioned minister in the Netherlands where .. he thought, 
money for investment was plentiful. Designedly, the majority of those he met 
on his trip from Brussels to Amsterdam were bankers or publicists. Upon 
arrival at Amsterdam he lost no time in securing dinner engagements with 
bankers of renown such as Neufville and staphorst. Conversation with these 
men led Adams to adopt a I'OS7 view of the possibilities for a loan in the 
Provinces. He concluded that several of the more substantial banking houses 
would willingly stand security on loans in return for American produce. If 
Philadelphia would contract to supply the produce, convoys could safely de-
liver it either to the Netherlands or to St. Eustatius in thelDutch West 
Indies. Such a system would not only aid in securing a sorely-needed loan 
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but it would automatically extend the commerce between the two republios and 
thus help change the political attaohments of the DutOh.8, 
Consequently, Adams rejoiced when he reoeived an interim oommission, 
valid until the arrival of Laurens or some other properly appointed person in 
his stead, to negotiate a loan with the Low countries.84 This finallyaf-
forded him the opportunity to apply the theories he had been expounding and 
to do so without the immediate surveillance of Franklin or the Frenoh court. 
After sending for Thaxter, his private secretary who had remained in Paris, 
he informed Abigail that he had determined to remain in the Netherlands until 
further orders.85 He hastened to assure the Committee for Foreign Affairs 
that he would use his utmost abilities, but, for the first time, he added the 
warning note that he could promise nothing. At the same time he indireotly 
assured them that they had made a very prudent choioe of negotiator, partiou-
larly as his four or five weeks sojourn in the country had furnished him the 
opportunity of becoming aoquainted.86 He reoeived the commission on September 
17 and proceeded direotly to ask friends and aoquaintances for aid and advice. 
Sinoe he had no real political authority, he and his advisors agreed that it 
would probably be better not to make his mission known to the states General 
but rather to handle the loan as a matter of private credit.87 He soon dis-
covered this to be a very slow method sinoe it forced him to conduot the 
business with great secrecy and caution. The problem of communication com-
~. 
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pounded the difficulty. Moat of those to whom Adams wished to apply spoke no 
88 English and their French was as sketchy as his own. 
One of the first to whom Adams appealed for advice was~enrick Bicker, 
a wealthy merchant, member of one of the most respectable families, and a 
loyal Patriot. Bicker immediately recommended the House of Vollenhoven as it 
was "wholly Dutch, biased neither by France nor England.,,89 This company, 
however, refused to take the risk on the grounds that its trade was fixed in 
the Baltic and could not well be extended to North America. Vollenhoven had 
suggested Van Blomberg as broker, and this worthy gentleman set up another 
appointment between the minister and Vollenhoven in hopes of changing the 
banker's first decision. To no avail! The company continued to refuse. 90 
When informed of this refusal, Bicker expressed his regrets but took the 
opportunity to advise Adams not to apply to them a third time. He remarked 
that he was not surprised to find that the general credence in the solidity 
of the United states was somewhat less than Adams liked to believe. To this 
he significantly added that real confidence could be developed only with 
great patience and "after the appearance of some person properly accredited." 
Bicker would have liked to be more helpful but hesitated to recommend others 
whom the minister might contact as too many refusals could constitute a 
serious drawback to an otherwise excellent project.9l 
Adams needed neither Vollenhoven's refusal, Bicker's advice, nor the 
advice of other friends to demonstrate to him that a minister plenipotentiary 
was needed before a~ large sum could be procured. He had scarcely reoeived 
the commission to inaugurate a loan when he addressed Congress on the neces-
sity of having at The Hague a minister empowered to oonclude political and 
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92 commercial treaties. Under his tutelage, Francis Dana, the Secretary to the 
Peace Commission, sent a similar message to Congress. 93 Adams bad been told 
quite frankly that neither was money as plentiful nor Americ~credit as 
strong as he had thought. It appeared somewhat "mysterious" to the Good 
mynheers that the person delegated to secure a loan was not simultaneously 
empowered to negotiate treaties of alliance and commeroe. 94 In subsequent 
letters the same message--a commission to treat politically was essential to 
negotiations for a loan--was placed regularly before Congress.95 These let-
tars eventually bore fruit in securing the coveted commission but some 
months elapsed before the letters arrived in Philadelphia, were acted upon, 
and the new oommission reached Amsterdam.96 
In the meantime he continued to struggle against difficult odds. When 
he had first appeared in the Netherlands, he had entertained high hopes of 
easy negotiations once he had a commission to borrow. He hardly had the com-
mission when the first fears of not being immediately successful entered his 
mind. Two weeks later he reported that he was still busy inquiring as to the 
best house and the best terms but that he would postpone a final decision 
until Laurens' arrival. Shortly, the conflict between England and the Nether-
lands caused Dutch interest to turn another direction and forced Adams to 
50ft-pedal his efforts to obtain a loan. When he could again take up the 
matter in earnest, intervening events had further diminished his prospeots of 
suocess. 
In mid-October, news reaohed him, via Thomas Digges, that Laurens was 
in the Tower of London and not apt to visit the Netherlands for Bome time. 
The British had captured a number of papers in Laurens' custody. Among these 
was a draft treaty drawn up in 1778 by John de Neufville, at the behest of 
Van Berckel and several of the Patriot burgomasters of Amsterdam, and by 
\1illiam Lee of Virginia. The treaty was primarily commercial4.n character, 
and it was not intended to become effective until pacific relations were re-
established between England and America. Furthermore, it had been conceived 
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by agents acting on their own or, at most, as representatives of only a small 
segment of the sovereignty of their respective countries.97 Nevertheless, it 
was sei~ed upon by England and used as a weapon against the adherence of the 
Dutch to the Armed Neutrality. 
Since the previous spring Russia had been forming a league of the 
Northern maritime powers in an effort to protect neutral shipping on the 
principle of free ships make free goods. Denmark and Sweden soon joined 
Russia but the United Provinces remained uncommitted. Unwilling to sacrifice 
their trade in ships' timbers and naval supplies, the Dutch merchants had 
drawn upon themselves the anger of the English government. Some of the 
Netherlanders saw the Armed Neutrality as a providential answer but others 
feared English retaliation in the Dutch Indies. All were paralyzed at the 
thought at war. 
Through the summer and early fall of 1780 a desultory correspondence 
was carried on between The Hague and st. Petersburg. The Hague wanted the 
League to guarantee her colonial possessions; St. Petersburg re,tuaed. Before 
the Netherlands could be admitted to the League, Russia insisted that The 
Hague officially notify the belligerents of its determination to accede; the 
States General hesitated. This seemed too much like unnecessary defiance 
toward England. France was content to let nature take its course, but England 
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could not permit the Netherlands enlisting against her the support of the 
entire Neutral League in a free-ships, free-goods policy. Lord Stormont, 
English minister of Foreign Affairs, determined that there wa'but on alterna-
tive, regardless of the inconveniences it would involve. If the United 
provinces joined the Armed Neutrality, war would be inevitable. 98 The Dutch 
were bard pressed to find a way out of their dilemma. ItAll parties are 
divided over what Holland will do in the Northern Confederation. Neither the 
Stadholderians nor Republioans, nor Anglomanes, nor Franoomanes are 
agreed.,,99 Finally, William V and the Nobles of Holland, fearful that their 
leadership was failing, desperately insoribed their opinion in the resolution 
book of the States General in an effort to prevent accession to the League. 
The proposed oonfederaoy, they deolared, gave insufficient security to justify 
exposing Holland to the wrath of England. They urged that the more unjust the 
English conduct, the more careful must be that of the republic since she was 
100 
unable to defend herself. In spite of this formal opinion and the sound 
reasoning whioh prompted it, on October 10, the states of Holland and West 
Friesland, the weathervane of the states General, resolved to aocept the con-
101 federation on Russian terms. 
At this cruoial moment, England received a boon in the form of the 
papers taken from Henry Laurens. Yorke presented these papers, especially 
the Lee-Neufville draft treaty, to the Prince and the powerful Anglophile 
Secretary of the States General, M. Fagel, as also to the prince's mentor, 
the Duke of Brunswick. After consultation with the other two, the prince 
presented the draft treaty to the states of Holland where it oaused oonsidera-
ble astonishment. The States required Amsterdam to report on this matter on 
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october 25. Yorke had been certain that the affair would "thoroughly cool 
the ardor for the Northern League," but his assurance received a shock when 
Amsterdam and Van Berckel rather calmly admitted their part ~thetreaty.l03 
The burgomasters then issued a pamphlet to justify their conduct and published 
a French translation of it in the Amsterdam Gazette. Their explanation was 
the obvious one--one which has never been contradicted--that the treaty was 
contingent on the colonies working out an accommodation with Great Britain and 
that it would be presented for ratification only when that condition was tul-
filled. Or as Adams succinctly put it, "The English might as well have al-
leged a treaty between the rooks on the trees and the storks on the houses 
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as a cause of war. n 
Yorke and stormont, however, had determined to persist until either 
the Netherlands bent to the English will or until war with them could be de-
clared and thus the Dutch forced to stop shipping naval stores to the allies. 
Both men were convinced that the Hollanders had been treated with too much 
105 moderation; the burgomasters' attitude did little to dispel this convic-
tion. Yorke assured his superior that an immediate declaration would have a 
106 great influence on the Northern League. stormont followed the lead and 
sent a strong memorial to be presented to the states General unless the 
Provinces showed clear signs of refusing to acc~de to the Armed Neutrality.l07 
Not only did Yorke judge it unlikely that the Provinoes would refuse but he 
knew that votes sufficient to guarantee accession had already been submitted 
to the Secret Committee. Yorke then rushed his memorial to the States 
General on November 10 in the hope that some positive votes might be changed 
before it was too late. His memorial demanded a formal disavowal of the 
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conduct of the Amsterdam regency, prompt satisfaction proportionate to the 
108 
offense, and an exemplary punishment of Van Berckel and his accomplices. 
If the Dutch refused the impossible terms presented, England gould declare 
war and thus put the Netherlands into the position of belligerents and beyond 
the pale of the Neutral League.109 ,llien the States General hesitated to print 
the memorial, Yorke bad both Dutch and French translations inserted in ~ 
Hague Gazette so that all Europe should understand the distinction England 
was drawing between this quarrel with the Netherlands and the Neutral 
110 League. 
The Yorke memorial caused a violent fermentation especially at Amster-
dam. For the succeeding weeks fear permeated the Dutch; all interest seemed 
centered on this memorial which the States General had taken ad referendum. 
La Vauguyon informed his court of the general indignation and called the 
memorial an "act of arrogance." However, France was not anxious to bave the 
Netherlands join the belligerents and his home office directed La Vauguyon 
111 to advise Holland to disavow the entire proceeding of Amsterdam. Yorke 
agreed that there was great alarm, especially on the Exchange, but believed 
that the greater part were unwilling to break with England. He still hoped 
it would produce a reconciliation on British terms.112 Adams sent a copy of 
the memorial to Congress with an explanation of the impossibility of censuring 
the burgomasters since the Amsterdam regency formed an integral part of the 
sovereignty of the nation and also paid a fourth of all the taxes. He re-
marked strong symptoms of resentment throughout the country and noted that 
insurance rates had gone to twenty or twenty-five per cent, but he was not 
113 quite ready to predict that war would result. The memorial he described 
as "a masterpiece ••• a curiosity." Because of the tone of it, he thought 
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simple non-accession would not satisfy the British who had practically de-
clared war against Van Berckel and the burgomasters. charging them with fac-
tion, cabal. and a host of similar crimes. But he judged thai if the republic 
did not join the Armed Neutrality. it would be "wholly owing to this memo-
114 
rial." Finally, on November 20, 1?80, the States General voted for acces-
sion and signed the formal agreement with Russia in St. Petersburg on January 
3, 1781. 
During the period of confusion, Adams had kept Congress informed of 
developments. At first he viewed the disclosure of the documents taken from 
Laurens with moderate placidity and determined to make the best possible use 
of them. In the belief that they were in general quite harmless, he assured 
Huntington that "on the whole gil seems to be rather a fortunate event that 
these papers have been publicly produced.,,115 He hoped to turn sentiment 
against the English for their treatment of Laurens and so collected informa-
tion on Laurens' confinement and forwarded it to Dumas for publication. 
Dumas inserted it in the Lelden Gazette after deleting two or three lines be-
cause he feared the reference to "white eyes lt would be too apt to compromise 
the writer.116 Adams sanctioned this touch of prudence and submitted that the 
title might be "misleading as Nerone neronior is nearer the truth."ll? It 
was not long before he had ample cause to reverse his first judgment of the 
wisdom of producing the papers. The events of the succeeding months turned 
United States-Netherlands relations from poor to much worse. Looking back at 
the situation years later he wrote, "ThB discovery of the Lee-Neufville draft 
spread universal coneternation throughout the seven Provinces. I do not re-
member to have found one person who pretended to see the wisdom of it. fll18 
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other developments also, Adams faithfully reported. In one letter he 
drew a parallel between Boston and Amsterdam, between ctis, Hancock, or Adams 
and Van Berckel. In another, he saw England pursuing the sam( pattern as she 
had in America--separate the people from their regency and the other cities 
of Holland from Amsterdam.119 His surmise vas reasQnably correct as the 
Yorke-stormont correspondence showed that these two ministers contemplated 
declaring hostilities only on Amsterdam and actually did lay battle plana 
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which would wreak the greatest vengeance on that city. After the republic 
voted accession to the Armed Neutrality on November 20, Adams informed Con-
gress that, in the opinion of many, the republic would not have taken this 
step but for the discovery of Laurens' papers. For his part, he did not ex-
pect England to honor the Netherlands' decision. He vas certain the Court of 
st. James would prefer risking a war with all the maritime powers to accept-
ing the principle of free ships, free goods. The Netherlands appeared to 
him to be in an "embarrassing 8i tua tion. It The pro-English prince commanded 
the army and navy, and was in general supported by the nobility and the 
clergy. Counterbalancing this advantage, Yorke had apparently erred in giving 
Laurens' papers to the prince rather than presenting them directly to the 
states since this made William appear as Yorke's tool, hardly a factor recom-
mending him to the Dutch nation. The intemperateness of the memorial also 
antagonized many. After expatiating on the pros and cons, Adams opined that 
"all these things • • • far from aiding our affairs • • • have put an entire 
stop to them for the present. The nation is trembling for their commerce, 
their money in the British funds, their East and West India possessions, and 
no man dares engage in a measure that may in some degree increase the 
alll'll"m ,,121 
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on November 23, three days after acceding to the Neutral League, the 
Province of Holland determined to disavow the action of its burgomasters in 
the offending treaty and put the entire matter before a Grand Qbmmittee acting 
as a court. 122 England refuse. to accept these measures as ample satisfac-
tion and presented another memorial with a solemn warning that silence regard-
ing it would be interpreted as a refusal to comply with England's demands.123 
As the situation continued to deteriorate, Adame fired off impressions more 
rapidly. The general purport of all this correspondence was that the Nether-
124 lands would have peace at &n1 price. Adame explained the determination of 
the Dutch to remain neutral as partially due to their long-standing de testa-
tion of the French. Matq of the Dutch people hoped they might escape English 
wrath by joining the Armed Neutrality. England, they presumed, would hesitate 
to offend such a powerful league.12' Fears and tumults, however, were on the 
increase. Franklin was concerned that if the states General complied with 
126 Yorke's memorials, Adams would be in jeopardy. Adams was probably too 
occupied to worry excessively about his own safety at the time, but at a 
later date, he reminisced that "the apprehension, at this time, was very 
general, that Mr. Van Berckel and one or two of the burgomasters, Hooft at 
least, were to be immolated like the De Witts; and not a few expected that the 
American ambassador would not escape. ,;J.27 
After Yorke presented a second and even stronger memorial in December, 
Adams noted that, to a Dutchman, war was the "greatest of evils," and that 
Yorke was playing on this by a series of memorials "to keep up the panic." 
For his own part he found this panic a nuisance as well as dangerous. While 
it continued, his work was almost at a standstill since "no man dares engage 
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for me; very few dare see me." If the prince's denunciation had "excited an 
alarm" and Yorke's first memorial fta terror," the second memorial "corrobo-
rated and augmented it." A few persons, however, were beginning to feel "the 
128 indignity as well as the terror." To Jenings he predicted that Yorke 
would "kick and cuff and pinch this people until he forces them into a little 
spunk." He confided that he found men more willing to "cry shame" on the 
last memorial but credited Yorke with the astuteness to push intimidation 
only far enough to prevent the Dutch from being of help to America or lending 
Adams money, not far enough to declare war.129 
Until the capture of Laurens, Adams had kept his commission to nego-
tiate a loan secret from all but a very few. But, once convinced that the 
business was entirely in his hands, at least for the foreseeable future, he 
proceeded to contact prospective brokers and bankers in earnest. After 
Vollenboven's refusal to undertake the loan, Bicker recommended Bowens and 
Sons, relatives of his OWD. This company displayed 80me interest for a few 
days but was soon intimidated by the furor caused by the prince's denunciation 
of Van Berekel and the magistrates. l30 Importuned to reconsider by Adams, 
they made some inquiries which convinced them that there was no hope of 
success and so, on the day of Yorke's first memorial, they again declined the 
trust. l31 In the meantime, the broker, Blomberg, had taken seriously ill and 
could not properly attend to his business. This situation presented Adams 
with a major problem since brokers who spoke French or English as well as 
Dutch were rare. Bowens suggested Christian Tenkate and William Van Vlooten 
but Bicker was not enthusiastic about either of these. He agreed that they 
were capable but feared that they might be influenced by their own interests. 
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In addition, Van Vlooten resided in Utrecht and, although he might well con-
trol the money for investment there, that area possessed insufficient capital 
l~ . for the project Adams contemplated. Thus, after all his e~orts, Adams 
found himself without a broker or a banker. To compound the difficulty, 
Congress not only remained blissfully unheeding of the financial straits of 
her minister abroad, but even complicated his situation. By simple resolution 
they determined that Adams should pay the bills drawn on Laurens.133 No 
simple resolution, however, was able to make money available with which to do 
so. This task required hard work and involved multiple disappointments. 
On two occasions only had Adams received some little encouragement in 
his efforts. Van der Capellen wrote of a relative who was inclined to invest 
twenty thousand florins. Adams conditionally accepted the offer dependent on 
a time wh~n a house would be chosen and terms fixed. l }4 Both of these condi-
tions wer~ destined to be months in the future. A seoond hope was offered by 
Franklin who notified Adams that the king of Spain had offered his guaranty 
for payme~t of interest and principal for a $150,000 loan to the United states 
to be taken up either in France or Holland. Because of loans being floated 
by the French government, Franklin felt the offer could not be used to full 
advantage there and passed the information on to Adams. This gentleman 
responded that he received it nas cold water to a thirsty soul.,,1.36 Un for-
tunately, it proved a mirage and nothing further came of it. In the meantime, 
bills were being presented. Adams was forced to refer these to Franklin for 
payment and to add the information that he had been told that other bills 
totaling some twenty thousand pounds were on the way.137 
After months of discouragements, Adams confessed that there were no 
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prospects of borrowing any money at all. The events of the past year had 
extinguished any credit that might have been available. rfEven the Burgoyning 
of Cornwallis" would be insufficient to convince the Dutch tba-t they ought to 
lend to America. l38 To Huntington, Adams described the reasons for the un-
availability of money. In the first place, the Dutch traditionally admired 
the English and hated the French and time would be required to eradicate these 
prejudices. In the meantime, British arms being consistently successful, the 
Dutch were little encouraged to invest in a losing cause. Another reason for 
hesitancy was the long-undetermined question of the Netherlands' accession 
to the Armed Neutrality and the impropriety of upsetting delicate negotia-
tions. Finally, the publication of Laurens' papers and the a~gry memorials 
of Sir Joseph Yorke had upset the entire country. These reasons combined 
"have thrown this nation into a state of astonishment, confusion, and un-
certainty to such a degree that no house I have yet thought it prudent to 
apply to dares undertake the trust. The times are now critical indeed.,~39 
\ilien Gillon asked Adams for assistance in procuring a loan for South Carolina, 
Adams pointed out the United states' money could not be at his disposal to 
give and, furthermore, there were representatives also from Virginia, Pennsyl-
vania, and Massachusetts in Europe soliciting. To aid one of them would give 
the others similar rights to seek his assistance. Aside from these reasons, 
he was simply unable to assist. "I have left no measure unattempted that 
prudence could justify, but have neither procured a~ money, nor obtained the 
least hope of obtaining any •••• 140 Hopes are all at an end." J. L. 
Austin, unsuccessfully seeking to borrow on behalf of Massachusetts, was ad-
vised to find consolation in the faot that he had had "as good luok as anyone 
1 ,,141 e see 
With Adams the expression of discouragement was never synonymous with 
submission to it. He continued to make extensive inquiries and even various 
proposals, only to have them politely deolihed. He, on his p~t, was loathe 
to apply to small houses until he had exhausted every possibility of engaging 
a large concern since the political considerations involved seemed as vital 
to him as the economic situation.142 Oddly enough, Adams viewed Joml 
Neufville, the only representative of a major house who held out any hope 
for success, as deceiving himself. Others advised Adams that any effort he 
would make while the country was so distraught would be injurious. He agreed 
that little credit would be available while there seemed any danger of Eng-
land regaining sovereignty in America.143 
Through November and early December the Anglo-Dutch sparring had 
elicited from Adams a fresh round of pleas for Congress to commission a 
minister plenipotentiary. He pointed out the advantages. A commission would 
secure external respeot for its bearer; it would give him the right to olaim 
the privileges and prerogatives of his position; it would assist in getting 
a loan, and it would designate thepne commissioned as the oenter of American 
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affairs in the country. Since he was already on the soene and ready to 
act in that capacity, he began inquiries as to the possible extent of his 
powers. A message to his agent in London requested any infonnRtion Digges 
could glean as to whether or not Laurens had a oommission as minister pleni-
145 potentiary or only the oommission to negotiate a loan. James Searle, 
reoently arrived in the Netherlands, assured Adams that Laurens had the de-
sired commission, but Adams was not completely convinoed. l46 The American 
was not alone in his concern about a commission as plenipotentiary. The 
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English ministry was also interested but with different intent. stormont 
directed Yorke to undertake a careful investigation as he had information re-
garding a proposed connection between the United States and t~ United Prov-
inces. "It will be essential to watch Adams as narrowly as possible. He 
certainly has some of the powers that were given to Mr. I&urens, but whether 
or not his commission is so extensive as that of Laurens I cannot as yet 
saye,,147 Yorke assured the Foreign Hinister that the news of one American-
Netherlands treaty had been too badly received to fear further activity in 
tllat area for a time. Less consoling, howevor, was the news that Adams had 
148 declared that he had full powers to treat with any buropean country. 
Actually Yorke was either misinformed or he misinterpreted Adams' powers since 
that gentleman was commissioned to treat only for a general peace, for a 
commercial treaty with Britain, and for a Dutch loan. 
Adams' own awareness of the limitations of his powers and of the use-
lesaness of all three commissions in the existing circumstances probably 
contributed to the strong note of discouragement in his December mail. By 
the early part of the month the Stadholderian party had become sufficiently 
powerful to engineer the disavowal of the Lee-Neufville treaty in all but two 
of the cities of Holland. American credit was "totally annihilated." Any 
who would dare undertake anything would likely be charged with aiding and 
abetting rebellion. His every effort frustrated, Adams bitterly reflected, 
flFriendship for us in this country goes little farther than an inolination 
for our commeroe. 1I149 Conditions were such that every channel he had been 
pursuing was suddenly being closed to him. Men who had formerly talked en-
couragingly of loans now refused to hold out the slightest hope. During the 
tumult of November, he had rejoiced at the publication of the Pensees and 
Howe'S Narrative and had eagerly awaited that of the Burgoyne papers. Then 
there had been so much to be published, but by December a few 'rticles to 
Digges apparently comprised the entire propaganda effort. 
Adams informed Congress that his work was at a standstill and that, 
far from helping him, few wanted to be seen speaking to him.150 Even the 
weather was becoming unpleasant and he grumbled to Jenings. "I shall cover 
87 
me with nannels and furs like a Dutchman. A man's feelings soon remove all 
the ridicule of it.,,151 It was nearly a year since his arrival in Europe 
"and the dullest year it has been that I ever saw. Such another, I hope I 
shall never see." American credit was "not worth a guinea." "As to the olive 
branch, the seed is not yet sown that is to produce the tree that will bear 
152 it." Upon learning that Franklin was again suffering from the gout, he 
grumbled that he. "could wish for the gout, too, or anything else to make the 
scene agreeable to me, who in this oapital of the reign of mammon cannot find 
the air of Passy or the amusements of Paris." Even the good Puritan virtues 
of industry, simplioity, and economy were perverted into "only private 
virtues that begin and end in self.,,153 He longed to be at home where he 
might do something worthy of history, "if I could get there without going 
154 -after Mr. Laurens." He advised his countrymentto abandon their dependenoe 
on Europe. "I wish we were wise enough to depend upon ourselves for every-
thing and upon them for nothing. Ours is the richest and most independent 
country under heaven and we are continually looking up to Europe for help!,,155 
EVen attendance at Sunday services prove' an irritation to him. In Rotterdam 
and Utrecht, he chose the Presbyterian service as least likely to be biased 
"... 
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in favor of England; in Amsterdam he visited Episcopalian and Presbyterian 
chapels. He was annoyed to hear each parson preach and pray for England, the 
royal family, and their triumph over their enemies--definiteli a "work of 
supererogation in these reverend zealots." It irked him further to recognize 
these servioes as a fair gauge of popular opinion since, in addition to the 
numerous English people, many English-speaking Dutch attended these churches 
and seemed not to be offended.l56 
The year, then, appeared to be ending most dismally from Adams' point 
of view when the English took a further drastic step. Having received no 
answer to their latest memorial (December 12), the English ministr,r directed 
Yorke to depart from The Hague without taking leave and to repair to Antwerp 
to await further orders.157 They also drew up a manifesto in which they 
traced the development of Anglo-Dutch friendship, listed the aggravations 
presently suffered from Amsterdam, and declared their intention of securing 
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satisfaction. These actions brought the relations between England and the 
Netherlands to a new crisis. The news of Yorke's departure on December 25 
rekindled the ferment but with one difference--which Adams was quick to note 
and slow to trust--the English ministry was being rather warmly cursed where 
formerly it was only feared. His friends believed that things appeared to 
be improving, but he remained unconvinced for a time.159 He would concede, 
however, that the stalemate might well soon be over and either peace or war 
would result. Peace would be highly preferable to the inhabitants, but, in 
case of war, the Netherlands could demand the ai,d of the Armed Neutrality and 
thereby add four more opponents to England's enemies. These possibilities 
were something for Adams to watch closely and to be ready to take advantage 
\ 
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of if an opportunity presented itself. In the meantime, there seemed 
nothing to do but await future developments. 
/ 
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CHAPTER III 
/ 
A MEMORIAL PRESENTED, JANUARY-MAY t 1781 
The fiDal days of 1780 and the beginning of the new year, 1781, brought 
a Dew dimension to the political scene in the United Provinces. As the news, 
and gradually the purport, of Yorke's withdrawal began to permeate the country, 
a revitalization ot the public spirit slowly appeared. From the doldrums of 
fear and apathy, so irritating to Adams, a spirit of self-vindication and 
national pride began to evolve. The streets of Amsterdam swarmed with all 
manner of party propaganda, each party seeking to out-print the others. 'rhou-
sands of extravagant and incredible reports were circulated. Adams viewed 
the scene with both pleasure and consternation. He rejoiced to find masterly 
defenses of the burgomasters being circulated and told with relish of a popu-
lar song designed especially to inspire sailors with resentment toward the 
English. A woman singing this song in the streets sold six hundred copies 
wi thin an hour.l He had been warmly, although inaccurately t assured that more 
than four-fifths of the Dutch loved the Americans and desired their success.2 
He observed the republican party become more outspOken and openll compare the 
friendship~between England and their own country to that between cain and 
Abel.3 On the other hand, he recognized the strength of the national prejudic. 
1+ in favor of the British and the potencl of the st&dholder's influence. 
Official circles were far from riel ding to popular sway. ID the government 
every move was "studiousll delayed." A counter-manifesto, retaliatory letters 
101 
102 
of marque and reprisal to balance those issued by the Court of St. James, and 
even the decision of the Court of Holland on Van Berckel were so retarded and 
their promulgation so clouded that none knew whether war had }(een declared.5 
The prince, the investors in British fUnds, and the merchant groups each had 
much to lose and little to gain from war and their influence was powerful in 
the states. Consequently, the American minister staunchly refused to predict 
6 the outcome as he could Itnever depend upon anything here until it is past." 
He did, nevertheless, take a keen interest in events as he conceived the whole 
system of Europe being settled within a few weeks by the decision of the 
Dutch.? 
Although his activities were temporarily restricted to very quiet, 
private contacts, he made the greatest possible use of his forced role of 
spectator. He admitted, "! am not able to do much towards midwifing the 
great events with which the times are pregnant, yet! don't think the less 
8 
nor the less anxiously about them for that. tf Once again interpreting popu-
lar opinion from the Sunday service, Adams was pleased to note that when, on 
the Sunday preceding Christmas, the parson of the Presbyterian church began 
his customary prayer for the king of England, he was stopped by a murmur. 
On Christmas Day the prayer was interrupted by "still greater confusion," 
and the following Sunday the "offensive clause" was completely omitted.9 The 
theater proved another excellent place for taking the pulse of popular senti-
mente He attended a production of the national tragedy, after which the 
actors, according to their custom, addressed the audience. On this occasion 
their address was interlarded with phrases betraying the republican spirit, a 
quote from a popular street song, and a solemn injunction not to be slaves. 
103 
.. 10 All these were received with strong applause. 'N'hen a new stage plaY', "De 
Ruiter," appeared, there was applause "a tout rompre lt for every line in which 
,,;, 11 / the En~ish were roughly treated. 
Other encouraging signs appeared. The presses continued to turn out 
innumerable pamphlets, handbills, songs, and poems, but more and more the 
preponderance of these were against the English, and, not infrequently, they 
contained favorable hints concerning the Americans. Private family groups 
and small social meetings also displayed strong anti-English sentiment.12 On 
a trip through the major cities of the Province of Holland, Adams deteoted a 
growing spirit of resentement toward England.13 In spite of all these good 
omens, he was wise enough not to become too sanguine. He recognized that the 
populace reflected the first strong feelings of resentment but that this sen-
timent had not yet proven capable of accepting the shock of heavy commercial 
14 losses. 
Time would demonstrate that Adams was more justified in his premonition 
than even he realized. Between the English manifesto of Deoember 20 and 
Yorke's departure from The Hague on December 25, an estimated two hundred 
Dutch ships with oargoes valued at fifteen million florins were seized.15 
The wealthy St. Eustatius in the West Indies was struck on February 3, 1781, 
and the value of its oapture was thought to be more than three million pounds 
16 
sterling. Fortunately for Adams' future negotiations the news of these 
losses did not reaoh the Netherlands until popular spirit had, to a degree. 
solidified. Even so. there was great distress at the news. especially at 
Amsterdam where the losses were the heaviest. This oity, the acknowledged 
leader of the republican and anti-English foroes, resolved to send deputies 
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to England to work out an accommodation. l ? The other cities of Holland, decl 
ing that they would not "debase themselves by courting the robbers," refused 
to support Amsterdam in her resolution and no delegation was 'ent. Dumas was 
quick to note that their manly statements would have been more noble if their 
18 losses had been on a par with Amsterdam's. On the other hand, the English 
population in some of these cities, for example, Rotterdam, was quite con-
siderable; so the unwillingness to compromise with England was all the more 
remarkable. The anti-English climate of opinion, which had by that time 
waxed strong enough to prevail over Amsterdam's anguish, was not primarily due 
to th~ efforts of John Adams but some part of the credit must in justice be 
given to him. 
As soon as the first hint of favorable signs appeared, Dana advised 
the minister to use the opportunity presented by the English. The manifesto 
of December seemed to have "thrown open the door wide, and let us enter with-
out hesitation." If, however, Adams should find the door not quite open, 
Dana, as one good militia diplomat to another, suggested entering anyway. He 
counselled that at times it was not only "necessary to step over a prescribed 
line," but also that when one did so to promote the interests of his country, 
he was "entitled to much merit.,,19 Adams took encouragement from such advice 
and in January (1?81) resumed his activities to enlighten the Dutch concerning 
America, to borrow money, and to seek recognition. 
As a first step, he again began to flood the presses with articles. 
Those sent to Digges usually appeared in the Courant, the choice of most 
20 Londoners for early American news. This channel o~ communication was short-
ly blocked by the British who inaugurated a much sterner policy of aurveil-
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lance and concentrated on the stoppage of all traffic in illegitimate oor-
respondence. Digges warned Adams that "the times are too much against us yet 
. 21 
to open the contraband commeroe which we formerly dealt in suice.stully." 
Correspondence between them gradually dwindled to the point of extinction. 
Communioation with Luzac, on the other hand, had been facilitated. Adams' 
private seoretary, Thaxter, living in Leyden with the minister's sons. could 
personally deliver artioles and he apparently made many trips to the editor 
of the Leyden Gazette.22 Probably the major pieoe of work translated and 
printed by Luzac was the pamphlet, The Crisis.23 but he frequently printed 
news items and artioles favorable to the Amerioan oause. Dumas regularly 
channeled to Luzao publishable material sent to him first by Adams. Official 
news and items ot unusual importance the minister generally .ent to Dumas at 
Tbe Hague to enable him to impart these items to various key figures before 
their appearanoe in print. Such, tor example, was the procedure with the 
congressional resolution praising Adams tor his stand of the preceding April 
24 
on paper money. A series ot revolts--in Washington's army, among the 
Vermonters, and of the Pennsylvania Line--provided stories which the English 
press dramatized.25 Dumas begged for information and also for Adams' im-
pressions in order to "tranquilize the weak and diminish the joy of the ill-
intentioned.,,26 Adams, in turn, colleoted his information froll a numbt'!r of 
correspondents--Dana, Franklin and his nephew W. T. Franklin, Williams, 
Mazzei, the Lees, and others throughout Europe as well as a large number of 
friends and relatives in America. Thus he was able to contradict the false 
reports which were designed ohiefly to give the impression that the spirit of 
rebellion was decreasing and that shortly the Americans would sue for peace. 
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He, on the contrary, stressed the motive of independence which fostered these 
revolts. The revolt of the Vermonters was purely to maintain their independ-
27 . 
ence from New York; the revolt in Pennsylvania was for redr'ss of minor 
grievances. The actions were far from being a return-to-England movement. 
The only two men of the Pennsylvania group who suggested joining the English 
. 28 
were promptly hanged by their fellow revolutionaries without further ado~ 
Prominent among all the publicists, Jenings continued to prove of 
inestimable worth to Adams. In 1781, Jenings became acquainted with the 
editor of Lettres Ho11andoises who lived in Bruase1se This editor was favor-
able to the American cause and glad to print articles to further it. Indeed, 
he requested material for a brief account of the situation in America as a 
special article to introduce his seventh vo1ume. 29 One of the first pieces 
Adams sent to Jenings to be forwarded was a pamphlet written by Ca1koen in 
defense of the Amsterdam burgomasters. For the most part, the logic of this 
pamphlet saemed irrefutable to Jenings, but he warned Adams that there was 
one theme of it which would cause trouble. The fear was that the United 
States would develop in extent and in power and thus become a dangerous com-
mercia1 rival. The old fear, earlier expressed by Dumas and then by Van der 
Cape11en, would be resurrected if the passage in 4uestion were printed. 
Jenings was not himself apprehensive of American rivalry but had heard the 
arguments from others and so had prepared a set of answers to assuage the 
fears of the doubtfU1.30 Adams signified his approbation of Jenings' proposed 
answers, and Jettings proceeded to draw up an article for publication. The 
chief premises of this article werel 1) There was no cause for any commercial 
jealousy between Europe and the United States. Rather. mutual advantages 
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would accrue, with the Dutch profiting most from the increased trade. 2) The 
United Jtatea had neither need nor desire to supplant the Dutch carriers but 
these would benefit more if American independence were aCknowiedged and a 
cownercial treaty signed. 3) In the evant that England were to regain her 
colonies, she would prevent a free commercial system. Therefore, the article 
concluded, Holland's own welfare depended on a treaty of alliance and com-
merce. 
31 
A week before Jenings submitted these proposals, Adams had requested 
him to collaborate with the editor of the Lettres Hollandoises on the subject 
of an alliance between the United Provinces and the United states. To that 
request, since he already had it in mind to attempt a treaty of amity and 
commerce, Adams appended the hint that there was good reason for introducing 
Jenings' speculations at that time. Jenings was quick to pick up the hint 
and to apply himself assiduously to promoting the objective. Consequently 
three subsequent issues of the Lettres pointed out the advantages in increased 
wealth, power, and commerce to the Netherlands from such an alliance. 
Jenings, fearful that the message might not be understood, took great pains 
to emphasize the need of IiUl alliance since "the more strokes given • • • will 
make the nail go better.,,32 
Fortunate to have someone willing and able to apply those strokes, 
Adams C0l41d devote time to other problems. At almost no time during his so-
journ in the Netherlands was he free from bills drawn by Congress. Invariably 
these had to be referred to Franklin for payment as his own efforts to effect 
a loan were long unsuccessful. He had very quietly applied to several houses 
as soon as he received the commission to negotiate a loan, but all refused. 
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political conditions during late November ana December, 1780, rendered any 
further effort unavailing for the time being. No event, however, could keep 
the busy mind of John Adams from observing, plotting, and preparing. John de 
Neufville had been suggested by Van der ~~pellen as an old and zealous friend 
of America.33 He was also the head of a large and thriving banking business. 
From the time of his arrival in Amsterdam, Adams had been acquainted with 
Neufville and had found him to be the only banker who, once Yorke had pre-
sented his fatal memorial, believed any loan could possibly be realized. Some-
time in January of 1781 the two men agreed to draw up terms and experiment 
with a loan. Neufville presented a rough dT9.ft of terms34 which served as a 
basis for discussions between Adams and the banker during February. 4~ter, 
Adams attributed his willingness to experiment ~t that particular time to the 
insistence of Neufville.35 It might have been more accurate to say that the 
co-operation offered by Neufville encouraged Adams to open the loan earlier 
than prudence or common sense would have dictated. Adams had personally 
made "all the solicitations that decency would countenance" but had failed. 
His friends and advisors, with the single exception of Neufville, warned him 
that he would ru:J.n the entire business if he tried to negotiate without first 
approaching the States General and William V. The problem was that. before he 
could approach these, he would need a commission to treat with them. The 
minister conceded that his advisors were in all probability correQt, but that 
he r:1Ust follow the di:oectives of Congress as given to him and try the experi-
ment. 36 
The directives of Congress. whether correctly or incorrectly inter-
preted by Adams, were certainly one of the reasons for initiating the loan, 
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but there were also other reasons. In the first instance, bills were regular-
ly being presented for payment. He had not a "Bingle ducat" and there was no 
certainty that F'ranklin could continue to meet the obligatiomS. Both he and 
Franklin had repeatedly besought Congress to stop drawing on accounts that 
were non-existent, but its plig}lt was such that Congress turned a deaf ear. 
Adams solemnly warned that, if FTanklin were to fail him, he would simply pro-
test the bills. That seemed preferable to engaging for them and then, being 
unable to pay, being sent to prison or declared bankrupt.37 Naturally, he 
was loathe to protest any bill drawn in the name of Congress as this action 
would be ruinous to American credit. In addition to the very material pres-
sure of outstanding bills, a more subtle pressure could be applied by Neuf-
ville through other Americans living in the Provinces. Neutville confidently 
predicted a considerable sum and importuned the minister constantly. Since 
the banker was a good host and extremely popular with the Americans in Amster-
dam, he might easily convince them that the only obstacle to a loan was the 
lack of authorization from Adams. Not desiring to be charged with negligence 
or obstinacy by his confederates and reasoning that no harm could be done as 
America had no credit to lose, Adams capitulated. Mutually agreeable terms 
for the loan were worked out with Neufville.38 
The loan was launched at the beginning of March, 1781, but it fared 
very badly. Neufville attributed the poor returns to having opened it too 
600n, but Adams disagreed. He was of the opinion that it was "better too 
soon than too late" since an opportunity once missed was a complete loss. 
Further, it was only by trying the experiment that he would "know whether we 
have credit and friends or not. 1139 However, he was not entirely satisfied 
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with Neufville's management. itJhen he had asked Bicker about Neufville the 
previous fall, Bicker had refrained from answering the query. Others, he dis-
covered, had a "public and a secret manner of speaking." Co~equently, in a 
formal letter, they would describe Neufville's as a very solid concern with 
sound credit; at the same time, they would, if asked in confidence, caution 
the inquirer to be careful. Adams found Neufville honest and well-meaning 
40 but not a clear-headed businessman. Consequently, when the loan was slow to 
materialize, Adams requested the banker to send some of the countersigned 
obligations to him as he intended to function as his own broker, banker, and 
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undertaker. Even while devoting his very best efforts, Adams was careful 
to counsel Congress to expect nothing for several months at least and assured 
them that the initiation of a loan at the time was regarded as a dangerous 
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measure "whi'h nobody but an American would have risked." His luck at bor-
rowing was no greater than Neufville's, and any hopes either had entertained 
were scuttled by the news of the lOBS of St. Eustatius--news which reached 
the Netherlands about the twentieth of March. However, when Neufville ex-
pressed relief at the minister's "indifferencen to the slow progress of the 
10an,43 Adams was properly indignant. By return post, he retorted that he 
was far from indifferent. lIe could agree with the banker only that, although 
his reputation among some people might be affected by success or failure, it 
meant little to him in a personal way- The important point was that he had 
his instructions from Congress, and he considered it his "indispensable duty" 
44 to follow these directives and make the attempt. His reply concluded on a 
more conciliatory note by appealing to NeufYille's pride and business in-
stinets to make a success of the affair. In spite of Neufville's efforts, 
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no more than five thousand florins were ever borrowed under this loan. Of 
these, three thousand were lent by Luzac who had promised that amount before 
the loan was ever opened.45 There were a number of reasons f6r the ill-luck. 
Many of the Dutch felt a dread of embroiling themselves further with England. 
Especially was this the case in March and April when there was a strong ex-
pectation that peace would be restored to the Netherlands through the pending 
Russian mediation. 46 Others feared to invest their funds in a losing cause. 
Many merchants had lost heavily at St. Eustatius and no longer had the where-
withal to lend to America. This last cause, however, should not be over-
estimated. Failure was not primarily due to shortage of money for investment; 
a Russian loan, also opened about the first of March, netted 2,200,000 florins 
within approximately three weeks.47 
Whatever activity Adams undertook was to some degree related to the 
projected treaty with the Netherlands--a subject that weighed heavily on his 
mind. Propaganda was undertaken to inform the people of the similarity in 
ideals and desires between the two republics. In that similarity, he be-
lieved, lay the foundation for a treaty as well as a loan. Regularly he 
discussed with friends and acquaintances and then transmitted to Congress the 
views they expressed of the absolute impossibility, even the danger, of at-
tempting a loan without first possessing powers to negotiate politically. 
The longer he applied himself to the work of enlightening popular opinion 
and of initiating a loan, the more convinced he became that some political 
connection was necessary between the American minister and the Netherlands 
government. He had undertaken his propaganda and loan activities even when 
advised against doing so. In the same manner he had been advised against 
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even mentioning a treaty. Nevertheless, he determined to attempt some con-
tact with the Dutch government. 
Late in January, 1781, he sought Dumas' opinion of the/propriety and 
the prudence of attempting to be "introduced to one or more persons in power. 
the Grand Pensionary or Holland, or any members of the states General, in 
order to have some conversation upon American affairs:49 To Adams the entire 
matter seemed very obvious. Since it was to the mutual advantage of both 
countries to form a connection, it shoUld be to their mutual advantage to 
discuss their relationships and through these discussions to obviate any dif-
ficulties Yhich lay in the path of such a connection. Dumas hastened to 
agree that a treaty was one of the two major objectives to be attained--the 
loan being the other--but disagreed th~t the present was an auspicious time 
to undertake it.50 In January and February the country was still waiting for 
an answer from Russia as to what help the Armed Neutrality would give them in 
their trouble with England. Everything depended on her answer to their appeal. 
If Russia acceded to the Dutch request for aid, it would be necessary for 
America to appeal for recognition first to Russia as the leader of the North-
ern confederation. Once America was recognized by Russia, her problem of 
attaining recognition from the other maritime powers would be considerably 
simplified.5l If Russia should not succour the Netherlands and if the Dutch 
wished to remain neutral, it would be impossible for,them to compromise their 
position by forming any connection with an American minister.52 
The minister and Dumas viewed the role of the Netherlands from differ-
ent angles. Adams' attention was focused primarily on the Netherlands. The 
Neutral League played only a subsidiary role in his thinking. Dumas viewed 
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Russia and the Neutral League as of first importance. Much of his correspond-
ence with the minister in the spring of 1781 counselled caution until the de-
cision of Russia on Anglo-Dutch affairs became known. Absolu~ely nothing 
could be undertaken politically without Russian concurrence. Congress was 
informed that it would be sufficient time to take an1 steps toward seeking 
recognition of American independence when the expected rupture between Russia 
and England took place. Until that time, any negotiation would be useless. 
Under no condition should any previous application be made to the Netherlands, 
Dumas insisted, since that country could not act without the concurrence of 
the Northern alliance.53 Adams informed Congress quite to the contrary. A 
minister to the Netherlands was essential. nIf a minister is not sent, this 
nation • • • will be disgusted. It is certainly ill policy to neglect a 
nation which is more likely than any other to be affectionately attached to 
us, as they are the center of the commerce of the world; as they are lovers 
of liberty, ••• and as they are of the Protestant religion." He offered 
various combinations of political alliance for Congress' choice; a minister, 
who also bad a commission to represent the United States in the other ~ritime 
countries, could be sent to the Netherlands; a minister could be sent to 
Russia to treat with all the neutral powers, and a second person sent to re-
side in the Netherlands and handle special interests there; t.inally, a minis-
ter might be sent to each of the maritime powers.54 B.J each of these alter-
natives, Adams specifically provided a minister to be stationed in the Nether-
lands. It was inconceivable to him that Congress should choose to authorize 
no one to negotiate with these countries. 
Since Dumas, the obvious person to arrange private introductions, re-
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fused to do so, ~dams was forced to hunt for another avenue of ingress to 
governmental circles. Article X of the Treaty of Alliance with France occured 
to him. By this article France had agreed to join America in Anviting other 
powers which had received injuries from England to make common cause with 
them. He opined that if Congress or someone authorized by Congress proposed 
this to France that country could not and would not refuse to fulfill the 
treaty.55 He ~epeated his reasoning on this to Dumas and to Searle asking 
each for his reaction. Searle being in Paris Adams requp.sted him to confer 
with Dr. Franklin on whether Franklin believed hL~self still possessed of the 
proper authority to make and to implement such a suggestion. This was an 
important question since the former commission composed of Franklin, Arthur 
Lee, and Adams had, until dissolved in 1779, power to treat and to make a 
treaty of commerce with any nation in Europe. If the dissolution of the com-
mission did not annul this authorization, Franklin would have succeeded to it. 
The next question would be whether or not he still possessed it. Communica-
tion across the ocean was both slow and uncertain. Searle assured Adams that 
Laurens had been made minister plenipotentiary to treat with the Netherlands. 
If Searle were correct, Laurens' authorization would supersede that of Frank-
lin.56 Searle also informed Adams that Congress had given to Adams Laurens' 
commission as minister plenipotentiary. Adams, never having received such a 
commission, concluded that either Searle was mistaken or that Congress had 
forgotten to transmit it. He possessed only the authorization to secure a 
loan in the Netherlands and for the time had no intention of claiming any 
other.57 He was convinced, however, that Congress should be contacted and 
authorization secured before the Northern powers settled their own affairs 
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with England, and America lost her opportunity to gain their assistance. Duma! 
agreed with Adams that it was high time Congress proposed that France join in 
extending an invitation to the neutral powers. For the purpo(e of issuing 
such an invitation, Dumas presumed that either Adams or Franklin possessed 
sufficient authorization. Adams willingly conceded that the point of author-
ization, once the feat was accomplished, would not be of great moment in an 
event of so much importance to America. He was certain that Congress would 
gladly ratify any accession of the neutral powers to the Franco-American 
Alliance whether initiated by Adams, Franklin, or even by Louis XVI without 
consulting either of the Americans.58 He did, however, believe that a prior 
commission would be of material importance in initiating an adherence of the 
Netherlands or of the neutral powers. 
A letter from Adams to Congress reminded that body of Article X of the 
alliance and warned that, if the expected hostilities between the neutral 
powers and England were to materialize, the "first moments of warmth and en-
thusiasm occasioned by this rupture, will be the most favorable" to invite 
them to join the alliance. To this he appended an explanation of the quandary 
as to who was authorized to issue the invitation. He strongly urged Congress 
to remove all doubts by granting a formal commission to someone to treat with 
the Northern powers and with Russia.59 In another letter addressed to Con-
gress, but never sent,60 he expressed his sentiments a little more fully. An 
interim commission should be given to someone since Laurens, who reportedly 
was authorized, would not be able to fulfill his duties for some time. If 
there were people who might feel it derogatory to accept an interim commis-
sion, there were others who willingly would do so in order to serve their 
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country. At any rate neither prudence nor good sense could sanction congres-
sional neglect of the Dutch. He went on to add that he was not particularly 
anxious to be the one commissioned but that he would accept t~ task if ap-
pointed. He would consider it his duty to render this service since he looked 
upon himself as an "expensive article" to the United States, his present com-
mission being "extremely honorable to me, but totally useless to the pub-
lic.,,61 
Following his general attitude that every opportunity to render service 
to his country must be grasped, Adams next sought the opinion of Dumas on pro-
posing to the States General a pact regarding war vessels. In the name of 
both wisdom and humanity the Dutch could permit their war vessels, privateers, 
and merchantmen to take their prizes to American ports and even to trade there. 
In return they could give a similar permission to the American captains to 
use the Dutch facilities. Dumas assured him that the proposal was valid and 
no real objection could be levelled against it. He was, nevertheless, strong-
ly against any such step for the time being as it would only serve to embar-
62 
rass Their High Mightinesses and could accomplish nothing. Again Adams 
conceded--partially. He accepted the idea that it was too early to present 
any proposal to the states General as a body but he maintained that "hints 
and ideastt might be made to individuals as a means of "familiarizing them with 
such speculations." He then grasped the opportunity to tutor Dumas on the 
proper role of a diplomat whose appointed function did not consist in waiting 
until "things go of themselves" after the critical moment was past. Rather, 
a diplomat should emulate the midwife and make preparations for the crisis to 
insure that all might go well. The Hague diplomats, carefully shunning him, 
-
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doubtlessly would not have appreciated his concluding piece of rusticity: 
"And the corps diplomatique, with all their superb pomp, are but a company of 
63 grannies." / 
Hardly had the ink dried on this pronouncement when Adams on February 
8, 1781, received the Journal of the Continental COngress. He read therein 
that he and the other ministers abroad had been commissioned to accede to the 
maritime regulations drawn up by the neutral powers. As Congress' resolution 
was taken as a result of a letter from Adams the previous April, he was jubi-
lant. ttTbus you see that I began the mischief, and I assure you I am ready 
to finish it, if properly invited, and a very little invitation will do.,,64 
Having this information was one thing; being able to use it was another. Rum-
mage through the mail packet though he would, he could find no commission for 
the purpose nor any resolution authenticated by the secretary. Dana was re-
quested to consult Franklin and others as to the proper step to take in this 
contingency. In the meantime Dumas was sent a copy of the Congressional 
Journal with the directive to have the extract published in its entirely un-
less he saw some cause for not doing so. Adams acknowledged himself anxious 
to be recognized as the instigator of "such fine compliments to the Empress, 
and the display of so much simple wisdom in Congress.,,65 
Possibly Adams could not repress himself until Dumas responded. In any 
case, the Amsterdam Gazette published a translation of the article from the 
Journals on the same day that Adams transmitted a copy to Dumas. Dumas ex-
pressed great pleasure at the news itself but deep regret that it had been 
published so precipitately in the Amsterdam paper. He was doubly annoyed to 
find errors in the translation published. One "vicious error" certain to 
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cause trouble, was in translating as though the United states bad been invited 
when the original text established the condition "if invited thereto." La 
Vauguyon had pointed out this particular problem to Dumas and~greed with him 
on steps to be taken to repair the error. The Amsterdam translation would be 
treated as one not proceeding from Adams. Dumas would then issue what might 
be considered the Official translation from the original possessed by the 
minister. In order to effect this, Dumas requested Adams not to take the 
translator to task or have him make the necessary corrections in a future 
issue.66 Dumas had a second cause for regretting the Amsterdam publication. 
He had desired to use the information for political ends first and then give 
it to Luzac to publish. Dumas thought he recognized in the resolution an 
easy means of securing a connection, perhaps an interview, between Adams and 
a minister of a foreign court residing at The Hague. This arrangement would 
now be rendered more difficult and possibly unattainable. Dumas also re-
gretted that Luzac's interests had been neglected. He reminded Adams that 
Luzac was an old and trusted friend and had merited the preference rather 
than a man who was a recent convert. He went on to warn the minister not to 
be too communicative in political affairs, especially not to those motivated 
by self-interest or jealousy, and intimated to Adams that gazetteers could 
belong to this group. Piqued at Dumas' criticism, Adams informed him that 
anything published in the Journal was free booty to any novelist and so an 
item could not be saved for a favored editor. Congress meant it to be pub-
lished as quickly as possible so that captains of vessels who were not for-
merly governed by the regulation would know and abide by the new rule. In' 
addition, the confidential use to which Dumas desired to apply it before 
publication was not possible as\dams had no authenticated copy except that 
found in the Journal.67 
A fev weeks later the proper commissions arrived. Du~ and Adams met 
then to decide on appropriate action. They agreed to present a memorial to 
the states General and to the ministers of the three other courts involved. 
Adams then retired to Leyden to compose a proper memorial and a series of 
letters to Van Berckel. La Vauguyon, and the ministers of Russia, Denmark and 
Sweden. In this memorial. presented on Maroh 8, 1781. Adams introduced him-
self as the minister plenipotentiary from the United States. He did not mer.-
tion to whom he was accredited. Regarding the enclosed resolution of Ootober 
5. Adams stated that, as the American Revolution "furnished the occasion of 
a reformation in the maritime law of nations," he hoped it vould not be 
thought improper that the United States should participate in the benefits 
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and duties flowing from these regulations. The letters to Prince Galitzin 
of Russia, to Baron de Saphorin of Denmark, and to Baron d'Ehrenswerd of 
Sweden eaoh enclosed a copy of the congressional resolution with a courteous 
request that it be transmitted to the minister's respective court as Adams 
was unable to personally present it at the court in question. Adams sent 
these letters to Dumas for any additions he thought it expedient to make. 
When satisfied with their contents, Dumas was carefully to seal and deliver 
them in person.69 
Dumas oalled the next morning at the home of the president of the 
States General but that gentleman was out so the delivery of all the packets 
was deferred until the following day. On Harch 10 he delivered the correspond 
ence beginning, according to Adams' directive, with the President of the State 
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General. The President questioned him about the contents of the letter and 
its origin. After answering these questions, Dumas was permitted to leave the 
packet together with his own name and address. He next attem~ed to visit the 
ministers of the Northern powers, but, as it was the day for their courier, he 
gained admission to the home of the Danish minister only. This gentleman 
promised to send Adams' letter to his court. At the other houses. he oould 
only leave the packet with his oard and hope for satisfactory actioh.'lO Adams 
sent a copy of the resolution to La Vauguyon, also, with the infor:nation that 
he had already communicated it to the other ministers concerned. He requested 
La Vauguyon's concurrence in the measure if an appropriate occ&lion should 
arise. La Vauguyon notified Adams that it would be completely impossible for 
him to seoond the measure without the express order of his court.?! Concern-
ing this reply Adams later commented that ttknowing perfectly ",ell the game ot 
the Count de Vergennes and his ambassador, it was precisely what I expeot-
ed. n?2. Within the week Adams was impatient for a reply from the states Gen-
eral and began to fear that the president might have the constitutional right 
to pocket, to suppress, or even to deliver to the stadholder papers addressed 
to Their High Mightinesses. The president, Dumas assured him, ~s not per-
mitted to either suppress or to deliver to another person papers addressed to 
the States General. The States General. however, could neglect or defer 
answering such papers as long as they wished. In the present situation, 
especially until England responded to Russia's current overtures to act as 
mediator between England ana the Netherlands, Adams should expect a lengthy 
wait.?' 
With that small consolation the minister had to be satisfied. In spite 
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of Dumas' faithful efforts, further information on the fate of the memorial 
was sketchy. In the first place, Dumas often had difficulty in contacting a 
member who could give him the desired information.74 The Ba~ was a rendez-
vous spot when the states General was in session but the deputies had to re-
turn frequently to their own cities or provinces for directives because they 
did not constitute a sovereign body. Also, anything as insignificant as the 
memorial was relegated to the background while more pressing matters con-
cerned Their High Mightinesses. March had been a very busy month for the 
states General. The government of the United Provinces was clumsy and every 
piece of business took an unconscionably long time. In spite of this hand!-
cap, the states General had finally issued a counter-manifesto against the 
British and had acceded to the offer of a Russian mediation of their diffi-
culties with England.75 The discussion over the augmentation of the army or 
navy or both was a party issue which consumed valuable time but never reached 
decisive aotion. Consequently, a matter of as little immediate concern as 
Adams' memorial went begging for a hearing. Early in April. Visscher, a 
pensionary of Amsterdam and a member of the States General, informed Dumas 
that, as far as he could ascertain, the President had sent the memorial to the 
Seoret Committee. This committee, composed of the ~lrst deputies of the 
respective provinces, could be expected to grant a general hearing on the 
measure. The next report sounded the death knell. To his surprise Dumas 
learned that the memorial had been turned over to the greffier or seoretary. 
Such action was the equivalent of rejection since any matter remitted to the 
greffier was considered finished unless resuscitated by a new order.76 In 
all probability Adams did not accept this news as the heartbreaking blow it 
,.. 
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might have been to him under different circumstances. He was already too busy 
with other plans. 
As soon as Adams read in the Journal of the Continental/Congress that 
all ministers were empowered, if occasion presented itself, to guarantee 
American adherence to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, he cast about 
him for an exact definition of his political powers. He was already convinced 
that the possibilities of a loan without some quid pro quo were small. He had 
sounded Dumas on proposing an agreement with the Netherlands regarding mutual 
permission for all ships of either country to enter the ports of the other, 
only to be told that it was a good idea--but not yet~?? Huch of February was 
devoted to exchanging opinions on the possibilities of implementing Article X 
of the Treaty of Alliance with France. When he informed Dumas that. according 
to Searle, Laurens had a commission, his correspondent replied that if Laurens 
had any powers they were at the bottom of the sea and useless. Furthermore, 
they had applied only to the Netherlands. Since he was now empowered to 
pledge American adherence to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, Adams 
should immediately apply to Congress for powers to treat with all countries 
concerned, beginning with Russia.?8 It seemed that every path ended at a 
brick wall unless and until he could discover some way of communicating on a 
political level. 
If this were the case, he would look for the means. ay mid-February 
the minister was toying with the thought that his powers to negotiate a loan 
implied the power to do whatever was necessary. Congress had expressly 
promised to ratify whatever was related to the object of a loan although no 
mention was made of treaties or alliances. "If such a treaty should be 
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necessary to accomplish a loan, I suppose the power is sufficient to negotiate 
and execute it and accordingly I should not hesitate to enter into conferences 
I 
upon the subject • • • even to execute in all the forms a treaty, one article 
of which should be a loan to the United States.,,79 When asked by Bioker if he 
had any power to treat with "bodies politic and corporate," Adams sent a copy 
of his commission to Bicker to judge for himself. In the accompanying note 
he pointed out to his friend that no power to make treaties or alliances had 
been given to him in express words. On the other hand, the members of the 
commission which had made the treaties with France in 1778 lacked not only the 
power but also the title of either ambassadors or ministers plenipotentiary. 
Therefore, he assured Bicker, there was a precedent to follow. If a loan de-
pended on a treaty he would readily execute a treaty, provided one article of 
it should be a loan, and he did not doubt that Congress would ratify it. 
Bicker was not convinced; he saw in the commission only the authorization to 
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raise a loan. 
Just at this point all quibbling over the possible use and extent of 
his powers ceased with a definite commission to the Netherlands. On the re-
port of a committee to whom Adams' letters of September 24 and 25 were re-
ferred, came a oommission giving him "full power, general and specific, to 
act in that quality LOf oommissione!?, to confer, treat, agree, and conclude 
with the person or persons vested with equal powers by the States General of 
the said United Provinces, of and concerning a treaty of amity and commerce." 
The commission added that Congress would ratify "such treaty, conventions, 
and agreements as he shall judge conformable to the ends we have in view." 
With this commission he received a detailed plan of a treaty and the inatruo-
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tiona to adopt this plan in "whole or without any essential alterations. 1t 
Above all, care was to be taken to accept nothing inconsistent with the 
treaties already concluded with France.8l Unfortunately, the fequisite let-
ters of credence to Their High Mightinesses and to the Prince of Orange were 
not enclosed. These were promised by the next conveyance since Hun~ington, 
the President of Congress, had thought it undesirable to delay all the dis-
patches until these credentials were prepared. Two days after the commission 
and instructions were dispatched, the credentials were drawn but the "next 
conveyance" failed to deliver them to Adams until April 6. nearly six weeks 
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after he received the commission. 
Without credentials there was little Adams could do in a ministerial 
way. He applied to Bicker, Dumas, and others for advice but was told to do 
nothing "tor fear of throwing betore the people new objects of division and 
dissension.,,83 The country was too overwrought to listen kindly to any pro-
posal which could further endanger hopes for peace. "They are furious for 
peace. Multitudes are for peace with England at any rate, even at the expense 
of risk of joining in the war against France, Spain, America, and all the 
rest. They are in a torpor, a stupor such as I never saw any people in be-
84 fore." It was a relief to him to know that ultimatel)" he would bave the 
requisite commission. For the interim he was sufficiently busy without it. 
His loan opened the first of March and he was busy signing his "obscure name 
. 85 
nine and twenty thousand times" to obligations and coupons. He was de-
cidedly more interested in the memorial on adherence to the Neutral League 
which he did present to the States General on March 8 than in a commission 
sans credentials. Oddly, he did not even acknowledge to Congress the receipt 
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of his commission for nearly a month although he had corresponded with Phila-
delphia in the meantime. When he did write, he emphasized the lengthy process 
any request for recognition would follow. After lying upon t~e table for a 
long time, the request would be taken ad referendum, i.e., sent to the various 
provinces, cities, and bodies of nobles who composed the sovereignty. These 
would "deliberate, and deliberate, and deliberate" before returning any an-
swer. He would do all in his power to secure the desired treaties but felt 
"obliged to say that no commission that was ever given required more patience, 
fortitude, and circumspection than this." These were, he added with nearly 
as much truth as humility, fl"nrtues which I much fear have not fallen in suf-
ficient quantities to my share.,,86 
The only action he took during March primarily as a result of his new 
duties was to assure Dumas that he had every intention of continuing to use 
that gentlemants services.87 On one of the last days of the month. he penned 
a rough draft of a memorial requesting recognition of American independence 
to be presented to the States General when the opportunity arose. The arrival 
of his credentials on April 6 seemingly moved him to make another rough 
88 draft. A considerable rearrangement of his thoughts took place between 
these two drafts but the message was unmistakably the same. In the first, and 
with two very minor changes in the second, he proposed that in case he would 
not be accepted as minister plenipotentiary, he had a right and duty to attend 
the peace conference wherever it might be held. In addition. he had the right 
to demand all the privileges and prerogatives granted by the law of nations 
to a minister plenipotentiary travelling through or temporarily residing in a 
country other than his destination. These lines definitely evidenced his 
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recognition of the possibility that he r~ight not be accepted by the United 
Provinces. His third, and fina~ draft completely omitted this paragraph and 
worked on the assumption that he would be admitted.89 The on~ other major 
change between the early drafts and the final one was the omission in the 
final form of several paragraphs stating his reasons for being in France, his 
inability--due to English indisposition to treat--to fulfill his previous com-
mission, and his subsequent reasons for having left France and entered the 
Netherlands. 
The arrival of his letters of credence encouraged him to greater 
activity. .After di~re5sing on the complicated series of conveyances by which 
they reached Amsterdam, Adams promised Congress that he would try to present 
them shortly although the prospect was dim. He tried writing a note to inform 
La Vauguyon of thf'! new commission and to express his readiness to confer with 
the French ambassador whenever it seemed necessary for the common good to do 
so. For some unexplained reason, he left the note uncompleted. La Vauguyon 
finally received word of the commission in a very formal note a few days be-
fore A.dams presented to the states General a memorial seeking recognition.90 
Since he was now endowed with a more permanent character, Adams felt 
he should establish a residence suitable to his position. He decided to re-
main in Amsterdam as it was the most convenient city for the merchants who 
had bills of exchange to settle through him.9l It was also a favorite city 
for Americans, both resident and travelling, and a residence there would' 
enable him to meet more of these people. As most of his time, until the 
previous month or two, had been passed in Amsterdam, he had made numerous 
acquaintances in the city whom he was loathe to leave. 92 He contacted the 
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firm of Sigourney, Ingraham, and Bromfield as the best acquainted with Ameri-
can ideas and requested that they procure a suitable dwelling for him. 
Elaborating on his definition of suitable, he directed that th6 kitchen, four 
bedrooms for gentlemen and two for servants, a large reception room and a 
room for transacting business were to be immediately furnished. A man to 
take care of the house and a cook were to be hired. The firm was not to spend 
above three thousand guilders a year on the establishment. 93 Planning more 
carefully for his needs, he soon decided that two men servants should be 
hired--one for the affairs of the house and the other for footman and valet. 
A carriage for four passengers was to be provided along with horses and 
coachman. To do things in proper style, Sigourney and Company were to pro-
cure three sets of livery to consist of deep blue cloth coat and breeches with 
scarlet oape and scarlet waistcoa.t, and a hat and great coat. His next set 
of directions dealt with such incidentals as the number of tea cups, knives, 
forks, and table napkins to purchase. After penning these quite explicit 
orders, he admitted it was "new work" to him as he had never troubled about 
94 furnishings for a home before. 
In mid-March irancis Dana in Paris received a commission to st. Peters-
burg. Instructed by Congress to consult both Franklin and Adams regarding 
this commission. he notified Franklin of it. After meeting with the doctor 
and Vergennes, he planned a trip to Amsterdam. Before Dana departed for the 
Netherlands, Franklin gave a half-hearted consent to the Petersburg mission 
but used the occasion to express his sentiments again on militia diplomacy. 
He informed Dana that he felt America erred in offering an alliance before it 
was desired. He though it far preferable not to have issued commissions for 
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ministers to the several courts, including those of Spain and Holland, to 
which comr'lissions lud been given, until Congress had ascertained privately 
whether they would be received. He argued tJ:J.at each refusal ~s an additional 
slight and made the business of getting connections at other courts more dif-
. lt 95 fJ..cu • 
Dana departed Paris on Sunday, April 9 and so undoubtedly was in con-
tact with Adams before tbat individual completed a letter addressed to Frank-
lin. In this letter Adams couched a stront:: rebuttal to Franklin's wait-until-
invi ted policy and advocated his own more aggressi vo method. :£"irst, he de-
clared that ::..urope was really in America's debt and in justice owed America 
the help she asked. 
If America could dissemble enough to threaten other nations with 
a return to Great Britain they would be ready to hang themselves to 
prevent it. But ,America is too honest and sincere to play this game. 
England would have all the mountains of Mexico and Peru in a few 
years if America should join her. Yet we are slighted. God forgive 
them, and enable America to forget their ungenerosity. 
He then turned to expound the propriety and the reasonableness of American 
requests. 
4merica has fought Great Britain and Ireland for six years, and not 
only Great Britain.!. but many <Jtates of Germany, many tribes of Indians, 
and many negroes LsiS7, their allies. Great Britain has been moving 
earth and hell to obtain allies against us, yet it is improper in us 
to propose an alliance! Great Britain has borrowed all the super-
fluous wealth of Europe, in Italy, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and 
some in France, to murder us, yet it is dishonorable in us to propose 
to borrow money! 
Put if, in spite of these facts, European nations were determined to maintain 
tLeir neutrality, he would gladly settle for a complete neutrality. 
Let all Europe stand still, neither lend men nor money nor ships to 
England nor America, and let them fight it out alone. It would give 
my share of millions for su§g a bargain. America. is treated unfairly 
and ungenerously by Europe. 
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He further justified his diplomatic creed to Dana in a final grUIllble before 
involving himself even more deeply in the direct action he admired. The 
United states were proposing nothing dishonorable. Any Europe~ court which 
did not recognize American aims as consistent with its own, had a right to 
"candidlyaay so" and there would be no harm done. 97 
Verbal sparring with Franklin was not allowed to deter him from the 
greater duties he was now prepared to initiate. "The black cloud that hung 
over the whole of the seven provinces; the solemn gloon that pervaded the 
whole nation; the universal undertainty and the timidity that had seized upon 
all minds, determined me to bring my own mission to a trial.,,98 It appeared 
to him that he had much to gain and little to lose by such a trial. He was 
anxious to receive recognition from as many countries as possible before 
peace negotiations were opened. He feared that countries at war with England, 
but anxious for peace, might accede to Britain's desire for stiff terms toward 
America unless restrained by their own previous recognition of the United 
States.99 He assured Congress that an exposition of all his reasons and 
motives for acting at that particular time would require too much time and 
space for him to enumerate them. In general, he felt that his measures would 
be more effective if performed immediately than if they were delayed since 
"every moment's delay would have been attended with danger and inconven-
ience."lOO 
More and more during the early weeks of April, Adams devoted his time 
to consultations with friends, many of whom were members of the sovereignty 
and among the most respected men in the country. These consultations con-
vinced him that it was time to polish a copy of his draft memorial describing 
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his mission and to present it with his credentials to the Prince and to the 
states General. If they rejected it, he would simply leave the country. If 
they accepted it, his mission would be accomplished. If they took it ~ 
referendum. which was the action most to be expected, he and his friends would 
benefit from an increased safety and security. While the national delibera-
tions dragged on, he would enjoy a quasi-diplomatic position which would se-
cure the protection of government, public faith, and national honor. lOl 
Dumas cautioned Adams that, when he came to The Hague to present his 
credentials, it would be prudent to first arrange a meeting with La Vauguyon. 
By doing so he would retain the ambassador's personal friendship and gcod 
will. There was no expectation that La Vauguyon would approve of the con-
templated action but a lack of courtesy could result in strained relations 
that would be harmful to the project. By giving the Duke "verbal knowledge," 
Adams could avoid submitting the action or the details of the plan to the 
102 determination of La Vauguyon or Vergennes. Adams apprehended difficulties 
in this interview but recognized the prudence involved. He was certain that 
Vergennes knew of the appointment--perhaps even before he himself had learned 
of it--aad had probably instructed La Vauguyon to throw every conceivable ob-
stac1e in the way of any action Adams might take. As distasteful as the 
interview with La Vauguyon promised to be, Adams judged it preferable to the 
consequences of neglecting the confrontation. Consequently, he dispatched, 
with Commodore Gillon who happened to be travelling to The Hague, a very 
formal note apprising La Vauguyon of his commission and credentials.103 
La Vauguyon requested an immediate interview in the event that Adams 
was contemplating any specific action. Upon Adams' arrival at the Duke's 
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residence, La Vauguyon spent two hours trying to persuade him not to present 
his credentials. La Vauguyon explained that he had not received any instruc-
tions which would entitle him to make even the slightest obse~ations in an 
official capacity. From his own personal viewpoint, however, La V~uguyon ar-
gued that it was not a good time to present credentials or request recogni-
tion. La Vauguyon supported his argument with all the local knowledge that 
he had gathered through several years' residence in the Netherlands. He sug-
gested that Adams contact some of the Patriots and assured the minister that 
104 these would support the ambassador's reasonings. Adams characteristically 
felt that he knew better what the Patriots approved. He had been in frequent 
consultation with such persons as Van Berckel, Van der Capellen, Van der 
Kemp, and Luzac and had their full approbation. In his own mind, he believed 
them unanimously of his opinion that the American negotiations, both commer-
cial and political. should proceed but "should be kept as distincb as possible 
from all French influence.,,105 
The following day the Duke returned the call and the two men spent the 
entire morning and into the afternoon in discussion. "He went over all the 
ground we had trod the day before, and ran all about Europe, especially the 
Northern Maritime Confederation. to find arguments against the step I proposed 
to take." When La Vauguyon objected to Adams' intended call on the States 
General, Adams found nno solidity ••• mere pretexts" in the ambassador's 
objections. ~~ Vauguyon then desired a postponement of the mission but Adams 
was too wily to accept that. He was convinced beforehand that Vergennes 
would be "point blank against me." and he preferred to act without being 
officially informed of Vergennes' displeasure. The Duke's 4ext inspiration 
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was . to urge that either Adams and La Vauguyon together, or La Vauguyon alone 
if Adams preferred, solicit the king for a directive to La Vauguyon to support 
Adams. This, too, Adams rejected as he was well aware who dir'cted the ldngts 
decisions in foreign affairs. He then informed La Vauguyon that he was de-
termined to proceed and would not change his mind even if he had a resolution 
of the king' s council right before his eyes. He insisted that tiae was 
precious and these negotiations could be spun out for years. Adams then 
closed the discussion by declaring that no ambassador, minister, council, or 
court was responsible for his actions. He alone should bear the responsibili-
ty for the •• l06 There was no choice for La Vauguyon but to yield. 
Each man took a dim view of the other's logic. Adams tersely stated. 
"His topics appeared to me extremely frivolous." La Vauguyon was of the 
opinion that it was Adalis' argument which was weak. "He responded to my ob-
servations with very .ague reasonings which did not appear to me to be well 
founded.10? Notwithstanding. the two men parted as friends. La Vaug\lyon 
promised his support as a private citizen although the proposal was contrary 
to his opinion and advice. Adams, from that time, always expressed deep 
respect for the personal character of La Vauguyon. Future contacts between 
the two men were much less·infrequent and much more friendly--the Duke aDd 
all his family received Adams with courtesy and even "the freedom and familiar-
ity of triendship*"loS Adams always spoke highly ot the ambassador and was 
generous in praising their mutual relations when asked about the. by Livings-
ton. La Vauguyon on his part was most careful to assure Adams of his estee. 
and good will and was pleased to receive AdallS. in return .109 These exchanges 
o~ courtesies may have given no direct aid to the AIIerican but they certainly 
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prevented a serious division in the Patriot party and, conceivably, a cause 
lost before it had time to mature.110 
Vergennes' reaction was sympathetic toward his ambassadOr at The Hague. 
He assured the Duke that he had taken the wisest course, but Vergennes was 
"not astonished at the little success. • • • I have had in various things to 
treat with this American plenipotentiary and have never been able to overcome 
his stubbornness." As for the business itself, "the step on which he has 
consulted you appears to us out of place in every respect and it can only be 
displeasing to the states General as it is not yet their convenience to ree-
ognize the independence of the United States." He then gave La Vauguyon 
directions for the future. "You will make no step to favor the admission of 
his letters of credence and if they are not received, as will probably hap-
pen, you will endeavor to convince him that they could not be in the present 
circumstances. It Vergennes had not added the final phrase as a device to re-
move the sting of rejection from Adams' heart in case of failure. It was a 
'much more pragmatic approach than that. If Adams did not accept La 
Vauguyon's explanation, "your words will serve at least to justify our pro-
ceedings if Mr. Adams should place us in the situation of making them known 
in America."lll Small wonder that Adams complained that after the treaty was 
signed Vergennes gathered unmerited credit. The Foreign Secretary had his 
minister in America formally announce to Congress that France had assisted in 
forming the connection between the two republics, at which announcement Con-
, 112 grees approved a vote of thanks. 
The necessary interview with La Vauguyon settled, Adams proceeded to 
the next step. He wrote out and signed two copies of his memorial. On the 
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nineteenth ot April these were addressed to Peter van Bleiswick, the Grand 
Pensionary of Amsterdam, and to M. Fage1, the Secretary of the States General. 
The memorial to the states General was of considerable 1ength./ It briefly 
developed the causes which had led America to declare her independence and 
dwelt at greater length on the country's intention of maintaining that in-
dependence. He then explored the topic of natural alliances between the new 
world and the old and pointed out that the most natural alliance of all was 
one between the two republics. This statement led to a discourse on the 
several political, religious, and commercial ties between them. As the 
Netherlands was a highly commercial country. Adams devoted a large part ot 
his memorial to the discussion of the commercial advantages which would accrue 
to the Dutch nation through an alliance with America. He concluded with the 
information that he was tully accredited to witness America's friendship and 
regard for her sister republic. In a much briefer memorial to the Prince of 
Orange. Adams informed the stadho1der of his commission as minister plenipo-
tentiary and his desire to present his credentials to the Prince. He briefly 
noted that it was in the spirit of renovating old friendships rather than of 
introducing new ones that he presented himse1f.113 
Barely had the two copies of the memorial been addressed when the 
States of Holland adjourned. Dumas, whose advice in these details Adams 
generally accepted. counselled presenting his memorial when the States of 
114 Holland were in session. This he thought would be early in May. Adams 
used the interim to good purpose. It had been the general opinion of his 
friends and confreres that the memorial should be published in the three 
languages--French, Dutch, and English. Copies were to be prepared for every 
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member of the sovereignty in all the provinces--somewhere between three and 
four thousand persons. Adams preferred that Luzac make the French transla-
tion because of his great reputation throughout Europe for articles in French. 
Dumas, however, pleaded for the privilege and Adams yielded. By this time 
Dumas was completely converted to the policy of prompt action and was as 
anxious as Adams to proceed. His translation was shortly completed and ready 
115 to go to the printers whenever Adams gave the signal. The Dutch transla-
tion was made by Luzac's brother-in-law, a bookseller, printer, and gazet-
teer at Delft. He enjoyed the reputation of being "one of the most masterly 
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writers in the nation in their own language." 
The translation in good hands and under control, Adams was free to 
marshal other forces and to apply pressures from a variety of directions. To 
Jenings he sent "some broken hints" and rjquested that Jenings expand them and 
have them published as a subject of importance. The general theme of his 
"hints" was the importance of American independence to the Dutch and the dire 
consequences to the latter if, in the future, America and England joined 
against a Dutch nation that had been unfriendly. These hints were complemen-
tary to those of a former letter to Jenings in which he dwelt extensively on 
the idea that the Hollanders could not justly say that they had nothing to 
gain from the war. They had a great deal to lose and the question was one of 
retaining and defending what they had. As usual Jenings responded immediately 
and by April 30 had met with a collaborator to get the "hints" into good 
form. ll7 Contrary to all his former ideas, Adams wrote to Franklin that he 
was inclined to begin protesting bills. American bills of exchange were in 
excellent credit and much sought as they were selling above par. If a set 
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were protested, the mercbants would get busy and exert their influenoe to re-
build the credit. "There is an appetite here for American trade as ravenous 
/ 
as that of a shark for his prey; and if they saw any prospect of having their 
118 trade broken up they would do much to save it." Even the aid of his wife 
was requisitioned although her help would neoessarily be long in arriving. 
Having informed her that he was destined to stay in Holland for some time, he 
requested that she have one of his early writings, The Dissertations on the 
Canon and Feudal Law, printed either in pamphlet form or in the newspapers. 
She was then to send a copy by every opportunity until sure that one had 
arrived. He mentioned his anxiety to have it for a speoial purpose.119 The 
partioular use to which he put it was to have a reprint made and addressed to 
Their High Mightinesses to help their deliberations on the justioe of the 
cause he represented. This reprint he later included in the volume of papers 
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which he caused to be printed relative to his reception as minister. 
On the first of May Dumas carried to Van Bleiswick a note from Adams 
requesting an interview for early the next morning as Adams had something of 
importanoe to oommunicate. Van Bleiswick, Grand Pensionary of !\msterdam, 
was the most important oitizen of the republic and, therefore, his good will 
was of paramount importance. At the ensuing interview Adams told the Grand 
Pensionary of his commission and of his intention to communicate his powers 
and credentials on Friday, May 4, to the States General and to the Prince. 
Van Bleiswiok suggested that there would be a problem involved in accepting 
these since Amerioa's independent status was not yet recognized. Adams 
failed to see that this should present any barrier since the Netherlands were 
at war with England. To this reply, Van Bleiswick merely smiled and agreed 
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121 that they had a common enemy. Accordingly on Friday morning, Adams, on the 
advice of La Vauguyon, visited Van Bleiswick again in order to give him a copy 
of the memorial. Van Bleiswick declined it with the advice t~t it was not 
the custom for foreign ministers to present to him any missive intended for 
the states General. He suggested that the copy intended for him should rather 
be presented to the Secretary, Fagel. He also warned Adams of the conduct to 
be expected of the President of the States General when the minister approached 
tha t gentleman .122 Bleiswick had cause to be well informed on the forth-
coming reaction of Van Lynden van Hemmen, the President for that week.123 
After his interview with Adams on l4ay 2 t Van Bleiswick had informed the 
Prince of Adams' intentions. Together they concerted a plan which William V 
outlined to Van Hemmen. A meeting of William, Fagel, Van Bleiswick, and Van 
12ft. Hemmen was then called to discuss the appropriate action for all to follow. 
After leaving the home of Van Bleiswick, Adams approached Van Hemmen. 
This gentleman responded exactly as predicted by Van Bleiswick and as agreed 
in their conference two days before. He refused to accept a copY' of the 
memorial as doing so could be interpreted as diplomatic reCOgnition of America, 
a step for which he could not assume the responsibility. He was willing, how-
ever, to listen to Adams and to report the business immediately to Their High 
Mightinesses. He assured Adams that it would thus be referred to the delibera-
tions of the several provinces. Adams accepted this promise as the best ar-
rangement he could procure. Nevertheless, he informed Van Hemmen that it was 
his intention to have the memorial printed and distributed so as to avoid mis-
construotions.125 Since no copy of the memorial was accepted by the States 
General, none could be published and thuB distributed to all members of the 
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sovereignty by that body. Adams chose the only method which could accomplish 
126 this objective, ~., make copies available himself. President Hemmen 
smiled at this proposal but made no comment. / After Adams' departure, Van 
Hemmen appeared before the states General to make his report. The deputies 
of all provinces except Zealand asked for copies of the President's report to 
transmit to their respective provinces. This was what was technically known 
as taking the affair ad referendum.127 
While Van Hemmen was making his report, Adams visited Baron de 
Larrey,128 secretary to the Prince, to deliver the briefer memorial intended 
for the Prince with a oopy of the memorial to the States General. The 
secretary promised to present it. Since the President had declined to accept 
the memorial, Adams and Dumas decided to dispense with taking one to Fagel, 
the Secretary of the States General. Approaching him under these conditions 
seemed improper although it had been Van Bleiswickls suggestion. They there-
fore returned to Adams' lodgings to await results. About two hours later, 
de Larrey brought the unopened packet with the Prince's explanation of the 
impropriety of his receiving any letter from Adams before the ~tion had 
129 recognized American independence. 
Adams had now done all in his power to secure an official acceptance 
of his memorW and credentials. In view of the fact that he had apprised 
the President of his intentions of having the memorial printed and distributed, 
he felt no qualms in proceeding. Therefore, Adams signed the French transla-
tion made by Dumas and ordered Dumas to have it published.l}O The next 
morning the minister again visited La Vauguyon to inform him of the actions 
and reactions of the previous day. The ambassador once more promised to 
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support Adams in his private capacity although he was still of the opinion 
that the measure was taken at a most unfavorable time.13l 
Before Adams departed from The Hague, La Vauguyon explained to him 
that in all probability ministers of the republic would wish to know the 
French position on the action taken by Adams. The ambassador intended to in-
form them that he had ha~o communication or instruction from his court on 
the subject and therefore could not take any stand. In brief, he would as-
sume a neutral position.132 Adams was very agreeable to this proposal as it 
was all he had hoped or expected from the French ambassador. Soon, however, 
La V3.uguyon had second thoughts. Delicate negotiations133 between France and 
the Netherlands could be jeopardized by the embarrassments Adams' memorial 
might have caused the States General. Expediency required that he convince 
the leading members of the republic that the action, in spite of his dis-
claimer, was not secretly French instigated. His intention to dissociate 
France from any unpleasantness in connection with the memorial took on a new 
urgency. La Vauguyon contacted Van Bleiswick and various republican leaders 
and assured them that the proceedings of Adams were not concerted with 
France.l34 In order to prevent later criticism from Adams he carefully re-
frained from passing adverse judgment on the step itself, but emphasized his 
own non-participation in it. Apparently he carried off this maneuver with 
a considerable degree of success. Even such l\nglophiles as Schultens and 
Van Goens,13; although normally inclined to suspect French intrigue, were 
persuaded that he had condemned rather than assisted the work. An intelli-
gence report sent to England also interpreted La Vauguyon's attitude as ad-
verse to Adams' project. Further, it sought to explain the French failure to 
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countenance Adams' action as a sign that France was disposed to abandon the 
"rebels" to their fate. l 3£) The Prussian ambassador, Thulemeyer, who could 
generally furnish a reasonably accurate running commentary on men and events, 
was not so easily convinced. He informed Frederick II that La Vauguyon 
seemed discontented with Adams' proceedings but that he himself privately 
thought the French minister had probably been the author of it.137 
This deduction Vergennes was as anxious to avoid, or to dispel, as was 
La Vauguyon. He instructed his minister to explain to those who might ap-
proach him that not only had he not concerted the step with Adams but he had 
done all in his power to deter the American. He was to add that the French 
government censored the demarche as being made "out of season." If Adams 
were to apply for further advice, La Vauguyon was to inform the minister that 
he had set himself the rule of not hazarding more counsel where that already 
given had been so lightly regarded. At the same time he was to break his 
newly-made rule by extending "one last mark of interest." He was to try to 
persuade Adams to withdraw his credentials quietly and await more favorable 
circumstances for presenting them. In the meantime La Vauguyon was not to 
worry about the complaints his actions would probably elicit from Adams. 
Vergennes had already instructed his minister in America, the Chevalier de 
la Luzerne, to present the facts of the case as they affected French conduct 
and principles to Congress. He was justifiably convinced that Adams would 
receive little sympathy there.138 
Vergennes had more important things in mind than merely preventing 
Adams from recewing congressional sympathy. He had long been working through 
1uzerne to have Congress put a check on the precipitous minister before Adams' 
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ventures could seriously disrupt the Count's careful diplomacy. Vergennes 
expressed the opinion that the minister's actions were not according to the 
intentions of Congress but rather the outgrowth of Adams' own)'e:xalted imag-
ination" and his desire for "a political role.,,139 The presentation of the 
memorial and credentials and their subsequent rejection by Prince and states 
General tended to compromise the United states and so furnished Vergennes 
another opportunity to demonstrate to Congress that Adams was irresponsible. 
Luzerne was therefore to urge Congress to transmit to Adams "instructions 
capable of moderating his ardor." To prevent further risks to delicate French 
diplomacy through similar rash actions by Adams or anyone else, Congress was 
to be persuaded to "prescribe once and for all to all its agents in Europe" 
that they take no action of a political character without previously consult-
140 ing France. 
Adams remained blissfully unaware of, or blissfully unperturbed by, the 
French machinations. He was far too busy. 
I was minister plenipotentiary for making peace; minister pleni-
potentiary for making a treaty of commerce with Great Britain; min-
ister plenipotentiary to Their High Mightinesses the States General; 
minister plenipotentiary to his serene highness the Prince of Orange 
and stadholder; minister plenipotentiary for pledging the faith of 
the United states to the Armed Neutrality; and what perhaps at that 
critical moment was of as much importance to the United states as 
any of those powers, I was commissioner for negotiating a loan of 
money to the amount of ten millions of dollars, and upon this de- 141 
pended the support of our army at home and our ambassadors abroad. 
Never bashful about letting his light shine upon the mountain, he described 
himself as "ardently engaged and indefatigably occupied" in the business of 
142 discharging all these duties. Although Adams admittedly was not the master 
of the understatement, his activity probably matched his words. 
Before leaving The Hague he had directed Dumas to have copies of the 
142 
143 
memorial printed and distributed. Dumas assumed the responsibility for 
omitting a short section at the beginning and the end in which Adams mentioned 
his commission to the Netherlands. He ordered an initial allotment of five 
hundred copies in each of three languages--Dutch, French, and English. Of 
these, three hundred were to be placed with the bookdealer who had charge ot 
printing them. The bookdealer, in turn, would sell or distribute them to his 
correspondents throughout the seven provinces. One hundred sets were to be 
sent to Adams for whatever use he wished to make ot them. Dumas himself 
would take charge of the final one hundred sets and distribute them to those 
persons who properly should be among the tirst to receive oopies. lIe would 
also provide the gazetteers with copies as soon as possible so that they 
could reprint and thus aid in spreading the knowledge of it. Adams, when 
informed, was perfectly satisfied with the arrangementse His only desire was 
to see it printed and distributed as soon as possible SO that the Dutch might 
see that their prosperity and very existellce depended on an earl,. connection 
with the United states.l44 On l~,. 11 the printing was completed and the 
distribution began. The bookdealer, according to previous arrangement, sent 
packets of the memorial to his oorrespondents in all the principal cities. 
Adams received a hundred sets. He carefully dispatohed two copies to La 
Vauguyon and distributed the remainder where he believed the,. would have the 
greatest effect. Dumas estimated that he sent out nearly one hundred and 
fifty copies that first da,.. Already on the next morning, the twelfth, word 
was received at The Hague that Amsterdam was reprinting the Dutch and possibl,. 
the French translations.145 As soon as the memorial was made publio, the 
majority of the journals of the oountry inserted oopies. In order to avoid 
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breaking up the memorial into shorter seotions, the widely circulated Courier 
of the Lower Rhine added an extra news sheet. In the course of the week the 
146 
memorial was well known throughout Europe as well as in the republic. 
The reception accorded it was favorable beyond expectation. Even the 
147 Anglophiles were able to find very little to dispute in it. Dumas posted 
men in various centers to discover what the general reaction was and to send 
him word. These assured him that they had heard no criticism of it but a 
great deal of praise. Adams discovered the same to be true in Amsterdam, 
where the popular cry became flHsalth to Myn Heer LSii/ Adams, and health to 
148 the brave Americans, II but he was too seasoned a public figure to take 
praise at its face value. He candidly wondered "if the effect will advance 
beyond the applause." Dumas' early pollsters had also inquired about the 
149 probable result but "everyone keeps a profound silence on that." Adams 
very naturally informed Congress of the step he had taken and enclosed copies 
of both memorials. Although he was pleased to add that the printed memorial 
was well received, he cautioned Congress that "the public voice has not that 
influence upon government in any part of Europe that it has in every part of 
America." Congress should, therefore, not expect any immediate results.150 
He himself did not. Dumas submitted the opinion given him by a friend that 
it might take three or four weeks for the various cities and provinces to 
act. Adams, not expecting a reply that soon, was perfectly willing to give 
time for deliberation. He would be satisfied with a response in eight or 
ten weeks, particularly as he presumed the Netherlands would postpone a de-
ci5ion until ~lssiats course of action was known. If Russia did not join in 
the war effort, he believed it probable that the Netherlands would willingly 
l~ 
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accept an invitation to join the Franco-American alliance. The first step 
toward this would be the acceptance of the memorial and the concomitant re-
ception of the American minister. / 
The rapid dissemination of the memorial led to some errors in printing 
and in editorial comment. In general, Adams took these in stride much better 
than Dumas. In the Courier of the Lower Rhine, the editor stated that Presi-
dent Van Hemmen had accepted the memorial from .l.dams and would serve as its 
patron. This inaccuracy worried Dumas, but the minister's only reaction was 
to thank Mr. Manson for the extra page he had devoted to the memorial and for 
his editorial comment.152 Dumas' special animus was reserved for the author 
of the article on the memorial in La Politique Hollandais. This unfortunate 
gentleman irritated Dumas by claiming that his English translation was made 
before The Hague translation appeared. He further offended by making several 
errors in translation, all of which Dumas carefully pointed out to Adams. To 
offset any fu~rm donft by the publication of these errors, Dumas sent an amend-
ing article to the Courier of the Lower Rhine, the paper most widely read and 
most apt to correct misimpressions successfully. Du~4S concluded his criti-
cism of La Politique Hollandais to Adams with a warning on a matter on which 
he and Adams had disagreed earlier. He cautioned Adams to be careful in con-
veying information to the gazetteers since they were not all as discreet, 
as prudent, or as sincere as Luzac; and some of them could be led to betray 
confidence by a public that flattered them.153 If Adams responded to this, 
his answer apparently has not survived. The plenipotentiary was more inter-
ested in several errors he had noted in the English copies--only one of which, 
however, he considered of material importance. This was the use of the word 
145 
"treaties" with France and s,2.lin where he had desired the word Ifrelations.n154 
Dumas checked the original English manuscript given to him by Adams and in-
formed Adams that the word "treaties" appeared in that copy.l~ 
Other business besides his memorial encroached on the minister's time. 
His ultimate objectives were to achieve a loan, a commercial treaty, and 
recognition of American independence. The memorial was the only method he 
could devise to achieve these objectives directly from the States General. 
There was a possibility that the same ends could be achieved indirectly 
through the aid of France and the application of Article X providing for the 
admission of other countries at war with England to the Franco-American 
treaty of 1778. Before presenting the memorial to the States General, he took 
occasion to formally remind La Vauguyon of this article. He assured the 
French ambassador that, whenever La Vauguyon received word from his court to 
take measures in accord with the article, the American plenipotentiary would 
be ready.l56 Later in May Adams enclosed copies of his memoriRl and a note to 
Franklin suggesting that the maritime countries be invited to join the 
alliance under Article X if they declared war on England. He could see no 
obstacle to inviting the Dutch to join right away. On the other hand he en-
visioned the Dutch furnishing their own self-made obstacles to accession--
they simply lacked the necessary determination to join. "Indeed, the mili-
tary character, both at land and sea, seems to be lost out of this nation. 
The love of fame, the desire of glory, the love of country, the regard for 
posterity-in short, all the brilliant and sublime passions are lost, and 
succeeded by nothing but the love of ease and moneYe,,157 
Bills of exchange were regularly being presented for him to authenti-
~ 146 
cate. Nearly every week the accumulation had to be recorded for Franklin sO 
158 tllat he might provide the necessary funds. Adams' interposition was re-
quired in approaching the responsible United States officials Lor the purpose 
of reclaiming Dutch ships retaken from the English by American privat~ers.159 
In the event that the vessel could not always be regained from the privateer, 
Adams at least felt his time well spent in securing and publishing the explana-
tion of the court's judgment. In the meantime Dumas found himself in financial 
straits and applied to Adams for succour. \fuen Adams had received his cre-
dentials, he had invited Dumas to continue in the position of agent or special 
assistant which he had been holding under Franklin. However, no specific 
agreement had eVer been mad.e between Dumas and Congress or between Dumas and 
Franklin. Dumas was under the impression that he had been promised the posi-
tion as secretary to Laurens at five hundred pounds a year. He was having dit-
ficulty meeting current expenses as he was receiving from Franklin only in the 
area of two hundred pounds a year--a sum insufficient to support a family. 
Adams claimed no knowledge of any promise made by Congress but upon investiga-
tion learned that Congress had reduced the grant for a secretary from five 
hundred pound to exactly one-half that sum. He promised, however, to do all 
that he could to alleviate Dumas' distress. l60 
Adams never wearied of supplying the presses and encouraging others to 
do 60. As a bolster to his memDria1 hopes he had Van der Kemp assemble the 
early communications between Van der Capell en and Governor Trumbull relative 
to the importance of an American minister in the Netherlands. Van der Kemp 
then translated the Articles of Confederation and the piece, "Heads of Enquiry 
and the Answers to It" and printed all as a unit relative to Trumbull's 
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letter. A friend of Van derKemp translated a number of other pieces and 
several speeches relative to the Massachusotts Constitution. with a preface 
by Van der Kemp, these were also published as a separate unit./ As a result 
of the -111 efforts of Adams and his friends, Thaxter could write that "the 
government and the people of this republic are infinitely more enlightened 
161 than formerly upon American affairs." 
Toward the end of May word finally reached Adams that Maryland had 
ratified the Articles of Confeder4tion and these would now become formally 
effective for all thirteen states. Directly the minister wrote letters, on 
the express instructions of Congress, to the States General and the Stadholder 
to inform them of the Maryland ratification. Dumas was to peruse these and 
either post them or deliver them in person as he thought wisest. Adams sug-
gested that mailing the notifications would prohibit questions or disagree-
162 
ments and therefore might be best. Having consulted friends, Dumas, on 
their advice, determined to deliver the letters in person as the mowe cour-
teous behavior. When he did so on June 5. both the president of the week, 
Baron Pallant de Glintheusen, and the Frince's secretary. Baron de Larrey. 
acdepted the letters and requested Dumas to return the following morning. At 
that time de Larrey returned the letter destined for the Prince. He apolo-
getically explained that the Prince could receive no United States communique 
until the States General had granted that country recognition. It was a most 
convenient excuse for not doing what the stadholder bad no intention of doing 
in any case. Glintheusen also returned the letter--opened--but oharged Dumas 
with having deceived him into accepting it in the first instance by ~mitting 
the term "plenipotentiary" when delivering it. On opening the letter he had 
148 
found it signed in this manner and therefore refused to accept it. Dumas was 
disinclined to take it back on such specious reasoning since Adams had openly 
assumed the title as everyone, including Glintheusen, knew. n<e President, 
however. concluded the interview by dropping the letter into Dumas' hat, ad-
monished him for having advised Adams to move so quickly, and departed.163 
Neither the minister nor his aide was to be that cavalierly frustrated. 
The attempt to act as a quasi-accredited minister having failed, their next 
recourse was to print. Dumas advised against printing the rejected letters 
but approved inserting the act of accession itself. The publication of this 
act would publicly and formally give the lie to British propaganda that the 
164 American union was on the verge of disintegration. 
Internal affairs of the nation similarly claimed Adams' interest since 
his own future reception partially depended upon the outcome of these. On the 
day Adams presented his memorial (May 4), Van Berckel demanded either a trial 
50 that he could defend himself or a declaration of innocence for his part in 
the Lee-Neufville treaty. It was a question whether the two affairs would 
165 aid or injure each other. In mid-May the city of Amsterdam sent an address 
to the provincial assembly condemning the inactivity of the country in mili-
tary preparations. This address directed the Amsterdam regents to push in 
the States of Holland a negotiation with the court of France for reciprocal 
plans of operation. Adams exulted that this tacitly included the United 
States and rejoiced to see finally some of the "old Batavian spirit_,,166 He 
assumed a generous portion of credit for the awakened interest on the grounds 
that the presentation and publication of his memorial had provided the city 
fathers with an opportunity to feel the public pulse. Since the memorial had 
149 
been so highly acclaimed, the Amsterdam regency had taken courage and decided 
167 to profit by the new-found public spirit. In reality the new spirit was 
just as likely based on exuberance over the news that La Motte/Piquet had met 
the English convoy of ships taken at St. Eustatius and had retaken twenty-one 
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of them. This was the type of news that could really cheer the mynheers. 
To increase its charm there was also good news arriving from General Gates in 
the Southern states and from the Spanish at Gibraltar.169 
In June the regenoy of Amsterdam petitioned the Prince to dismiss Duke 
Louis of Brunswiok from his counsel. The regents assured the Prince that 
they did not acoept as true the popular acousation that the Duke was excessive-
ly attaohed to the Court of London, acted in bad faith, or was politioally 
corrupt. They did, however, feel that his usefulness to both the country and 
William was a thing of the past and that he should be dismissed from all 
public affairs and from William's person and oourt. Louis had aoted as the 
boy William's tutor and the adult William's mentor and intimate friend. De-
manding his dismissal took oourage. Adams predioted that the reverberations 
of this petition would oause a orisis in business, but he deolared himself 
incapable of predicting the final results. Once again he gave pride of plaoe 
to the wonderful acoeptance of his memorial in emboldening the Amsterdam 
170 regenoy. 
There were other signs of reviving spirit in some of the cities during 
May and June--an aooount of whioh Adams faithfully forwarded to Philadelphia. 
A proposal was made in the States General for increasing the bounties for 
sailors and somewhat improving their conditions so as to help build up the 
navy. Their Grand Mightinesses of the States of Holland were so successful 
150 
in floating a loan for 8,000,000 florins that they decided to raise it to 
12,000,000 "for their defense." Holland and West Friesland consented to aug-
ment their land forces to nearly 18,000 men and also voted the/East India 
company a 1,200,000 florin loan at 3%. Most of the major cities of the prov-
ince petitioned for convoyage to the East Indies. Deputies from some of the 
cities of Zealand joined Holland in petitions for increased defense--a matter 
of some note as Zealand was almost entirely under the sway of the Anglophile 
stadholder.17l But all these and other examples were to the minister "faint, 
feeble symptoms of life" transmitted for lack of "more vigorous ones." He 
informed Congress that he had been told that "this vis inertia is profound 
policy" but, as far as he was concerned, if it were policy at all, it was 
172 
"so profound as to be perfectly incomprehensible." 
Throughout the early months of 1781 Adams consistently distinguished 
between the attitude of the people and that of the government. He rejoiced 
at the signs of a rejuvenated courage among the former and groaned at the 
"faint, feeble symptoms" of spirit in the latter. Possibly he misread both 
to a degree. At least the reaction to a loan floated by the French government 
would indicate that the populace and their government were much more in 
accord in their response to active participation in American affairs than 
Adams realized. An important segment of each group were interested in in-
creased trade and were sympathetic to whatever would promote this end. On 
the other hand they were unwilling to offer any challenge that might lose for 
them the good will of the neutrals. This was very evident in the manner in 
which they accepted a loan sponsored by France. 
In mid-April Vergennes informed his minister in The Hague that the 
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king wished to stand as guarantor for a Dutch loan of five million florins at 
four per cent on behalf of the United States. He cautioned La Vauguyon that 
the idea must be proposed very carefully and directed his mini.ter to contact 
their friends in Amsterdam in order to concert with them the time and manner 
of proposing it.173 In spite of all his efforts, La Vausuyon encountered 
formidable obstacles to floating a loan publicly destined for the United 
states. This was partially becaus~ the Americans lacked credit in Holland 
and partially because the Dutch were unwilling to compromise themselves with 
174 the neutral powers by even an indirect recognition of American independence. 
John Laurens bluntly informed Congress, nThe event has proved that its being 
a concern of the United States was sufficient for political reasons to occa-
sion the overthrow of the business.,,175 Only after the reference to America 
as co-sponsor was withdrawn and the king promised to borrow only in his own 
name and to assume full responsibility for the loan was there any prospect of 
success. By August Their High Mightinesses were disposed to open it on their 
own credit at 4%, the principal and interest to be secured by a general French 
bond. Bince the states General, although permitted to pay no more than 3% 
interest for themselves, normally found e~sy sale for their notes, it was cor-
176 
rectly presumed that a 4% loan would quickly be filled. The ultimate des-
tination of the money, although remaining a verbal understanding, was not 
officially committed to paper.177 In spite of this circumspection, the States 
of Zealand refused to sanction the loan until December 4, after which date 
the loan, with all reference to America obliterated, filled rapidly. During 
the same interval the loan publicly acknowledged as American stood still at 
178 only a few thousand florins. 
152 
Thus the first half of 1781 witnessed wi thin the Netherlands the in-
auguration of various activities, political and financial, which would require 
time to develop tully. In the meantime, beyond the confines of the Nether-
lands, situations were developing which could well have hampered or completely 
obliterated any possibility of Adams accomplishing his mission. 
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CHAPTER IV / 
FRANCE STEPS IN, JUNE, l781-JANUARY, 1782 
Innumerable efforts to effect peace, general or particular, were made 
during 1781.1 The English declaration of war on the United Provinces (Decem-
ber, 1780) and the accession of the latter country to the Armed Neutrality 
(effective November 20, 1780 but final signatures January', 1781) brought 
Russia very much to the foreground. At first it was presumed by practically 
everyone that Russia would fulfill the obligations imposed upon her by the 
convention of the Armed Neutrality. Even Sir James Harris, the English minis-
ter at St. Petersburg. did not doubt Catherine's sincerity in the convention. 
He therefore determined to convince her that the Dutch could claim no assist-
ance as the rupture between Great Britain and the United Frovinces was unre-
lated to that convention.2 Catherine in reality was anxious to find other 
means than war to fulfill her obligations and so informed the Dutch ambassa-
dor. Already in January the empress was reputed to have written to }'rederick 
II desiring him to offer his mediation to the United Provinces. 3 Frederick 
made tentative efforts through his minister, Thulemeyer, but very quickly 
withdrew in favor of a Russian mediation.4 
By the beginning of 1781 England was agreeable to a general mediation 
provided it was under the auspices of friends. Consequently, in January the 
Court of st. James verbally communicated to Emperor Joseph II of Austria 
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that Catherine had made an earlier offer of mediating the peace. This was 
sufficient inducement to elicit a similar offer from the Emperor who then com-
municated his intentions to Spain and France.' France respond~d with an invi-
tation to Austria to join in the mediation earlier proposed by Russia. 
Catherine accepted Joseph as co-mediator and she agreed to Vienna as the most 
6 
suitable place for opening the negotiations. However, she insisted that a 
reconciliation must be effected between England and the United Provinces be-
fore the general mediation could take place. The Netherlands accepted the 
mediation offered but England objected So a separate peace.? Therefore, the 
proposal was drcpped and plans for tne joint mediation were again under way. 
Adams, busy about many things, was intermittently aware of these 
rumblings of peace negotiations but refused to put any stock in them. In 
January of 1781 his news services informed him of Stormont's efforts to im-
prove English connections with the Emperor and then to secure Joseph's co-
mediation. He forwarded the information, with his personal reaction, to 
Dumas. "The English are laboring with all their might, intriguing with all 
their subtlety, and bribing with all the money they can spare in order to draw 
in the House of Austria to some connections with them." He personally be-
lieved that there was "nothing to be gotten by a connection with them except 
8 broken bones." In mid-March he was still very much of the opinion that the 
proposed mediation of Emperor and Empress was "only the artifice of England 
to embroil all Europe.,,9 To Jenings he acknowledged, "I don't wish she may 
succeed, but I don't much care if she does." He rather thought Europe de-
served to be penalized for her partiality and, furthermore, America ~s more 
apt to gain than to lose in this eventuality.10 He assured Huntington that 
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"England is at her old game of seduction and division, and is laboring under 
the pretense of employing the Emperor of Germany and the Empress of Russia in 
mediations for peace, insidiously to embroil all Europe in the'" War." He 
personally did not believe there was "the least prospect of a general 
11 peace." 
America's allies, however, were not equally indifferent. France was 
anxious to bring an end to the war, but was disposed to view the projected 
mediation with misgivings. Austria's traditional friendship for England and 
12 Vergennes' record in thwarting Russian foreign policy did not auger well for 
French interests in a Russo-Austrian mediation. On the other hand, it would 
never do for France to' offend two such powerful countries as Russia and 
Austria by an outright refusal of their good offices. The offer of mediation, 
therefore, put France in a diplomatic bind which required delicate manipula-
tion. At this Vergennes was skillful and could hope for success if no one 
were in a position to upset his designs. But here lay the problem. The 
friction between Vergennes and Adams the preceding year had made the French 
Foreign Minister fearful of entrusting any--much less such delicate--negotia-
tions to Adams. As soon as there seemed some possibility of a mediation 
within a reasonable length of time, he decided to exert his influence to have 
the unwanted minister replaced by someone more flexible. Consequently, 
Vergennes informed LUzerne that although he had now become convinced of 
Adams' adherence to the alliance--a matter which he had doubted the previous 
July--he very much questioned the plenipotentiary's discretion. 
His character and turn of mind are essentially opposed to what is 
proper in political intercourse; he is, and will be, a negotiator 
as embarrassing for his superiors astor those who have business 
relations with him. I am so convinced of this as to foresee with 
a sort of pain Mr. Adams taking part in the negotiations for peace. 
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The only possible solution was to remove the negotiation from ~damsl discre-
/ 
tion and he sent directives to this effect. "You may see, if possible, in 
case another may not be substituted for him, that he may have a colleague 
capable of restraining him."l3 
As the possibilities of a mediation increased and no word was received 
from America, Vergennes' anxieties regarding America and Mr. Adams increased. 
A second dispatch of the ninth of March informed LUaerne of further develop-
14 
ments. Vergennes wrote that France had not yet sent a formal response to 
the imperial courts but had indicated her willingness to accept the mediation 
if her allies were similarly agreeable. Spain had declared it her obligation 
to conclude the direGt negotiations with Cumberland before acquiescing to the 
general mediation.15 Vergennes pointed out to Luzerne that "these replies 
constitute an eventual acceptance" and that it was important that America also 
accept the mediation and, through the good offices of the king, make this de-
cision known to all the powers participating. As for Adams, Vergennes still 
regretted seeing the American entrusted "with a business so difficult and so 
delicate as that of pacification because of his pedantry, stubbornness, and 
self-importance." These qualities Vergennes argued, would 'lgive rise to a 
thousand vexations to the despair of his co-negotiators." The Frenchman 
probably found no solace in the thought that he would be the chief of these. 
Since his earlier dispatch he had reconsidered and now explained that he 
realized Congress would experience great repugnance in recalling Adams and 
therefore Luzerne should desist from further effort in that regard. He 
should, nevertheless, make Congress feel the necessity of directing Adams to 
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subordinate his actions to the directions of the king or his ministers.16 
Vergennes knew the instructions on pacification originally given to 
Adams .17 In order to improve the possibilities of a successful" media tion, he 
saw a necessity of these instructions being reconstructed along more flexible 
lines. Luzerne was therefore to urge Congress to use all the moderation pos-
sible in drawing up new instructions in order to win the favor of the media-
tors. Since London was expected to be difficult to deal with, a truce might 
be the solution. Accordingly. the American plenipotentiary should know Con-
gress' decision relative to this.18 l1ergennes communicated to Franklin--in 
an effort to win his support also--the information that a joint offer of 
mediation had been made and the king's response that he was obliged to con-
sult with his allies before acquiescing. Adams, the man with the commission 
for peace negotiations, was given no information at all in regard to this. 
Franklin was requested to transmit the in.f01"J1lation to Congress. Since Ver-
gennes had no doubt that Congress would perceive both the necessity and the 
usefulness of the mediation. Franklin was to urge them to send such instruc-
tions as seemed proper to their plenipotentiary. To this appeal Franklin 
dryly remarked that he was of the impression that Adams already possessed an1 
necessary instruction. He did, however, in his next communication to Congress 
very briefly relate the interview and forwarded Vergennes' request on instruc-
tions for Adams.19 
Negotiations proceeded very slowly in Europe but through March and 
April the various courts gradually framed their pr~liminary conditions. In 
the meantime, Luzerne transmitted to his chief Congress' disavowal of John 
A • 20 dams' position vis-a~vis Vergennes the preceding summer. Vergennes was 
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not at all satisfied with the scope of the remonstrance given Adams as it did 
not in the least curtail his powers in the approaching mediation. Repointed 
out to his minister that Congress had checked Adams only on the one point of 
securing French approbation before making known his full powers. They said 
"absolutely nothing of other objects on which I believe some remarks ought to 
be made to Adams." Vergennes desired that Congress would enjoin Adams never 
to undertake the "slightest step" without the previous consent of the king. 
This, Vergennes believed. was the "only means of restraining Adams and of 
rendering us master of his conduct." lIe was convinced that~dams had ttnot 
the ability to appreciate fine distinctions which is a requisite of a negotia-
tor" but rather inclined to follow the nnights of his too ardent imagina-
tion." Vergennes did not state his views primarily for the enlightenment of 
LUZerne but for that of Congress. Luzerne was directed to impress Huntington 
with Vergennes' opinion and "to make him feel its justice" in order to secure 
21 from Congress a supplement to the instructions given to Adams. 
In a second dispatch of the same date Vergennes warned that the pros-
peets for peace were not favorable. England. he wrote, demanded as prelimin-
ary agreements the dissolutmon of the alliance between France and America and 
the return of the colonies to a dependent status. If England held to this, 
there were no hopes for peace. Nevertheless, a negotiation might open during 
22 the coming campaign and Congress ought to have instructions prepared. A 
month later Vergennes informed Luzerne that Adams had assumed the character of 
minister to the States General--a stroke-whioh confirmed all Vergennes' bad 
impressions of the redoubtable Adams. The mediation still bore every appear-
ance of being considerably in the future. The admission of America as a 
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negotiating power constituted the major obstacle to initiating the proceeding& 
Vergennes advised that the most effectual means of removing that particular 
difficulty lay in a decisive American victory over the Britis}:r'~ In brief, 
Vergennes was repeating advice he had given directly to Adams two years pre-
viously--America should put more effort into the war and leave the politics 
of Europe to France.23 
The reception of Vergennes' letters--all of which arrived at approxi-
mately the same time--was Luzerne's signal for action. He applied to Hunting-
ton for a committee to whom he might communicate the information and the ad-
24 
vice that they contained. The appointed committee (Messrs. Carroll, Jones, 
\:Jitherspoon, Sullivan, and Mathews) met with LUzerne on May 26 and heard the 
French ambassador detail the position of his court. After the meeting, the 
majority of the committee departed, but the chairman (Daniel Carroll) remained 
with Luzerne and under his guidance drew up a report for congress.25 This 
report was an abvious repetition of the ideas forwarded in Vergennes' letters. 
Huch of the conference, according to the report, had been devoted to observa-
tiona on the past conduct of Adams and to suggestions on the future dependence 
of both Adams and Congress on the good offices of the king. Faithful to his 
instructions, Luzerne praised the patriotism of Adams but made it abundantly 
clear that, in the French estimation, the man's prudence left much to be de-
sired. The committee was plainly told that Congress should "draw a line of 
conduct to that minister, of which he may not be allowed to lose sight." 
Luzerne carefully recalled to their minds the ill-fated incident wherein Adams 
thought he had a right to declare publicly his mission to treat with Britain. 
The moral of the tale was made unmistakably clear. If Congress had the faith 
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in the king which his «ajesty's wise and benevolent conduct should have in-
spired in them, they would easily perceive the necessity of subordinating the 
actions of their plenipotentiary to the judgment of his majesty: Congress, 
~uzerne insisted, should have the Greatest independence in establishing broad 
outlines for the minister's guidance, but "with respect to the manner of 
carrying them into execution, he was to receive his directions from the Count 
26 de Vergennes." 
There were other circumstances of which ConFress should similarly be 
mindful. Congress had no connections with the powers involved in the media-
tion and it devolved upon the king to represent the United States. Luzerne 
assured the committee that the king would, as a matter of "prudence and 
justice," support the American representative unless "this minister, by aiming 
at impossible things, forming exorbitant demands • • • to!? misconstruing his 
instructionslt would cause a rift between himself and the French negotiators. 
In this unhappy event France would necessarily proceed without constant com-
I:lunication with the American minister and the apparent contradiction between 
the allies would have a deleterious effect on the negotiation. 27 Although 
Luzerne promptly added th3.t it was understood that lithe most perfect inde-
pendency" was to be the IIfoundation of the instructions" given to Adams, his 
remarks left no doubt that "independency" was not to wander beyond French 
gUidelines. Having proposed severe restrictions on the plenipotentiary 
appointed, he proceeded to delimit the subject matter within Congressional 
competence. On the supposition th9.t Engbmd was in a sufficiently strong 
military position to "debate with the greatest energy and obstinacy" any 
articles relating to America, he counselled Congress to great moderation in 
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drawing up instructions. To secure the good will of the mediating powers, 
the plenipotentiary should be free to yield on any point, save independence. 
Following Vergennes' instructions, Luzerne further observed that the great 
difficulties which might arise in forming a definitive peace might possibly 
lead the mediators to propose a truce and, consequently, the American pleni-
28 potentiary should know the intentions of Congress in that regard. 
On June 6, while the unsuspecting Adams was anxiously watching the 
repercussions of his memorial, the foregoing report was taken into considera-
tion. The committee proposed the resolution that the plenipotentiary be in-
structed to concur with the king in accepting the proposed mediation but that 
he be instructed at the same time to accede to no treaty that did not guarantee 
the independence and sovereignty of all thirteen states and which did not 
leave the treaties with France in full effect.29 Accordingly, the only two 
stipUlations recommended by the committee were those which Luzerne had indi-
cated--the recognition of American independence and the fidelity to the 
Franco-American treaties. An effort, in the form of a motion, was made by 
Witherspoon, delegate from New Jersey, to set guidelines for the settlement 
of disputed boundaries. This resolution was in two parts. The first stated 
that the "desires and expectations" of Congress relative to the boundaries 
had been set forth in the earlier instructions of August 14, 1778, and deliv-
ered to Adams in the fall of 1779, but that Congress thought it "unsafe at 
this distance" to bind the negotiator with "absolute and peremptory direc-
tions" on any pOints except independency and the Franco-American treaties. 
Beyond this, Adams might use his "own judgment and prudence,1f in accordance 
with circumstances, to secure the interests of the United States. The 
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second part of the i;,litherspoon resolution enjoined consultation with the 
ministers of France on all subjects and concurrence with them in the negotia-
tions for peace or truce. Consequently, this final paragraph/was a faithful 
rendition of Luzerne's requests. vfhen a vote was called for on this para-
~rapht only ',Jard and Lovell, both of f·1assachusetts and staunch Adams defend-
ers, voted "nay.,,30 The instructions, then, consisted of the original resolu-
tion to accede to the mediation and to accept no treaty infringing on the 
sovereignty of the thirteen states or negating any part of the treaties be-
tween France and the United states, and the additional motion of Witherspoon 
to consult, and, in specific cases, to concur with France. 
John Witherspoon next proposed an additional instruction relative to 
the power to agree to a truce. By his former instructions, Adams was author-
ized to accept a truce only on a long-term basis and if it were accompanied 
by the complete withdrawal of all British land and naval armaments. 31 The 
new instructions provided for ereater flexibility. They empowered the pleni-
potentiary to agree to a truce of any duration thought necessary by the other 
belligerents provided that it did not infringe upon the right to complete 
independence and provided that Great Britain be not left in possession of 
any part of the thirteen states.32 
Adams' ministerial power was thus rapidly succumbing to the chipping 
process inaugurated by Luzerne. Nevertheless, as long as Adams remained the 
sole ~merican negotiator (a negotiator that was concomitantly in process of 
parrying a vaguely worded invitation from Vergennes to come to Paris for 
peace discussions), there was reason to believe that he would interpret the 
instructions as he would wish to interpret them. It was still necessary to 
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give him colleagues capable of restraining him. A feeble effort in this di-
rection had been made by the committee in the form of a report and resolution, 
but the suggestion of adding co-negotiators had been rejected ~y a vote of 
five to four. 33 When the revision of the instructions vas completed, Congress 
directed the committee to communicate confidentially the substance of the 
instructions to Luzerne.34 The ambassador vas not satisfied. He informed 
them that the instructions vere incomplete as they entrusted entirely to 
Adams' judgment the decisions in regard to peace and the best interests of the 
United States. Luzerne reminded them that their minister vas capable of mis-
interpreting instructions and had von the censorship of Congress for that 
very thing. He pointed out the dubiousness of a man vho embroiled himself 
with the friendly court of France being able to placate the mediators, and he 
injected the idea that ineptness in diplomacy could easily vitiate the entire 
pacification. He also appealed to sectional interests to sever support from 
Adams. He averred that Adams was so blinded by the interests of the Eastern 
States that he would assure to them the right to the fisheries even if, to 
secure these presumed rights, he would have to ignore the distress of the 
South and the needs of the nation. Adams, he concluded, would see no danger 
in continuing the war to secure the interests of the few states whose alle-
giance he commanded.35 
After their discu8sion with Luzerne, the committee formulated a plan 
of action. The minister or ministers vere to be made much more dependent 
upon French advice and consent. Accordingly, the committee submitted 
recommendations as a basis for further revision of the instructions. In the 
second paragraph of his instructions, Adams had been given the right to "use 
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your own judgment and prudence fl to secure the interests of the United States 
subject only to the bonds imposed by circumstances. The committee wished the 
above quoted words changed to "are therefore at liberty to se6ure ••• " a. 
statement which obviously left him the job but did not specifically sanction 
his "own judgment and prudence." When this was brought to a vote, the amend-
ment was accepted. It was further recommended to insert after the word "con-
currence" in the directive to undertake nothing without French knowledge and 
concurrence, the words "ultimately to govern yourself by their advice and 
opinion, endeavoring in your whole conduct 
" • • •• 
In the vote on this, 
Connecticut joined Massachusetts and Rhode Island in voting "nay." Bland of 
Virginia also opposed and Pennsylvania turned in a divided vote, but the 
recommendation was accepted.36 
As soon as these recommendations had been accepted, the committee pro-
posed a reconsideration of the question whether another person or persons 
should be joined to Adams in the negotiation. In accord with the bidding of 
Luzerne,37 the committee suggested the addition of two co-negotiators. This 
was too much for John Witherspoon. Up to this point he had agreed to, and 
proposed in Congress, most of the restrictive resolutions advocated by the 
French ambassador. He now thought that to go any further and either discharge 
Adams or shackle him with co-negotiators would be "an act of too great ob-
sequiousness," one which would set a poor precedent for the "future conduct 
of our affairs.,,38 On the whole, however, Congress was not averse to the 
idea but met difficulties in choosing the additional two men. On Wednesday, 
June 13, John Jay was elected and, after some French interference, Franklin, 
Jefferson, and Henry Laurens were added to the commission.39 
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Agreement on the major issues reached, Congress proceeded to draw up 
the proper commissions--to accept the mediation and to treat of peace. They 
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also gave the instructions a final approval. These new in8'truc~ions read 
very differently from the set Adams had been carrying for over eighteen 
months. ~dams was now only one of five and by many considered subordinate to 
Franklin's leadership. The 1779 boundaries were no longer his sine qua non 
but only an optimum which permitted of unspecified amputations. lio longer 
was Adams or even the commission permitted explicitly to use their !town judg-
ment and prudence!! in securing American interests, but they must ultimately 
govern themselves by rrench advice and opinion. This last clause aroused 
some antagonism even among those who normally followed the lead of Luzerne 
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and who were not interested in ltsaving face" for Adams. These argued that 
the instructions made the American negotiators extremely subservient to 
France. But Luzerne, aware that he commanded a majority, took the high posi-
tion of insisting that France would accept such a trust only if it were will-
ingly accorded, and oalled for a vote. It was no time to lose French friend-
ship. The ruse worked and the instructions were confirmed.42 Both sides 
then settled down to a few weeks of an uneasy truce marred by sporadio ex-
changes while they prepared in earnest for future warfare over Adams and his 
commissions.43 
Adams, completely unaware that he was the subject of these important 
deliberations, was reluctant to permit himself any expectation of using the 
commissions which he held. There could be little doubt that, if he had for a 
moment suspected that the powers he held were in process of curtailment, he 
would have devoted much more thought and energy to the pursuit of any oppor-
Knowin 
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of the intrigue in Philadelphia, he proceeded about his normal affairs and 
paid little attention to newspaper articles on the Russo-Austrian mediation 
proposals. His friends in Philadelphia, in the meantime, were' working hard 
to preserve or restore as much of Adams' independency of action as was pos-
sible. 
One of the first struggles of significance centered on fishing rights 
off Newfoundland. These fishing rights were a major interest to the New 
Englanders. They had furnished a primary reason for the bargaining to secure 
for Adams the commission in 1779. The belief was current that the British 
would sign a peace treaty only if they could sign a commercial treaty with 
the United States the same day. As long as Adams was sole negotiator for the 
commercial treaty he would be in a position to delay the entire pacification. 
His friends attempted to strengthen his position by making these fishing 
rights a sine qua non of the commercial treaty. When the motion to do so was 
first introduced, it was rejected; but Luzerne thought he saw the handwriting 
on the wall and rushed the information to vergennes. 44 Early in July Marbois, 
charge d'affairs in Luzerne's absence, sent similar news. He notified the 
Foreign Minister that the Adams faction was planning to arouse public feeling 
on the question through the medium of the press. His special concern was a 
pamphlet dispatched from his post in the Netherlands by Adams which was caus-
ing quite a stir in the New England states. In this pamphlet Adams stressed 
the necessity of independence for Canada., Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and 
claimed that European powers should not participate in the fisheries of those 
areas.45 The disparity between Adams' ideas and those which Luzerne had been 
seeking to promote was apparent. A few days later, a motion was carried to 
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revoke Adams' power as sole negotiator for a commercial treaty.46 
Hardly had the commercial treaty power been revoked when Arthur Lee 
moved to reconsider both the appointment of additional commiss~oner8 and the 
entire instructions of June 15. The motion was defeated then but was again 
brought up on AU5~St 2 only to be postponed by adjournment. The same fate 
attended its resumption on August 5. Finally, on the eighth of August, Lee 
again moved a reconsideration of the June instructions. In the debate several 
of the most loyal supporters of France deplored the instructions, but they 
argued the necessity of accepting them. Madison admitted that they were a 
sacrifice of national dignity_ On the other hand, he insisted that the sacri-
fice was more apparent than real since it was only "ultimately" that France 
must be consulted and this was already necessary due to the treaty of 1778. 
He also noted that French interest and policy would dictate to them the ren-
dering of every possible advantage to the United states in order to alienate 
47 48 America from Great Britain. The pro-Galliean Jenifer of Maryland agreed 
that France would procure "tolerable terms" for America as the best means of 
promoting her own interests but admitted, "I trust more to her policy than to 
her justice." Witherspoon, who had had much to do with the formation of these 
instructions, defended them on the grounds of the disputes between Adams and 
Vergennes. Due to these disputes Congress was bound either to pass theee 
instructions or to re4all Adams. They had chosen the former as less wounding 
to national dignity. Wben brought to a vote, the instructions stood unchanged 
from their June 15~ format. 49 
The long-awaited news of all these changes reached Vergennes only in 
September. He sent congratulations to Luzerne for his "vigor" in opposing 
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the first set of revised directives. These he agreed had placed too muoh 
authority in Adams' hands where, "with his oharacter and his principles, 
these powers would haTe been dangerous." Vergennes also expr~ssed relief at 
the inorease in negotiators. He did not really expect either Jefferson or 
Laurens to arrive but was satisfied that Franklin's "sagacity will temper the 
obstinacy of Mr. Adams.,,50 
The Foreign Minister's joy was perhaps proportionate to the anxiety 
which hae preceded it. On May 21 Hussia and Austria had again officially of-
fered mediation services and enclosed their propositions as a basis for a 
general peace. To reject the offer outright would be tantamount to making 
enemies of these powerful countries. On the other hand, acceptance could be 
delayed only 80 long. Time was running out and still there was no answer to 
the Foreign Minister's letter requesting restrictions on Adams and co-
negotiators with him. Finally, Vergennes decided that Adams should be on 
hand in case the negotiations opened. Therefore he had Ber~nger extend an 
invitation to Adams to return to Paris as soon as possible.51 His only ex-
planation--American interests required his presenoe there. Such ambiguity 
failed to pry Adams loose from the many interests he was busy promoting in 
the United Provinces. He returned a polite letter to the Secretary asking for 
more information on the nature of this important business. After enumerating 
the tasks on which he was engaged, he explained that these matters were too 
important to be lightly laid aside. Therefore, unless the Paris business was 
of great weight, such as either a general pacification or an invitation to 
the United Provinces to accede to the alliance w~th France and the United 
States, he declined the invitation until affairs could be put in better order. 
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~Jhen Vergennes received this response he dispatched just the necessary atom of 
information to bring Adams. Berenger was told to inform Adams that there was 
a question of peace negotiations and it was necessary for Verg.e'nnes to consult 
with the American peace commissioner.52 
If there had been any very specific information available, Adams would 
have been grateful for it. He had not received any type of official notifi-
cation prior to Berengerfs report although he had been following the frequent 
articles on mediation in the public papers. Aware that he was unacquainted 
with official development, he surmised that he was intentionally being kept in 
ignorance since "perhaps something has been expected from the United States 
which was not expected from me." Apparently he was not as concerned as he 
might have been that France would secure more moderate terms to offer the 
mediators directly from Congress than wou~d be offered by himself. He was not 
inclined to take an optimistic view of the efforts at mediation as he simply 
refused to believe that England was sincere in her pretentions for peace. The 
major part of his hopes--until this expectation was completely destroyed in 
mid-June--had been founded on the assistanc& of the Armed Neutrality. For a 
brief time, he feared a private settlement between England and the Provinces 
but England's refusal of a separate mediation dispelled that worry until the 
following spring. HI~ found England t 13 substi tu te offer to accept a general 
mediation only a little less threatening. He was persuaded that it, too, 
was but an "insidious maneuver of the British ministry.n53 Russian intentions 
he was unable to fathom. He had heard through the Dutch ambassador at St. 
Petersburg that Catherine would participate in a general mediation only on 
condition that the British accept the rea:l:itime treaty and grant American 
\ 
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independence. He personally believed the Russian statements "so faint, re-
served, and mysterious" that no faith could be placed in them.54 Obviously 
Adams was not being kept up-to-date on the progress of the mediation. This 
view was being expressed a full month after Russia and Austria had presented 
their preliminary positions on peace to the courts of' Versailles, Madrid, and 
London. In spite of' the Dutch ambassador's report, these preliminary proposi-
tions in no way indicated a "must" on independence. 
On the other hand, a summary of his views on mediation indicated that 
Mr. Adams had a good comprehension of the pitfalls of' any immediate negotia-
tion. "I confess I should dread a negotiation for a general peace at this 
time, because I should expect propositions for short truces, uti possidetis, 
and other conditions, which would leave our trade more embarrassed, our union 
more precarious, and our liberties at greater hazard than they can be in a 
continuance of the war; at the same time it would put us to as constan~and 
almost as great an expense. 1t Fortunately for his peace of mind he was unaware 
that, only a week before he wrote these words, Congress had made possible the 
very things which he dreaded.55 
Long before that unsettling news arrived, he had received Berenger's 
notice of the proposed peace talks and made preparations to leave Amsterdam 
for Paris. At the same time Dana was preparing to begin his mission to Russia 
where he hoped to gain recognition as American plenipotentiary. Since he de-
sired a secretary, he sought and obtained Adams' permission to take the young 
John Quincy Adams with him. Charles, who was suffering from homesickness, was 
permitted to accompany Jackson, a friend of his father's, home to Braintree. 
Adams left Thaxter to handle his affairs in Amsterdam and Dumas those at The 
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Hague. Between them they carried on all the works ! ... dams had begun--including 
the regular collection and translation of all available state papers. Some ot 
these wer(~ transmitted immediately to Congress; others were retained tor 
Adams' signature and transmission after his return trom Paris at the end of 
July.56 Once the boys were in safe hands and his various responsibilities 
delegated to his assistants, Adams set off for Paris where he arrived on the 
evening of July 6, 1781. 
'Iihe following morning he applied for an audience with Vergennes but 
found the minister in council. The Count sent a message that unfortunately 
he must leave the city immediately on business but that Adams should call 
upon M. de Rayneval, Vergennes' undersecretary. Rayneval would be able to give 
him the information which Vergennes wished the American to have. That after-
noon Adams paid his respects to R;~yneval who told him of the proposed media-
tion. In the ensuing discussion the American learned that England had not 
made any specific proposals--a conclusion Adams had reached while still in 
Amsterdam--but that Vergennes wished to discuss various poihts before a media-
tion should begin. Among these points Rayneval mentioned the problem of 
whether Adams was a "British subject" or in what light he was to be considered. 
Tlle patriotic Adams bristled at this needling and assured Rayneval that he 
was not ·and had no intention of becoming a British subject again. He would 
prefer to be Ita fugitive in China or Malabar." In closing the conference 
Rayneval suggested that ~dams remain available as Vergennes desired to confer 
with him that they might understand each other's views.57 
Two days later Adams received an appointment from Vergennes tor nine 
0' clock on l4ednesday morning the llY! of July. \;fben he arrived at the Foreign 
iiinister's Versailles office, he was shown a copy of the first three prelimin-
ary articles offered by the co-mediators. Since the copy was in French and 
the fourth article was carefully concealed by a book, he requested a copy of 
the entire communication but was refused.58 In the course of the conversa-
tion, the French officials informed him that the Spanish answer to these propo-
sitions was already prepared and the French answer in process. Neither Ver-
gennes nor Rayneval could say wheth~r or not England had as yet responded. The 
interview finished, Adams rushed to his lodgings to prepare a report to Con-
gress and to begin organizing his own response to the articles proposed by 
Russia and Austria. Ha.ving neither Thaxter nor Dana with him, the minister 
was left to write, translate, and make copies of everything himself.59 
Having read but not received a copy of the three articles, Adams COlll-
mitted them to paper from memory and dispatched a copy to Congress with some 
first thoughts on the matter. He introduced them as articles submitted by 
~)t. Petersburg and Vienna "in consequence of some wild propositions" made to 
them by England. He assured Conl!:ress that it would be a "long time before 
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anything would come of the maneuver. " 
A few days later he condemned the project as an English effort to win 
desertions from the American army and apostates from the cause of independence 
and alliance through the art of "seductions, deception, and division." In a. 
subsequent letter he expressed the opinion that Bngland was using ths_:mediatioll 
in an endeavor "to administer soporifics to their enemies.,,61 On the first 
proposition--that a separate peace should he concluded between England and the 
colonies without the intervention of either the other belligerents or the 
mediators unless the latter were specifically requested to attend--he posed 
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no objection provided the negotiations were held only after the mediators 
acknowledged American sovereignty. 'rlhe second proposi tion--tha t this separate 
peace be signed conjointly with the peace among the other belligerents and 
that the terms of both peace treaties be guaranteed by the imperial and neutral 
powers--he also found acceptable if it were agreeable to France and to Spain. 
Tr!e third proposition--to declare a general armistice on the basis of the 
stu tUB quo for a yet2.r or longer while the terms of the peace were being worked 
out--he strenuously rejected. To justify this rejectio~e urged that there 
were numerous arguments, "momentous and decisive," against any armistice. 
lOeace, he charged, would be retarded rather than expedited by relaxations 
and concessions. The real recipe for a good and lasting peace was a combina-
tion of successful warfare in the United States and firmness, patience, and 
62 perseverance in the peace chambers. 
In drawing up his position to present to Vergennes, he was disturbed 
a little by the uncertainty whether his answer was entirely for the Foreign 
l1inister's own enlightenment or whether Vergennes intended to forward Adams' 
impressions to the imperial courts. He had no objection to either of the 
first two articles provided that France had none, but he explained his objec-
tions to the third in detail. A truce, which he admitted was not explicitly 
mentioned in the article but had been alluded to in some of Vergennes' ob-
servationa, he feared would lead only to a. bl:Jody war once the truce was over. 
A short truce would be even more dangerous to America. lberefore he pro-
claimed his reluctance to enter into any discussion on the subject. If, 
however, virtue must be made of necessity and such a discussion must be held, 
there were two express conditions prerequisite to that discussion. In the 
first place, the allies would have to agree that the existing treaties would 
remain in full force for t:he duration of the truce period and until such time 
as Great Britain did acknowledge American innependence. The second prerequi-
site involved the complete removal of all British land and naval forces from 
every part of the thirteen states. If these two conditions, which would 
indicate virtual independence, were accepted, Adams in turn would accept the 
term "truce" rather than hold Britain to the humiliation of a forthright ac-
knowledgment of that independence. His reasonin€5 he then carried a step 
further and inquired how 3ngland could treat with the representatives of 
America upon either a truce or an armistice without thereby acknowledging the 
independence and sovereignty of the thirteen states. The interrelation be-
tween representation and sovereignty opened the question of the character of 
the American representative at the Congress. He declared that there was no 
justification for discussing American affairs as they pertained to knerica at 
any congress in which the American representative was not present. On the 
other hand, the very presence of an American representative was an avowal of 
American sovereignty by the other members of the congress. The only solution 
to the anomaly--and a very obvious one he thought--was for the mediating 
powers to issue an article recognizing the United States and inviting their 
minister to participate in the Congress.63 
From the position that the presence of a representative from a country 
constituted recognition of that country, Adams quickly advanced to the posi-
tion that he would be willing to confer with a minister from England. For 
the moment, he saw no inconsistency in going to Vienna and treating with 
and English minister without waiting for recognition since the !Ivery existence 
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of such a congress would be of use to our reputation." This decision may 
have res.ted partially on his belief that England was trying to capitalize on 
her pretension of desiring peace but was at the same time refusing recognition 
as a means of preventing a peace settlement.65 He was convinced that England 
was not sincere and this was a means of calling her bluff. Accordingly, he 
assured first Huntington, and then Vergennes, that he vas willing to go to 
Vienna without being previOUsly recognized. The only preliminary on which he 
would remain adamant was that neither an armistice nor the status quo appear 
on the discussion agenda. To the Frenchman he offered the explanation that 
his instructions positively prohibited either of these.66 Although the new 
instructions of June 15~ had not yet appeared in Europe, he vas citing more 
the desideratum than the absolute even of the old directives, since these had 
permitted a lengthy truce under specific conditions. 
On his part, Vergennes had been taking his time and carefully awaiting 
development before responding to Adams' remarks on the three articles which 
he had permitted the American to see. Apparently the thought of Adams ar-
ranging oonferences with the English at Vienna galvanized him into aotion. 
He dispatched a letter addressed to "Mr. Adams, agent of the United States of 
North America." Since this address was in the handwriting of a clerk and 
only the signature in that of Vergennes, Adams was uncertain whether the term 
"agentrt was a clerk's "blunder" or the Foreign Minister's "art and design." 
Whatever the explanation, the fact irritated the minister and aroused in him 
a suspicion that Vergennes was perhaps indicating by this a conformity to the 
views of the mediating courts.67 Regardless of the superscription, there W •• e 
things that Vergennes was determined to make very clear to Adams in the letter. 
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Above all ~dams must not seize the initiative and start for Vienna. In no 
uncertain terms Vergennes wrote that he had shown Adams the propositions and 
requested observations on them because of his confidence in the American's 
judgment and zeal for his cauntry--not because things were sufficiently ad-
vanced to present the American response to the imperial courts. Adams was 
curtly informed that there were "preliminaries to be adjusted with respect to 
the United ::5tatesli before Adams could put in an appearance. In the meantime, 
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all business must of necessity be transacted through the French ~ourt. 
The blunt reminder evoked another change of thought from the plenipo-
tentiary and the immediate reply that he bad no intention of appearing in 
Vienna or of "ministerially or otherwise" approaching the mediators. He 
stated that he held too poor an opinion of the whole affair to become involved 
unless duty called him thence. He could not, however, resist calling the 
Foreign Minister's attention to the inconsistency of the mediating powers 
in not inviting him. He reasoned that in actual fact they had acknowledged a 
"belligerent power in America" of sufficient importance to claim their atten-
tion. Also, in the propositions they co~municated to the several courts, they 
did "imply that America is a power, a free a.nd independent power." He re-
minded Vergennes that his mission had been sufficiently touted that the co-
mediators could be presumed to be aware that he was in Europe and vested with 
all necessary powers. They could likewise be presumed to understand that he 
could not know that there was a congress or be expected to repair to it and 
there meet the British for talks unless he were informed of it. And the 
proper per.ons to do the informing were the co-mediators. Therefore, he had 
reason to expect an invitation might still be forthcoming. 69 
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In the event that Vergennes had succeeded in forgetting Adams' basic 
philosophy of diplomacy, he thought this a singularly attractive occasion to 
recall it to the minister's mind. "The dignity of North America does not 
consist in diplomatic ceremonials or any of the subtleties of etiquette; it 
consists solely in reason, justice, truth, the rights of rnankind, and the 
interests of the nations of Europe; all of which, well understood ;r.e., as 
Adams would have them understoog are clearly in her favor." Then as a part-
ing shot and with a full turn to the argument Vergennes had raised, Adams 
assured the Count that he would not insist upon all the niceties of etiquette 
but would "certainly go to Vienna or elsewhere, if your excellency should 
invite or advise me to go.,,70 Judged from the activity Vergennes had initi-
ated in Congress to restrain or replace him, this apparently was not exactly 
what the Foreign Minister had in mind. 
When this lengthy letter was followed by another two thousand words 
the following day, Vergennes must have been exasperated. As Adams thought 
over Vergennes' remarks, he feared that he had not conveyed his full meaning 
in the letter of July 16 in which he had discussed going to Vienna without a 
special invitation. He now explained tr~t he did not hold this intention 
irrespective of any other consideration. Rather he based it on the supposi-
tion that the mediating powers planned to accept him in whatever c~pacity he 
was sent and grant him all the prerogatives of that particular character. 
However, since writing the former letter, he had looked over the articles 
again and now took issue with the wording of the first article. There were 
no "American colonies" but a sovereign United ,states of J'lJIlerica and the very 
word lIeolony" implied ideas long rejected by the States. Since this term had 
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been employed, it now seemed to him that a more explicit recognition should be 
a prerequisite of any oonference • 
, 
There followed a lengthy expose of the in-
. consistency of calling any congress or offering any mediation'if the entire 
affair were but the internal one of subjects not obeying their sovereign. 
Hediation of its very nature involved only sovereign powers.71 
In spite of his series of letters to the ministry, Adams received only 
I the one brief communique from Vergennes. This he considered "poor encourage-
ment" to continue being overly communicative with the French ministry. Con-
sequently, he began to plan for his return to the Netherlands where he thought 
it possible to "negotiate for peace with Great Britain much more rapidly than 
in France.,,72 Before he was content to leave Faris, however, there was one 
final point he thought necessary to bring to Vergennes' attention. In a last 
epistle, he expounded at length on the constitutional impossibility of the 
imperial courts soliciting a minister from each separate state rather than a 
representative of the United States as a unit. He remarked that this scheme 
would not only meet with complete failure but would be considered in so un-
favorable a light as in all probability to meet with a solemn remonstrance 
from Congress.73 His words were not simply beating the air in spite of the 
total silence with which they were met. 'rhe mediators bad discussed and Ver-
gennes had more or less approved a four or five year truce during which each 
state would separately declare its intentions regarding independence. In 
fact, LUZerne had been enjoined secretly to feel out the states which seemed 
more inclined to submission and was already about it.74 Adams' intervention 
scotched this along with the projects for a truce or uti possidetis. 
Although at the time his Paris sojourn seemed frustrating and 
--
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discouraging, Adams later took great pride in the results of the efforts he 
had made there. When writing the whole story for the Boston Patriot, he at-
tributed the eventual defeat of this "profound and magnificent 'project • • • 
for the purpose of chicaning the United States out of their independencett to 
his correspondence with Vergennes and to his remarks on the three preliminary 
articles. To support this statement he quoted lengthy extracts from the 
French reply to the mediating powers and remarked that every idea and almost 
every expression in their response was taken directly from his communications 
with Vergennes. Adams was not known for timidity in acclaiming his own suc-
cess but on this occasion at least he was not unique in thus evaluating his 
work.?5 
Adams could only speculate why Vergennes had uttered no word of ap-
proval if, and when, their views so closely coincided. The "midnight silence" 
he eventually concluded was a necessary concomitant of Vergennes' efforts to 
have his mission revoked. He argued that if he were to transmit to Philadel-
phia (which he would be sure to do if he had copies) the king's intended 
answer sO like his own or any words of approbatiorlpr agreement from the French 
court, the results could have been disastrous to Luzerne's efforts to manipu-
late Congress.?6 His intuition was probably correct. When Vergennes informed 
Luzerne of the general progress of the mediation he gave the impression that 
Adams had played merely a passive role of charmed agreement. "He has appeared 
very satisfied with this which we have said and done in favor of his country 
and I persuade myself that he will render to Congress an account which will 
leave nothing to be desired_"?? Luzerne, in presenting this account to Con-
gress, described Adams as satisfied with the effort Vergennes had made. He 
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reported that the major obstacle to a negotiation was the difficulty of agree-
ing on the status of America. This problem, he assured them, Vergennes was 
still attempting to solve and in due course would notify them ti~oncern1ng the 
conduct which the state of affairs will require from Congress. n?8 If Ver-
gennes was inclined to accord Adams only token recognition, Luzerne was deter-
mined to by-pass him altogether. 
Having no faith in the "sublime bubbles" blown by the mediators and 
"weary of such roundabout and endless negotiations,,,?9 Adams was in such 
haste to get back to the important affairs awaiting him in Holland that he 
rode day and night. In the long run this was not a time-saver as the weari-
ness induced by the trip in combination with the uncommon heat of the summer 
and the "pestilential vapors" from the stagnant waters of the Netherlands 
brought on a severe fever. He managed to handle business as usual during the 
early part of August as the advance of the fever was slow. From the latter 
part of August until early October he was completely incapacitated and able to 
transact no busin.ess; even his beloved letter writing was put aside from the 
25- of August until the 4~ of October. For several days he was deli~ious and 
near to death. His recovery was extremely slow and ae did not regain full 
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vigor until several months later. For a time he despaired of regaining his 
health if he remained in the Low Countries. He believed himself of "so little 
use to the publiC, that I cannot but wish it may suit with the views of 
Congress to recall me." However, the skill of his physician, the administra-
tion of an "all-powerful bark," and the self-cure of "obstinate perseverance 
81 in walking" finally restored him to health. 
His views of the situation in the Netherlands tended to fluctuate. At 
192 
times, when it was particularly jaundiced, he found no virtue in the Hollanders 
at all •. That was the case in a letter he wrote on August 4 but had the good 
sense not to post. 
// 
At the time he fumed about the internal divisions and 
animosities, the inertness of the military, and the debilitating talk of 
peace. He even envisioned the Dutch using America as the purchase price for 
82 their own peace. A few days later affairs appeared in a different light. 
"This people must have their own way. They proceed like no other." ·He 
demonstrated his point hI regaling Congress with the shrewdness of the govern-
ment in their system for handling naval prizes. The owners of privateers 
rather than the government gave the captains orders to take their prizes to 
any friendly port--specifically including American ports--and to join ships of 
these friendly powers "to undertake jointly anything advantageous." This ruse 
enabled the government to claim the orders were merely independent directives 
of the ship owners to their captains. Adams saw it as an indirect acknowledg-
ment of American sovereignty.83 
The news of the "glorious victory" on August 5 of Admiral Zoutman 
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over Admiral Parker won general applause throughout the nation and encour-
aged the Dutch navy and Adams in roughly equ~l degree. The minister was sure 
that if the Amsterdam regency, which had been large~y responsible for the 
enthusiasm shown among Zoutman's officers and men, were to propose treating 
with the Americans in the States of Holland, the proposal would meet with 
similar acclaim throughout the nation. For the first time, he opined that 
public sentiment was growing sufficiently strong that either a separate 
peace or concessions to the British were unthinkable. A few days later, the 
last day on which he tried to dispatch any business before succumbing to the 
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fever, he reported the new zest in the Dutch navy and in the country at large 
to Dr. Franklin. With a wonted exaggeration he crowed, "If I ever did any 
good since I was born, it was in stirring up the pure minds 01 the Dutohmen, 
and setting the old Batavian spirit in motion after having slept so 10ng.,,85 
When he had sufficiently recovered from his illness to undertake again 
the duties of his office and to re-open his correspondence, he happily ob-
serv~d a continued upsurge in the general attitude toward America. He praised 
the "almost universal" sentiment that "the English are wrong and the Americans 
right in this war." He had several explanations for this ohange in Dutch out-
look. The commercial cities--and they were the real population centers--were 
strongly determined not to relinquish American trade. The Dutch, also, were 
finding the conduct and principles of,the Americans very like that of their 
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"venerable and heroic ancestors." Both of these attitudes Adams had skill-
fully and ceaselessly nurtured through interminable writings and discussions. 
During his sojourn in Paris and his subsequent illness, he had been unable to 
personally produce as much material for publication as he had formerly. He 
did, however, continue to take a vital interest in the work of others and to 
sponsor it whenever possible.8? 
On the whole Adams found it a great deal more simple to make his 
thoughts known in the Netherlands than back home in Philadelphia. In spite of 
the fact that he was a prolific letter writer--sometimes dispatching to Con-
gress two or three letters in one day--that august body was at times months 
88 behind in receiving his messages. This caused him no little chagrin. The 
cause lay partially in distance and the vicissitudes of the weather; ill-health 
prevented all correspondence for several weeks, but chiefly, the lack of 
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communication was plain bad luck. He had been advised shortly after he first 
arrived in the Low Countries to send his dispatches for Con~ress through Cur-
son and Gouvernieur at St. Eustatius. Accordingly, he had sent several 
packets of letters and various papers to their address. A number of these 
were apparently confiscated when st. Eustatius was taken although he knew 
nothing of it until a July 26 notice in a London paper reported the confine-
ment for high treason of these gentlemen on the charge of an illicit corre-
spondence with Adams.89 The illicit correspondence could refer only to the 
official dispatches as he had addressed to the defendants such packets obly 
with a brief request that they be forwarded to Congress. Another "half a 
cart load • • • all my letters to Congress for 6 or 8 months" were aboard 
Gillon's ship. Gillon left the Netherlands in June, 1?8l,but did not arrive 
in the United States until late the following spring. Letters sent via 
several other vessels were intentionally thrown overboard to prevent confis-
cation.90 When he could arrange safe conveyance to the French ports, his 
correspondence stood a moderate chance of crossing the Atlantic safely. A 
major difficulty was to get packets to a French port. Opportunities by pri-
vate hand were scarce and letters sent by public post were sure to be opened 
and probably copied.9l These various difficulties in transmitting correspond-
ence necessitated a great deal of copying and recopying of all communications 
in an effort to secure safe conduct for at least one copy. 
Huch of his attention was claimed by some of the lesser duties of his 
office. Bills of exchange never ceased arriving. In each case, the minister 
had to judge the authenticity of the bill,92 record it, and apprise Franklin 
of it in hopes that money could be provided. At times this came close to 
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being a vain hope. Adams had barely returned to the Netherlands when Franklin 
warned that Adams and the other ministers of Congress would no longer be able 
to depend on France for their salaries as the French government planned to 
transmit future loans directly to Philadelphia.93 By June, bills vere once 
more being drawn on Henry Laurens who was still confined in the Tower. Adams 
requested Franklin to pay these but described the affair as a "phenomenon" 
which only "you philosophers" could explain. To this request Franklin was 
forced to respond that he could not get any money from France and thought it 
time to test Adams' earlier avowal that a few protested bills might serve the 
American cause in Holland. 94 Adams' own efforts to borrow money were unavail-
ing. In mid-October his loan amounted to less than three hundred pounds.95 
By late fall political affairs again, after a long, quiescent period, 
began to consume his time and energies. The possibilities of a mediation still 
dragged on when on August 24, he had received the nevs of the appointment of 
co-negotiators to sit at the peace table with him. His first reaction was one 
of relief. For one thing. he had no expectations of a treaty materializing 
and momentarily thought of going home to wake those who might be lulled to 
sleep by dreams of peace. Secondly, he vas glad to be joined by others pos-
sessing a talent for peace as "my talent, if I have one, lies in making 
war. tt96 When he next wrote of the subject, his views were largely the same. 
"It is still a great satisfaction to me, because I think it is a measure e8-
sentially right, both as it is a greater demonstration of respect to the 
powers whose ministers may assemble to make peace, and it is better calculated 
to give satisfaction to the people of America in all parts, as the commission-
ere are chosen from the most considerable places in that country." He also 
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found ita "great consolationlt as it removed the possibility of delay due to 
his illness, "when, for many days together, there were many chances to one 
that I should have nothing more to do with commissions of any ,.ort." He re-
peated these same thoughts to the President of Congress later and curtly re-
futed Jenings' remark about a "trial of spirit and fortitude" with the declara-
tion that, on the contrary, it was "more honorable than betore and much more 
easy." Even at the end of November he accepted it as "a measure which has 
taken off my mind a vast load, which • • • would have been too heavy for my 
forces. ,,97 
Through December, as his health improved and new possibilities in 
Holland whetted his political appetite, he became successively more sensitive 
to the motive behind his diminution.98 When he received his wife's expres-
sions of outrage, he counseled her not to be too upset about the malicious 
attempts of his countrymen but "let them take their course and go the length 
of their tether." His system was not only right but was already triumphant 
so he could only laugh at "their impotent range and fury.,,99 He explained 
himselt a little more fully to his friend Dana when he informed the latter 
of the retraction of the commission for a commercial treaty. Vergennes and 
followers had been forced to "adopt our system of war and politics" inoDrder 
to succeed in undermining Adams' powers. "I will consent, upon these terms 
to be diminished down to the size of a Lilliputian, or of an animalcule in 
pepper water." He added with disarming frankness that he could be "the more 
indifferent" as there was presently no prospect of peace and he had no ex ... 
pectations of being called to act on these commissions. lOO By the end of 
the year he was convinced that he had been "colleagu.ed" with malice atore-
thought. nIt is true that I am a sheep and that I have been fieeced. • • 
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No, I had rather say that I am a bird, that my feathers have been plucked and 
worn as ornaments by others." Philosophically, he was not of a mind to be too 
upset. "Let them have the plummage if they will; it is but a ,geegaw," and of 
101 little importance until it became possible to get "possession of the bird." 
The prospect of peace appeared too far in the distance to excite him 
but a DeW commission for an alliance with the Netherlands, received toward the 
end of November, was a different matter. It seemed so perfectly designed to 
102 . fit into the developing situation there. Through the fall the mynheers 
were gradually becoming more sensible of their own relations to England and 
to the United states. This awareness Adams attributed in part to his own 
activities. In August he was exulting at the'beneficial results of the pub-
lication of his memorial. He extolled it as the very thing needed to "arouse 
the nation and bring forth the public voice," and credited it with making 
known "with absolute certainty the sentiments of the nation. tt As proof he 
cited various instances where public op1n1on had promoted or prevented govern-
ment action.103 Other forces were also at work. Shortly after Zoutman's 
encounter with the English fleet on August 5, the States of Holland resolved 
that another squadron be ordered to convoy the merchant fleets of Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam. A resolution presented in the States of Holland advocated 
concerting naval action with the French and sponsoring the French loan in 
order Uto annoy the COllmon enemy by strengthening the Congress of North 
America.,~04 In a debate in the States ot Guelderland, regarding the loan to 
France for the benefit ot America, the question of alliance with France was 
again discussed. One deputy claimed "he bad rather acknowledge the independ-
ence ot the Americans than contract an alliance with France." He was answered 
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by Baron van der Capellen de Marsch, cousin of C~pellen tot den Poll the close 
friend of Adams, with the observation that an alliance with America was worthy 
of consideration. Capellen supported the observation with a brief homily on 
the advantages to be derived therefrom. Adams rejoiced to recount it as the 
first opinion, publicly delivered, in favor of American independence. Never-
theless, he was wary of believing the battle against the Anglophiles of the 
United Provinces was won. He prefaced his account of Capellen's remark by 
explaining that it was as "problematical as evern what was the political sys-
tern of the country or if it even had a system, and closed with the comment 
that it would be "long, very long" before the country was unanimously of Van 
105 der Capellen's opinion. 
It was at this juncture that Adams reported the offer of a Russian 
mediation between England and the United Provinces. England, none too willing-
1" accepted the Empress' offer but flatly refused to have Denmark and Sweden 
106 participate as co-mediators. The Provinces also accepted Catherine's 
services but several of the major cities, including both Amsterdam and Rotter-
dam, were little disposed to favor a separate peace. La Vauguyon regarded it 
even more unfavorably and tried to sow disunion among the members of the 
assembly of Holland to prevent a favorable vote.107 The war itself furnished 
cause both for sorrowing and for rejoicing. st. Eustatius was regained from 
the English on November 27. On the other hand, on November 21, Negapatam in 
the Dutch East Indies was lost and a part of the Dutch African coast would 
have been if the French fleet had not come to the rescue. loB The greatest 
news of all was that of the American victory at Yorktown. By the twentieth 
of November the word reached Europe through the Frenchman, Lauzun. In the 
I ! 
,Iii. 
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Netherlands many immediately concluded that the congress at Vienna would now 
materialize. Adams was not to be so easily deoeived. He contended that the 
"Cornwallization" was insufficient of itself to bring England -to terms to 
which the Americans could agree.109 The victory was not completely barren, 
however, as a number of "persons of oonsequence," who were not normally in-
terested in his proceedings, had gone out of the way to congratulate Adams. 
Even more encouraging to the potentiary was the personal approbation given by 
La Vauguyon to Adams' desire to implement a new commission to negotiate Ii 
110 Dutch-Franco-American alliance. 
Nearly a year earlier, on January 9, 1781. Vergennes had informed the 
French ambassador in America that England had declared war on the Provinces 
and that the resulting situation presented a favorable opportunity for a;,union 
between the two republics. The French court, at that time, advocated that 
Congress dispatch a "wise and enlightened envoy" with full powers to complete 
an alliance with the Netherlands. Count de Vergennes insinuated that it was 
to be "desired" that this envoy receive his "principal direction" from Frank-
lin, in order to avoid "discordant proceedings" and to "give unity to the 
political affairs of Congress." A confirmatory dispatch of February 19 fol-
lowed. An authorization to Luzerne to offer the interposition of the king to 
effect this alliance between the two republics and a hint that Congress ought 
to prepare these measures without delay were the only significant additions 
in the February dispatCh.lll This offer Luzerne first officially presented 
112 in May but no action was taken. Although, from time to time, he expressed 
surprise that the king's generous offer should be neglected, LUzerne was soon 
busy about many interferenoes of a more imminent nature. Finally, having 
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circumscribed Adams' authority in the pacification to his satisfaction, the 
minister requested on July 20 a committee to receive the mess3ges relating to 
an alliance. Immediately the same committee (with the solitary exchange of 
two members) as had in June cooperated on the denuding of Adams' commissions 
SO effectively, was appointed to again meet with the French minister. The 
committee submitted their report after the f:Jeeting on July 23 and again on 
August 1,113 but no action was taken until August 9. The report recommended 
that the French court be notified thatii.dams already held a commission to 
propose a treaty of amity and commerce and that he would be further directed 
"to confer on all occasions in the most confidential manner" with La Vauguyon. 
Adams, in turn, would be notified of these proceedings and instructed to take 
full advantage of the French interposition both through the servioes of La 
114 Vauguyon and through correspondence with Franklin. After some debate the 
report was accepted, and the committee was directed to report instructions 
for Adams on a treaty of alliance with the United Provinoes. Four days later 
they reported back. They prefaced their recommendations with the directive 
that, if Adams could form a treaty of amity and commerce in which the inde-
pendence of the United states was recognized according to his previous instruc-
tions, he was not to open the subject of an alliance either offensive or de-
fensive. If, however, he found it impracticable to operate on his previous 
instruotions he might form a defensive alliance provided that certain stipu-
lations regarding American relations to France and to the United Provinces 
be observed.115 
Further discussion was postponed until August 16 when final instruc-
tions, differing somewhat from those of August 13, were prepared for Adams. 
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It was this set with the accompanying commission which Adams so rejoiced to 
receive in November. The new instructions, in direct opposition to the 
August 13 edition, authorized Adams to seek an alliance with the United PrOT-
116 inces and, if possible, a triple alliance to include France. In general, 
the instructions emphasized recognition of American sovereignty. To the 
original requirement that the United Provinces must recognize the sovereignty 
and independence of the United States was added the phrase "absolute and un-
limited, as well in matters of government as of commerce." The clause against 
peace or truce until all three countries agreed was amended to proscribe an, 
laying down of arms until American sovereignty and independence were acknowl-
edged in a treaty terminating the war. The clause permitting mutual guaranty 
of possessions was deleted--the minister was not to sign any stipulation for 
offensive action or guaranty of possessions. In other particulars, not re-
pugnant to these instructions, Adams might use his own discretion but was 
specifically enjoined to confer on all occasions and in a most confidential 
manner with the French minister at The Hague.ll? 
NotoDly were the new instructions less subservient to Luzerne's re-
quests than those on paCification in June, but in this instance the delibera-
tions of Congress were not presented to him for approval until after the final 
vote was taken. The Chevalier was made acquainted with the details of the 
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entire proceeding only on August 22. As he had had difficulties leading 
Congress to act at all, he could hardly have caused the business to be re-
opened. He could only inform Vergennes of the congressional reluctance and 
admit that he had in no way influenced the resolution which differed consider-
ably from his suggestions. He noted that this was proof that Congress wished 
to conclude "without intervention" a treaty limited in duration and purely 
119 defensive. 
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If Luzerne had been able to get an account to Vergennes in time of his 
untiring efforts to motivate Congress. he would h~ve received congratulations 
as on other occasions. Vergennes still knew nothing of Luzerne's success 
""hen in October (1781) he again directed his minister in a. vein similar to 
that used in January and February.120 In October's dispatch Vergennes, al-
though less inclined to believe the Provinces would embarrass their peace 
negotiations by opening communications with ~mericat was still anxious to have 
an accredited American representative in the republic. He was convinced that 
sooner or later circumstances would make some type of negotiation possible. 
viorried that Adams was transcel:ding his instructions by corresponding with 
the opposition in England.l21 he emphasized the importance of his February 
observations on the desirability of the envoy receiving directions from 
Franklin in order to avoid disparity in the negotiations. He succinctly 
added that Adams was very capable of causing just that.122 ;:"'11 of these ob-
jectives Luzerne had tried to accomplish but Vergennes did not receive the 
news until late November or December (1781). By th.9.t time he had completely 
reversed his former expectations on a Dutch-American alliance and had devel-
oped the conviction that the Dutch would regard any advances as too much 
complicating their own quarrel with England.123 The Foreign Secretary, there-
fore, chided rather than congratulated Luzerne for his activity, especially 
for giving ministerial form to his insinuations to Congress. ~uzernet he 
wrote. shOUld have understood that the king's offer was a service he wished 
to render to the Americans and not one he expected from them. One 
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cOrilmunication to Congress would have been sufficient to make the offer known. 
Vergennes' concluding thought betrayed his ~1noyance at the indirect repulse. 
/l.fter telling Luzerne to stop discussing any French offer of interposition, 
he explained that this was the only proper course to "a I1Ilul the defiant reso-
lution" taken by Congress and to make Congress "feel indirectly how much this 
defiance was poor gratitude to His Hajesty.,,124 
With the news of the Yorktown victory, Adams received this commission 
to negotiate, in league with the French ambassador, a triple--or, if Spain 
wished to join, a quadru.ple--alliance. To whomever he wrote, ',dams exulted 
that this new commission was "well-timed,1i and at a "strategic time" for 
foiling Britain's "insjdious trick." Only the new commission would prevent 
the mediation, which he termed a "master piece" whose "supreme excellence 
consists in its matchless effrontery," from succeeding. He anticipated with 
pleasure the announcement of a triple alliance and declared that if Their 
High Hightinesses were to make the proposal it "would be the greatest stroke 
of policy which they have struck this century." But experience with Dutch 
indecision and dilatoriness quickly pulled him back to reality and he added, 
"They are not to be depended on.,,125 
Eager to put this commission into execution while the situation in the 
Netherlands seemed favorable, he sent Thaxter to inform La Vauguyon of the 
arrival of important dispatches. La Vauguyon called on Adams at his home 
about one o'clock the afternoon of November 24. The two ministers spent ap-
proximately an hour and a half reviewing the possibilities. They were of one 
opinion as to the good effect such a proposal might have in counteracting the 
British "artifice" of a separate mediation between Britain and the Netherlands. 
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La. Vauguyon described the subject as "very well seen and the measure very 
well concerted." Nevertheless, he vas more than reluctant to take any de-
cisive steps as he had received no orders from his court. When the conference 
was over, Adams, in compliance with La Vauguyon's request, dispatched to the 
French ambassador a copy of the instructions he had received. In his accom-
panying note he suggested three alternative methods of procedure for the 
Duke's deliber.ation. First, the French minister might make the proposal to 
the States General in the name of His Host Christian Hajesty. Second t the 
two ministers might make a joint proposal. Or third, Adams might make the 
proposal as a consequence of his former proposal (April 19) of a treaty of 
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oOIlll'nerce. 
Immediately after the consultation, the French ambassador returned to 
The Hague to receive the final approval of the [states General to the loan to 
be floated on French security. According to their agreement, Adams forwarded 
a summary of their conversation and a copy of his commission to La Vauguyon 
at The Hague. Upon receipt of these, La Vauguyon expressed his personal zeal 
to concert with the American plenipotentiary but reminded Adams of the neces-
sity of a direct authorization from Paris. He confided to Dumas that he in-
tended to return to Paris wi thin a few days and there confer ';;lith Vergennes 
on the business. During the conversation he enlarged on Adams' third alterna-
tive suggestion relative to a commercial treaty. He carefully intimated that 
it might be appropriate for Adams to insist on an answer to his earlier 
memorial as a preliminary opening wedge.127 Thus, the subject of the memorial 
of April was re-introduced to the minds of all three men. It would lie dor-
ri.ant only a very short time. 
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In the meantime, the ordinarily impetuous Adams was not dismayed by the 
forced wait for Vergennes and his minister to decide on how and when they 
wished to proceed. On the contrary, he expeoted the wait to be beneficial. 
Time was on his side. The majority of the people appeared to him to desire 
an alliance with France and America and were being restrained from it only by 
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"whimsical fears" and "party quarrels. 1t Since a goodly number of newspapers 
and pamphlets were busily advocating an alliance, Adams judged a little time 
would help to prepare the way for his proposal.129 He was further encouraged 
by a proposal for a treaty with the United states from Oostergo, a small area 
in the Province of Friesland. This quarter was the first public body to 
venture such a proposal, although Van der Capellen de Marsch, speaking as an 
individual, had done so in the assembly at Zutphen. Oostergo was only a 
minute part of the sovereignty, but Adams predicted that "the whole republic 
must follow. It was necessitated to it by a mechanism as certain as clock-
work." He wisely expected no precipitous rush to follow the Oostergo example, 
as he knew the operation would be "studiously and zealously slow. ,,130 There 
were other indications that the Dutch were beginning to take a slightly stif-
fer line. They declared themselves unwilling to accept the Russian mediation 
except on the fulfillment of two preliminaries. These were that England agree 
to aocord them 1) the enjoyment of all the rights of the Neutral League and 
2) complete indemnification for all losses sustained in the war. Such terms 
England could not accept and Itthis little bubble will burst like the great 
one at Vienna.,,131 
Not only was the situation in the Netherlands gradually assuming a 
more favorable aspect, but Adams' relations with France appeared to him to be 
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improving. He considered himself as being on excellent terms with the Duc de 
la Vauguyon and rejoiced that the "miffs at Passy and Versailles seem to be 
wearing away.,,132 His latest commission apneared to reinforce that impres-
sion. From the wording of the instructions, which directed that he concert 
action with the French ambassador. Adams gathered that the commissLon resulted 
from an agreement between Luzerne and Congress. He. therefore, presumed that 
it was an outgrowth of an approved French poliCy.133 Consequently, he ex-
pected no problem in obtaining Vergennes' sanction on its implemen~tion when-
ever he and La Vauguyon decided. He was completely unaware of the ~act that 
the attitude at Paris had changed considerably from the time that the sugges-
tion for a triple alliance had first been forwarded to Luzerne. Du. e to the 
slowness of ~rans-atlantic communication and the dilatoriness of Congress 
Adams found himself possessed of a commission supposedly initiated or at 
least favored by the French ministry but which, unknown to him, the French 
government was no longer willing to support. 
La Vauguyon. too, was unacquainted with the change in Vergenunes t think-
ing and had, therefore, encouraged Adams to expect French co-operat j,on in 
proposing an alliance. He had even taken the unexpected step of in. timating 
that Adams might now request an answer to his April memorial. l34 ~is latter 
proposition was entirely agreeable to the American plenipotentiary and. while 
he awaited Vergennes authorization on the alliance--a wait which proved un-
ending.~-he proceeded to make arrangements accordingly. 
A first step was to accept an invitation from Dumas to meet and discuss 
with some personages at The Hague the idea of requesting a categor:tcal an-
swer on the memorial.135 He planned to keep the appointment on Deeernber 18, 
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but the Duke's arrival at Amsterdam on his way to Paris caused a postponement 
until the following day. La Vauguyon called upon Adams at his home about noon 
on the eighteenth and during the ensuing discussion the two men talked at 
length upon the possibilities of a categorical answer. La Vauguyon believed 
that the recent ItCornwallization" warranted a "higher tone" and that a re-
quest for an answer would be entirely proper. He suggested that Adams go to 
The Hague at a time when there was a president favorable to American aspira-
tions and demand an answer from the States General. To support his demand, 
the minister ought then to apply to the regencies of the various cities of the 
Province of Holland. The two men agreed that, as a preliminary, Adams should 
seek the reaction of the important government officials he had planned to 
meet at The Hague. Grateful for the good understanding subsisting between 
himself and La. V'l.uguyon, Adams resolved to follow the advice but to "take care 
not to advance too fast, so as to be able to retreat."l36 Consequently, the 
following morning, he visited The Hague where his friends similarly advised 
him to see the President of the States General at the first favorable oppor-
tunity and demand a categorical answer. Once that was done, he planned to 
wait upon Van Bleiswick, the Grand Pensionary, Secretary Fagel, and the pen-
sionaries of all the cities of :'olland and to apprise them of his intention.13'i 
Adams and La. V~uguyon met again at 10:00 o'clock on December 21 to dis-
cuss the advice ~dams had received at The Hague. They were both becoming 
quite enthusiastic. La. Vauguyon in requesting the appointment had expressed 
himself as "impatient" to converse with Adams on the affair. He had in fact 
stayed over in Amsterdam the extra days primarily to get a report. It was 
agreed at their meeting that La Vauguyon should acquaint Vergennes with the 
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proposal for a categorical answer. Adams also requested that the ambassador 
should inform his chief of the American's personal disposition to follow the 
directives he had received relative to an alliance. At the same time La 
Vauguyon was to impress Vergennes with Adams' firm determination to act only 
with French approbation. l }8 Vergennes, when informed by La Vauguyon of the 
plan for a categorical answer, raised no objection to it provided that Adams 
restrict himself to a purely verbal communication. Adams was, furthermore, 
to limit himself to a request for information as to whether there had been 
any deliberation on the memorial and as to what answer he might communicate 
to Congress. No permission was given for introducing a treaty of alliance.139 
The approbation was scarcely a week old when Adams put it into execu-
tion. Dumas had returned with Adams to Amsterdam after the latter's Hague 
consultation with influential friends. Thus both were at Amsterdam when La 
140 Vauguyon's message arrived and they immediately made plans. The States 
of Holland--that all important section of the sovereignty--was to reconvene 
on January 8. The States General was also to be in session then with the 
sympathetic Vll.n de Sandheuvel as president for the week. The minister and 
his agent travelled to The Hague on the eighth and sought an audience with 
Van de Sandheuvel at ten the next morning, January 9, 1782. In a brief 
verbal communication, Adams reminded the President of his memorial of the 
previous April notifying the States General of his plenipotentiary powers and 
his readiness to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. He added that the 
president at that time (Baron de Hemmen) had promised to present his communi-
cation to the States General but that he had not received any answer from 
Their High Hightinesses. He concluded with a formal "demand" for a'bategor-
ical answer which I may transmit to my sovereign." Having received the 
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President's assurance that he would report the interview to the States General 
for their deliberation. Adams sent a request to Van Bleiswick for an inter-
view. Due to illness. the Grand Pensionary was unable to grant the interview 
but indicated that public business could be presented through his secretary. 
Dumas then presented /\.dams' message verbally to the secretary for tranSlllis"ion 
t th G d P · 141 o e ran ens10nary • 
. The following morning the pilgrimage continued. The first stop was at 
the home of Secretary Fagel who assured them that he knew all about it. 
President Van de Sandheuvel had immediately reported to the States General 
and this body had taken Adams' request ad referendum as was their custom. 
142 Adams must await results. After his visit to Fagel. the minister began 
his visits to the official headquarters of the regencies of each city in 
Holland beginning with that of Dort. There he met the pensionary, M. Gyselaer. 
who not only officially received the communication but in his private capacity 
expressed willing acknowledgment of ~oth Adams and America. The entire depu-
tation of Haarlem received him cordially and, while unable to promise more 
than to pass the information to their constituents, sincerely wished him 
sucoess. He continued his calls at the houses of Leyden, Rotterdam, Gouda, 
and others until all eighteen deputations had been visited. Each deputation 
accorded him a good reception and several expressed an earnest wish for 
friendship between the two republics.143 Adams was well satisfied with his 
efforts and with the reception they had received.144 He very probably would 
have been even happier if he could have read, over Franklin's shoulder, a 
page from his own book. Franklin, shortly after he heard of Adams' proposed 
demand for a categorical answer, wrote to Jay in Spain. "I conceive there 
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would be nothing amiss in your mentioning in a short memoir . . . pressing 
t.hem to give you an explicit t de fini ti ve t immediate answer, whether they would 
enter into a treaty with us or not, that you might inform Congfess and, in 
145 
case of refusal, solicit your recall.!! This was a classic statement of 
militia diplomacy. 
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In the meantime, Adams had received the approval of his plan and of 
the strong terminology from several members of the States General. Van der 
'I 
1,1 
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Capellen assured him that a request for a categorical response in a tone 
"appropriate to the greatness of the American Union and to the unworthiness of 
the reoeption given to its ambassador" was the correct remedy for a dying 
cause. Indeed, he thought such a step in the prevailing circumstances "might 
be brilliant" (Van der Capellen to Adams, Jan. 6, 1782, C. }'. Adams, ·tlorks, 
VII, 502). 
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my chariot door" and then waited on the step until Adams drove off. This 
attention did more than a little to gladden the heart of the perceptive and 
unduly proud American. 
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CHAPTER V / 
TREATIES AT LAST, JANUARY-OCTOBER, 1782 
Having presented his demand for a categorical answer, there was little 
ministerially for Adams to do but await results. While he marked time, he 
undertook a number of trips about the countryside, trying to interest influ-
entia! people in a categorical answer. The first of these trips, made in 
late January and early February (1782), was through Friesland, the most re-
publican-minded of the provinces.1 His efforts there were rewarded when, 
toward the end of February, Friesland became the first province to vote for 
recognition of the sovereignty of the United States. From Friesland, he trav-
e11ed to various sections of the country, but the greater part of each week 
he spent in the major cities of Holland, particularly Amsterdam and The 
2 Hague. In this manner, he kept in constant contact with the various areas 
although there was little he could do to direct their deliberations. 
Not only in the matter of recognition, but in all the other projects 
which he had been pursuing, circumstances dictated a dilatory policy. One of 
these projects which had to await a more opportune moment was that of nego-
tiating a loan. The Neufvi11e loan had produced practically nothing. 3 To add 
to the frustration, Franklin informed Adams that he was finding it more diffi-
cult than formerly to obtain the money to pay drafts. Therefore, it would be 
4 
necessary to set the end of February as the tentative date to "shut up shop." 
This message, in union with his own intense desire to help, led Adams to 
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attempt one more effort at borrowing. He quietly applied to an old, estab-
lished house which had participated in the American trade for a hundred years 
and could be relied upon to evaluate the possibilities accurately. After two 
days of study, the banker reported that, until a treaty had been secured, 
there was no chance of success. He explained to Adams that the entire loan 
business was controlled by four men. If anyone of them would help, a loan 
could be arranged without much trouble. Without them, no loan could succeed. 
After indirectly approaching the four, Adams concluded that his efforts were 
in vain as they were all well paid to resist. According to the information 
furnished by the banker, the acquiescence of the states of Holland was not 
legally required for a loan but, in practice, no loan would be given without 
it.5 Franklin, aware of the close connection between government and finance, 
agreed that it was not an opportune time to solicit in the Netherlands for 
fear of complicating the delicate negotiations on both mediation and the cate-
goric demand. He expressed great "impatience" to hear the results of the 
latter. Favorable results would relieve him, also, and he was "quite sick of 
my Gibeonite ~siS7 offioe--that of drawing water for the whole congregation of 
Israel. ,,6 
Another project that Adams would have been overjoyed to advance was the 
proposition of a triple alliance. It was infeasible without French approba-
tion. He carefully abided by, but chafed at, the restraints upon him. While 
the States General were still debating the latest mediation offer, he informed 
Franklin that the republic was seriously considering an alliance and that he 
was sure a proposal to that effect would be successful. He pointed out, how-
ever, that the ardor of many who favored such a measure was "dampened" 
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by the apprehension that France was not anxious to see it materialize.7 La 
Vauguyon's passion for declaring France neutral on the proposition easily 
fostered that assumption. ~Ihen the states General, on February 14, 1782, ac-
c~pted with reservation the mediation of Russia, Adams grumbled that the 
French desire to retain the Empress' favor for the day of peacemaking had 
8 
caused an excellent opportunity to be lost. Although forced to abandon the 
idea temporarily, before long he again found an opportunity to solicit French 
approval. By late February, several small areas of the sovereignty appeared 
on the verge of acknowledging America. These signs Adams interpreted as 
certain evidence that the Netherlands were ready for a treaty.9 Optimistical-
ly, he prepared notes for a proposal of an alliance to be verbally delivered 
to the President of the States General. Dispatching these notes to La 
Vauguyon for prior approval, he explained that the general enthusiasm in the 
provinces made it "high time" for him to execute his instructions of August 
16.10 
The French ambassador hastened to cool the undesired ardor displayed 
by Adams. He informed the latter that it was impossible for him to make any 
statement ministerially as he had received no instructions from Versailles.ll 
Adroitly conveying the impression that, in his private capacity, he heartily 
endorsed the end to be achieved, he gravely warned Adams that the inconven-
iences in its accomplishment were serious. The presentation of Adams' pro-
po sal , he warned, would more retard than accelerate a treaty. With proper 
diplomatic finesse, he promised to explain more fully in conversation with 
Adams if that gentleman planned soon to visit The Hague.12 There was no need. 
Temporarily that s~uelched the idea as Adams had no intention of going ahead 
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without French approbation. Periodically La Vauguyon repeated the "no instruc-
tions" claim. The very most he would promise was to do nothing publicly 
either to aid or to hinder an American-Dutch alliance.13 
This neutral ground served French interests excellently. From this 
vantage point La Vauguyon could impress the independent Dutch with the modera-
tion of the Frenoh oourt in not desiring to interfere in any way in their in-
ternal affairs. France, he deolared, would confine herself to wishing the 
Netherlanders well in whatever they judged most conducive to their country's 
14 
welfare. Adams he hoped to steer away from an alliance by arguing that 
there was no real object to be aocomplished by forming one. By their concert 
for defense with France. the States General had already united their cause 
with that of France and, consequently, with that of America.15 If Adams 
raised objections to this rather specious reasoning, La Vauguyon was directed 
to point out to him that the king deemed a neutral conduct prudent, more 
espeoially as Congress had shown a repugnance to accept his majesty's offer of 
intermediation. Franoe, acoordingly, felt obligated to demonstrate to Con-
gress her disinterestedness and her delioacy in anything which might give the 
16 least offense. 
To the frustrations on the loan and on the alliance was added the ag-
gravation of criticism from Robert Livingston, the recently elected Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs.17 When Livingston took office on October 21, 1781, Con-
gress, due to the misfortunes that had befallen his copious correspondence, 
had only very poor information on Adams' activities. Of the minister's dis-
patches. only the brief note of May 16. enclosing copies of the memorial, but 
giving little explanation of the what, why, or wherefore of it, and no 
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information on the presentation of his credentials, had been received. Word 
from several other sources concerning Adams' memorial had reached Philadelphia 
but the accounts were vague. Consequently, Livingston lacked authentic inform 
tion on the motives, intentions, and circumstances relative to Adams' presenta-
tion. Nothing daunted, he proceeded to trace a proper path of diplomacy for 
the militia enthusiast. 
The first missive containing this unsolicited advice reached Adams only 
on February 13, 1782, although dispatched the previous October, nearly five 
18 
months earlier. Adams failed to record his deepest sentiment on the docu-
ment, but he proceeded to take it apart line by line and, under the diplomatic 
courtesy of accepting bits of advice, annihilated the entire array of Livings-
ton's arguments. Agreeing perfectly that his situation was "delicate," he 
assured the Secretary that from infancy he had "passed through an uninterrupted 
series of delicate situations" and so was accustomed to the experience. With 
deliberate misinterpretation, he acknowledged that his health was still deli-
cate and that there were some who feared his person was in danger but remarked 
that he had no apprehensions for himself.19 Livingston had written that the 
Dutch were disposed by their constitution and their economy to peace and would 
accept war only as long as absolutely necessary. America, through Adams, would 
20 
only open itself to embarrassment by trying to deterudne them otherwise. 
Adams agreed that the republic ardently desired peace but, he amended, only on 
honorable terms. England would not grant such and so the war would continue, 
and Adams might remain there in a "very insipid and insignificant state a long 
time without affront or answer." As for the partisanship of which Livingston 
accused him, he issued a firm denial. He had treated all men alike regardless 
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of party and had been as well treated by the court party as by the Patriots. 
Agreeing that the Dutch had a perfect right to judge for themselves on the 
matter of recognition, Adams rejected the implication that he had portrayed 
dissatisfaction with their conduct and declared he had "no reason to be dis-
satisfied.!! By way of proof he pointed out that time was demonstrating the 
correctness of his judgment, and the increasing conversion to those ideas had 
enabled him to proceed. On the advice of Vergennes, La Vauguyon, and several 
prominent persons, he had subsequently demanded an answer to the memorial and 
had been received politely by all parties. Complaints that he had not been 
well received would reach Congress via his opponents, but "they have their 
views ••• and know that this is a good string for them to touch.t! To 
Livingston's directive to flavoid giving offense to government by the appear-
ance of intrigue." he staunchly replied. nI stand now in an honorable light. 
openly and candidly demanding an answer in my public character." If there 
were any dishonor, he argued, it resided in the republic as none had yet 
ventured to return a negative answer to him. liThe dignity of the United states 
is therefore perfectly safe, and if that of this republic is questionable, 
this is their own fault, not ours. n2l 
Having vindicated his position, he expressed complete willingness to 
subscribe to the Secretary's advice to avoid any measure likely to encourage 
a public affront. He soothingly assured Livingston that "all appearances of 
intrigue and all the refinements of politics have been as distant from my 
conduct as you know them to be from my natural and habitual character'.;'" On 
the point of spending more time at The Hague, and of forming better connec-
tions with ministers of uninterested powers so as to glean information from 
them, Adams responded that he would in future follow the first part of the 
advice and spend more time at The Hague. (He neglected to mention that he 
was at that very time negotiating for a formal residence in t~~t city.) He 
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demurred on the second part. Forming connections with ministers of uninter-
eated powers was a matter "extremely delicate." There were no "uninterested 
powers." Every count17 waa interested, at least indirectly, in American af-
fairs. Further. eve17 minister had to be on his guard as he had competitors 
spying on his every move and could not risk openly vis! ting with an American 
minister. Nor did Adams think contact with any of them was wort~ the intrigue 
it would involve. None of them was entrusted with information of any pro-
22 fundit1· 
Within the week after Adams received Livingston's first broadside, he 
was treated to a second. Written on November 20, 1781, this, too, was a 
lengthy and pointed criticism of Adams' methodology.23 Livingston first took 
him to task for not sending information as was "expected" of him and especial-
ly for not explaining the principles and views of each major Dutch party. To 
this Adams dryly responded that it was not only "somewhat dangerous" to send 
information but that it was impossible as "the views of all parties are en-
veloped in clouds and darknesse,,24 ~ince Livingston's October letter, Con-
gress had learned from Dumas that Adams had presented his credentials. The 
Secretary, therefore, declared himself "astonished" that Adams had not writ-
ten to explain whatever peculiarity of situation induoed him to take measures 
which placed Congress in such a "humiliating light.,. Congress, Livingston 
darkly hinted, would want an explanation of this and of the minister's reasons 
for publishing the memorial. Livingston then set himself to tutoring Adams 
on the best interests of the Dutch--contending that they had nothing to gain 
from recognition that they could not as easily secure without taking that 
step.25 
This was just too much, and Adams quickly responded that his letters 
of May 3 and May 7, 1781, had contained full explana. tions of all the details 
that it would have been prudent to commit to paper. He volunteered the in-
formation that he had had the advice of friends and that, if he had not acted, 
his situation would have been "ridiculous and deplorable indeed." Far from 
placing Congress in a "humiliating light," his step had improved his own 
position. The measure, he repeated, was so well received that, with the ad-
vice of La Vauguyon, Vergennes, and friends, he had carried it further and 
demanded a categorical answer. He did not expect to receive the answer de-
manded, but the attempt placed America in a "glorious light." As for print-
ing the memorial, it was thepnly means to reach beyond the States General 
and contact the real sovereigns of the country. No one in Europe had made 
any objections to the publication and, if he had not done so, he would have 
"met with many disagreeable scenes if not public affronts.,,26 
To the Livingston advice "to be, in your language and conduct, a pri-
vate gentleman, fI Adams replied that that was exactly what he bad been. He 
remarked, however t that he was far too well known to remain incognito and that 
it was not to the public interest to attempt it.27 Livingston, although 
softening it with compliments on Adams' patriotism, injected a thought from 
the French court. "As our objects must be very similar to those of France, 
I should suppose it would be prudent for you to keep up the closest connec-
tions with her minister, to advise with him on great leading objects, and to 
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counteract his opinion only upon the most mature deliberations." Adams tossed 
this off with the simple rejoinder that "without interruption" he had ever 
28 had a "friendly connection with the French ambassador." / 
If Livingston's comments on prudent retirement and quiet conSUltation 
were pertinent when they were written, they were outdated by the time they 
were received. The internal situation in the Netherlands had evolved toward 
a firmer stance vis~-v1s England and a more favorable reaction toward 
America. Adams could hardly claim prime responsibility for this evolution,29 
but he had understood well how to capitalize on it. His demand for a ca.te-
goric answer was generally well taken. As far away as Spain, Carmichael in-
formed Congress that, since Adams had presented his demand, he, Carmichael, 
had been invited to the home of the Dutoh minister in }_drid--thereby denoting 
an improvement in the Dutch attitude toward America..30 Adams forestalled 
concern on Dr. Franklin's part by assuring him that there was no need for 
/ 
anxiety over the demarche. It had been well ooncerted both with Frenoh min1s-
ters and prominent Dutch officials. Its prime purpose was to force delibera-
tion on a connection with the allies at the same time as consideration was 
being given to the mediation proposal.3l 
Vergennes and Adams were equally anxious to secure limitations to the 
Dutch acceptance of the mediation. Vergennes could not afford to lose the 
Dutch source of naval supplies; Adams could not afford to lose a co-bellig-
erent, especially one with money. The proposal might open the door to his 
own negotiations or, at least, bring anc;end to a tiresome wait. He observed, 
"If it does not suit their affairs to make a bargain with us, let them tell us 
so candidly and let us all go home. ,,32 He had not yet completely regained his 
health and discouragements were again beginning to crowd in upon him. He 
personally wished himself nat home again every hour in the twenty-four.,,33 
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Naturally, he had no intention of going home unless recalled or replaced. His 
primary objectives--loan and treaty--had not been achieved, but his time, he 
felt, was not entirely uselessly spent. He enumerated. for the edification 
of Livingston, every allied success--political and military--of the entire 
past year. He did not claim credit for all of them but submitted that it was 
"impossible not to believe that the memorial bad some infiuence in producing 
some of them.,,34 
Tangible results shortly began to appear. On the twenty-sixth of 
February, 1?82, Friesland recognized American sovereignty and instructed her 
deputies to move in the States General that the entire republic do likewise. 35 
By late February the States of Holland took ad referendum the resolution to 
recognize the United States and the matter was soon under consideration by 
the various regencies of the province.36 This prompted the first burgomaster 
of Amsterdam to predict that America would be recognized by all seven prov-
inces within six weeks. 3? Although time proved his prediction to be only a 
week short, Adams was not immediately willing to accept that estimate. The 
general attitude, it appeared to him, was a desire for friendly relations 
but not for any treaty, even one of commerce, for a long time. 38 His Hague 
advisor, Dumas, was largely of the same opinion. He noted a very perceptible 
change in favor of America immediately after Holland took the memorial ad 
referendum, but he, too, tended to underestimate the power behind the changes 
that he observed. Having a long acquaintance with the interminable delays 
that could result from the ad referendum process, Dumas feared it was to be 
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used as a ruse for the States General to hide behind. While alleging lack of 
~nstructions from their constituents as a reason for not taking action, they 
could sit back, carefully watch developments, and spend immeasurable time on 
deliberation. 39 
As time passed, Adams appraised the situation as increasingly hopeful, 
but he continued to entertain some misgivings. Since the beginning of the 
year, trouble had been brewing from a new and totally unexpected quarter--
Amsterdam. Formerly that city had held pride of place in furthering American 
~nterests, but altered sentiment in the regency threatened to delay and pos-
40 
sibly even to prevent the reception of an American ambassador. A group of 
Anglophiles resorted to various subterfuges to accomplish their purpose. 
Representatives of this opposition called on La Vauguyon to discuss the French 
attitude toward the recognition of America. If the French policy of non-
~nterference could be propagated as one of indifference, much of the enthu-
siasm of the Francophiles would be negated. La Vauguyon, suspecting the 
motive of their visit, took pains to assure them that the king would undoubt-
41 
edly be grateful to see the states General following his example. The 
Anglophiles then spread the rumor that the French court was jealous of a Dutch 
connection with America and was secretly working against it. They went so 
far as to add that the French ambassador had said that his court would not be 
willing to recognize American independence if it had not already been 
42 granted. Another scheme proposed by the opposition was to adjourn the 
states of Holland without taking a vote on recognition. This plan was opposed 
by the powerful cities of Dort, Haarlem, and even a major part of Amsterdam 
itself because of other unfinished business in which they were interested, 
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particularly the plans for concerting military operations with France.43 For 
a time Dumas feared that the Anglophiles would attempt to keep Adams' admis-
sion under perpetual deliberation. To avoid this, he personally contacted 
many whom he thought would aid in preventing that type of action, and he im-
44 plored Ad~~s to visit The Hague and lend the weight of his presence. 
The Patriots recognized the necessity of counteracting any and all 
schemes concocted to prevent Amsterdam's approval of Adams' mission. Without 
Amsterdam there could be no recognition. Consequently, they produced a com-
promise plan and forwarded it to Adams for his approval. Basically, it was a 
plan whereby the provinces would acknowledge America in such a manner that a 
commercial treaty could be drawn up between the two nations, but no publiC, 
formal act of acknowledgment would be made. Adams quickly recognized that 
this would provide a nice "out" for the Dutch but would not provide a thing 
for him. His approval was not forthcoming. Rather, he viewed the proposal 
with "utter detestation.,,45 Dumas returned the plan to its chief proponent 
declaring that it could not be accepted as it did not provide for the cate-
gorieal answer Adams had requested nor did it provide for a public audience 
for the American minister.46 Adams hoped that the strong republican feelings 
of Friesland would effect the rejection of the compromise in the States Gener-
al, and thus prevent a permanent crippling of his negotiations by means of it. 
He regarded it as a half measure--one by which a country declared itself well 
disposed and yet refused to grant an audience--and therefore most unsatis-
factory to him. He could only interpret it as "an answer in the negative • • • 
and depart in consequence.,,4? For some days the proposition continued to rub 
on his mind. At first he believed it to have been conceived by Van Bleiswick 
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and not by the Patriots at all. Dumas assured him that Van Bleiswick had no 
part either in its instigation or in its development. It had been tormulated 
by triends who regarded it as the last alternative if they could secure noth-
48 ing better. Adams teared it the more as La Vauguyon appeared to accept it 
as a possible solution and, therefore, could not be expected to use his very 
considerable influence against it.49 
In order to map strategy, a triend,50 through the agency of Dumas, 
urged Adams to come to The Hague and confer with Burgomaster Hooft and the 
regents of Amsterdam. In this way Adams could discover what were their inten-
tions in regard to acknowledging America and receiving her minister. If the 
regents declared themselves favorable to his admission, Adams could then in-
siat that they espouse the cause openly and support it fully in the provincial 
assembly.5l Adams, accordingly, consulted Van Berckel and M. Bicker, Jr. on 
the wisdom ot approaching Hoott and the regency. He also discussed with them 
the suggestion that he approach ragel and verbally set a t~me limit to his 
demand tor an answer. It no &Dswer were received by a given date (April 15 
was suggested), he would so inform his government. As the regents appeared 
generally to hold the desired opinions, Adams was convinced that they would 
ultimately come to the right conclusion--provided that they were not side-
tracked by the conciliatory plan. This project was thereupon dropped and the 
three men agreed that it would be better to leave the regency to its own de-
liberations.52 
As February moved toward March, the minister became more and more 
aware of the changing atmosphere. Anglophile attempts at arousing mob scenes 
were no longer successtul. Sometimes the mob failed to materialize; at other 
2~ 
times, the tumult was turned against the Anglophiles.53 When an opportunity 
arose to purchase a house at The Hague which would serve well for an embassy 
building, Dumas and his confreres were elated. After some high-pressured 
salesmanship Dumas sold the idea to Adams, and the house was purchased at 
public auction on February 22.54 When the identity and the purpose of the 
purchaser became known, many Hague residents expressed their pleasure while 
the Anglophiles found it prudent to remain silent.55 Sentiment had changed 
to such a degree that Dumas was convinced that no one would dare to object if 
Adams were to move immediately to The Hague and assume his ministerial charac-
ter without waiting the decision of the States General.56 Not only were 
there obvious advantages in the purchase of the house economically, but it 
appeared to have a good effect politically.57 
La Vauguyon, similarly cognizant of the changed atmosphere, notified 
Vergennes of the enthusiasm which he encountered everywhere for breaking all 
connections with England.58 Vergennes was skeptical; he doubted that the 
Dutch intended to avow American independence. There was, he argued, no good 
reason for their doing so; on the contrary, they would only involve themselves 
in embarrassments. Nevertheless, France had a great interest in Dutch recog-
nition of American sovereignty as this "would cause an entire rupture between 
Holland and the Court of London"--an advantage not to be lightly eschewed. 
Therefore, La Vauguyon was to do nothing to discourage the Patriots. To avoid 
pitfalls on the other side, the minister was carefully to refrain from promot-
ing the action in any way, even indirectly. "We do not wish to impose upon 
ourselves the obligation of guaranteeing the results which it could have for 
the Republic. u59 Vergennes in his communique of the following week repeated 
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the directive "neither to favor nor to contradict" the activities of Adams so 
that France would not be responsible for the consequences. If La V~uguyon 
were pinned down on French intentions regarding Adams' demand, he was to 
state that the king had clearly manifested by his actions his intentions re-
garding America. Beyond that, his majesty made it an inviolable rule not to 
advise, particularly in matters of so much importance to the other country.60 
Ever wary of the perspicacious Adams, Vergennes warned La Vauguyon to use 
prudence in carrying out these instructions so that Adams could not interpret 
the ambassador's attitude as indicative of a bad disposition or change of 
principles on the part of France.61 
Early in March, 1782, the deputies of Friesland, following the direc-
tives of their own States, presented in the States General a resolution that 
American sovereignty be acknowledged. Deputies from all seven provinces took 
copies of it to present to their constituents. The presentation of a resolu-
tion by a province was a significant step and not to be equated with the ~ 
referendum action taken on a memorial by an unrecognized minister. Popular 
satisfaction was again apparent. Adams, wherever he travelled, was universal-
62 ly congratulated on his approaching reception at The Hague. He took aatis-
faction in informing his beloved wife, 
Your humble servant has lately grown much into fashion in this 
country. Nobody scarcely of so much importance as ~~nheer Adams. 
Every city and province rings with De Heer Adams, etc., etc., and 
if I were to judge of things here as we do in other countries, I 
should think I was going to be received at The Hague in awful pomP6 
in a few weeks, but I never can foresee one hour what will happen. 3 
The public in general expected the example of the Friesians to be imitated by 
the rest of the country. French and Dutch gazettes both widely reflected the 
64 
opinion that the American minister would be received shortly. On his part, 
Adams feared that too much credence was being given to the popular belief that 
the Friesians were always sure to attain whatever they undertook. He further 
discounted the prognosis on the basis of information he possessed of secret 
intrigues against his recognition both in The Hague and at Ameterdam.65 
The interval between Holland taking Friesland's resolution ad referen-
~ and the regencies of the province submitting their decisions was both busy 
and nerve-wracking. Although influential gentlemen had promised Dumas not to 
permit it, there still existed the possibility of the States adjourning before 
all the regencies and the body of nobles had reported. Dumas. supported by 
La Vauguyon. desired Adams to spend a few days and lend his influence in The 
Hague before the final vote was taken.66 In spite of the good omens there was 
a real dread of some last-minute slip. It was presumed by the Patriots that 
the English were strongly endeavoring to separate the Americans and the Dutch 
from each other and from the French and to involve Adams in any separate 
negotiations that would render abortive the effort to form a Duteh-American 
pact.67 
Paul Wentworth was the first of a group who were sent t~he United 
Provinces to gather information on the possibilities of a separate peace. 
In mid-March a forged article to the effect that Adams was preparing for a 
trip to London to treat of peace had appeared in a London paper supposedly 
at the instigation of Wentworth and with the sole object of breeding trouble. 
When Wentworth completed his professed business of arranging prisoner ex-
changes. the Patriots insisted on his being requested to leave The Hague. 
Apparently he proceeded to Amsterdam. It was suspected that he would there 
attempt some ruse to detract from the full authenticity of Adams' reception 
239 
68 if he could not completely prevent it. Another emissary, Thomas Digges, who 
enjoyed the added advantage of being a former correspondent of Adams, was sent 
to contact the American minister and to make some inquiries r61ative to peace 
negotiations.69 He requested a very secret interview with Adams. 70 The 
minister replied that he would receive Digges only in the presence of Thaxter 
and that he intended to communicate any interview in full to Franklin and to 
Vergennes.71 The Russian mediation offer which was still in process was 
another source of concern. Consequently, Thaxter had some basis for his com-
ment that "some Northern blast t or some demon from Britain may yet disappoint 
our well-grounded expectations_,,72 
By the end of March both Russian and English ministries, realizing that 
the resolution on recognition would certainly be brought before the States 
General very soon, tried to delay the progress of the deliberations.73 A 
major effort was initiated through the Russian court. The Russian government, 
acting as intermediary, communicated to the States General that George III had 
reversed his policy and was now disposed to permit free navigation to the 
republic and to negotiate a treaty similar to that of 1674.74 It was this 
treaty which permitted traffic in naval supplies and to which Dutch adherence 
had inaugurated the Anglo-Dutch rupture. At the same time England proposed a 
truce while these negotiations were carried forward. 75 Fearing that her 
minister at The Hague was not sufficiently sympathetic to the English party, 
Catherine dispatched a second representative, presumably more sympathetic to 
the English cause, to aid in reestablishing peace.76 The Prince of Orange 
exerted his influence, not to block Adams directly, but to strengthen the 
relations with Russia and to retain the right to make a separate peace. He 
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presumed that France would not object to a separate peace if the Netherlands 
secured the right to free navigation.and the right to export naval supplies.?? 
Adams undertook a constant round of conversations, visits, and trips 
throughout the country. He visited a number of mercantile houses to enlist 
their aid. As only Friesland, prior to the end of March, had voted recogn1-
tion, Dumas advocated spreading the idea that an American act of navigation 
could open to Friesland alone the ports of the United States.?8 This thought 
was quietly filtered among the merchants and shipowners of the major cities. 
As the same time news of the ordinance of Congress against British manufac-
tures reached the United Provinces. As the ordinance enhanced the Dutch 
prospects of garnering a laraer share of American trade, its arrival was well-
timed to have a strong influence on the Dutch merchants. It was impossible to 
estimate the degree of influence each of these factors had upon the merchants 
and business men. They culminated, however, in a deluge of petitions from 
merchants, bankers, shipowners, and others to their regencies requesting the 
recognition of America in order that commercial treaties could be signed. 
Many of the petitions were drawn up by close collaborators of Adams, ~ •• 
LUKe in Layden, Calkoen in Amsterdam, and Van Zoon in Rotterdam, to mention 
only III fe'll. 
The first of these papers, drawn by Jean Luzac, was the petition of 
members of the orsanizatioD of Traders, Merchants, and Manufacturers of Ley-
den to their city council. It was signed by nearly sixty business houses, 
and at their request two copies of the petition were forwarded to Adams.?9 A 
similar petition from the Merchants, Insurers, and Freighters of Rotterdam to 
their regency followed. The merchants of Amsterdam petitioned first their own 
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regency and then joined with Haarlem and Leyden in a petition to the provincial 
States and to the states General. On the latter there were approximately five 
hundred names, and twice as many would have willingly signed it it had been 
necessary. Hany familiar names appeared, among them that of Neuf'ville.,and Son. 
Van Staphorst. de la Lande and Fynje. and Matthew van Arp. A wide number of 
other petitions, most of them dated March 20 and signed by a greater or lesser 
number of persons depending on the size and commerce of the area or city pe-
titioning, were also addressed to the regenoies. to the States of Holland and 
West Friesland, and to the States General. Dort was a major exception. In a 
letter of March 20, the city merchants expressed confidenc~ that their regents 
would authorize their deputies to vote for the reception of' Adams at The 
Hague. 80 They, therefore, "judged it unnecessary to present a petition." The 
petitions worked effectively and oontributed to the speed of the delibera-
tions.8l Adams took delight in them as they enhanced the reputation of the 
Amerioan cause and supplied "an increase of strength and power equal to a 
82 great army or navy.1f By March 22, half of the eighteen cities in the Prov-
ince of Holland had voted for acknowledgment. Some of the most populous 
cities in the Netherlands were among those acceding, e.g. Amsterdam, Leyden, 
Dort, and Haarlem. 
The stadholder insisted that the measure was premature but decided that 
the movement was too powerful for him to stop. Therefore, he announced that 
he did not intend to make the effort. He promised to restrict himself to 
stating his views as his personal opinion only and not to use his influence 
against the acknowledgment.8} The Grand Pensionary, whose intentions Adams 
had often questioned, had earlier promised to promote the business with all 
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84 his power. The most critical stage of the difficult wait was thus over. On 
March 26. the remaining cities of Holland voted acknowledgment. The States of 
. 85 Holland and West Friesland gave provincial assent on f1arch 28, 1782. The 
States directed Van Bleiswick to notify Adams immediately of their resolution. 
Adams assured Van Bleiswick that he was very sensible of the "unequivocal 
demonstrations" of "national harmony and unanimity" and hoped these would 
forcibly operate toward a general peace. He also hoped that all other prov-
inces would soon follow the examples of Friesland and Holland. All breathed 
a sigh of relief as the accession of Holland virtually "amounted to acknowl-
86 
edgment of American independence and opens the road to negotiation." 
Other provinces were certain to follow, but delaying taotics would 
first be tried in some. Zwolle, where half the regency was composed of the 
nobles, sought to have a committee first take the proposal under advisement 
before it was turned over to the regency itself. Van der Capellen used his 
full influence to prevent so lengthy a process.87 The insistence of merchants 
and populace were too powertul. for any intrigue. Netherland's "inclination 
for us, like a spring pressed by a strong hand. is escaping and declares for 
us nobly, by an accumulation of addresses of corporations, which appear from 
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all parts." Petitions continued to flow. Many of them were published in 
the gazettes. Public opinion and commercial interests so coincided that early 
in April Dumas quite correctly predicted recognition before the end of the 
month.89 On the day of this prediction, April 4, 1782, the third province, 
Zealand, approved recognition. She was quickly followed by OVeryssel on 
April 5. Groningen on April 9, Utrecht on April 10, and Guelderland on April 
17. The States General gave its approval on April 19 and formally received 
Adams on April 22. Thus, within three weeks of the affirmative vote in the 
states of Holland and West Friesland, reoognition was acoorded.90 
A reasonable pride in the aooomplishment might well be forgiven Adams 
sinoe he had for over a year and a half looked forward to it as "the turning 
point"--the final determination of the question whether the Netherlands was 
for or against the allies. La Vauguyon agreed with this evaluation and re-
joioed that the event would separate conclusively the republio from England; 
that it would fix Amerioa more firmly in its independenoe; and finally, that 
it would foroe England to solioit a general peaoe. No small ends for a de-
termined militiaman to aohieve! An admiring Rotterdam oitizen thought the 
deed to have been aocomplished in "suoh an unexpeoted and singular way that 
whoever aCknowledges a Divine Providence will find her finger upon every 
step." Adams described it as the "foundation for prosperity and security to 
both nations. n9l Tired out from the exertions of gaining recognition and the 
round of formalities and congratulations whioh followed it, Adams wrote to his 
wife that "a ohild was never more weary of a whistle, than I am of embassies." 
But the very word "embassy" reminded him of the viotory that was his--a 
viotory which he believed to be a greater achievement than that of forming 
the alliance with France. 
The embassy here, however, has done great things. It has not merely 
tempted a natural rival, and an embittered, inveterate, hereditary 
enemy, to assist a little against G. B., but it has torn from her 
bosom, a constant faithful friend and ally of a hundred years dura-
tion. It has not only prevailed with a minister or an absolute oourt 
to fall in with the national prejudioe, but without money, without 
friends, and in opposition to mean intrigues, it has oarried its oause, 
by the still small voioe of reason, and persuasion, triumphantly against 
the uninterrupted opposition of 9~mily conneotions, court influence, 
and aristocratioal dispositions. 
The thought of his accomplishment so enohanted him that his offioial 
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correspondence repeated it in substance for the delectation of Congress. 93 
Although bursting with pleasure at the event which even "many indifferent 
people thinlc is a great point," he was too honest not to disclctim complete 
responsibility. His success, he assured his friends, was the result of a 
great number and variety of causes operating in the several parts of the globe 
which he "could no more influence than the fly upon the chariot wheel could 
raise the clouds of dust.,,94 
,\ full round of congratulations and receptions followed. Several days 
were almost exclusively devoted to the paying and receiving of visits from 
members of the government and the court. Adams estimated that there were at 
least a hundred and fifty of these ceremonial calls during the first four days. 
First and most important was the formal reception by the whole body of the 
States General. Following that, Adams was formally received by the Prince of 
Orange and a rew days later by the Princess. 95 Not the least among the 
formalities--and one which Adams particularly relished--was a dinner given on 
Tuesday, April 23, by La Vauguyon in honor of the United states. Adams was 
introduced to all the members of the diplomatic corps at The Hague. This was 
a novelty since Adams had not been accepted by the vast majority of the 
diplomatic corps--nor was he destined to be accepted on any but neutral terri-
tory for some months to come. Although he railed against a protocol which 
restricted the exchange of visits with many of these ministers, he cryptically 
observed that none had missed this event since nothing "in the whole volumi-
nous ceremonial, nor in all the idle farce of etiquette fl prevented a minister 
from partaking of a "good dinner in good company." La. Vauguyon, "by paying 
more attention to the new brother than to all the old fraternity," quite 
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compensated for any stiffness on the part of those ministers whose country 
had not granted reCognition. 96 
Among the very few of whose coolness Adams could not complain was H. de 
Llano, the "grave Spaniard." Adams, who possessed his full share of vanity, 
was proud to repeat in whole or in part the extremely effusive compliment 
paid to him by that dignitary. 
You have struck, Monsieur, the greatest blow in all Europe. It is the 
greatest blow which has ever been struck in the cause of America. It 
is you who have frightened and overwhelmed the Anglomanes. It is you 
who have fi19,d this nation with enthusiasm. It is you who have turned 
their heads. 
Recognizing that the remark could well be regarded as the effusion of the 
moment, Adams would relate the scene of the following morning when de Llano 
called upon him at his hotel. On that occasion the Spanish envoy. repeating 
his remark, turned to a gentleman of his party and added that he had not said 
it "in order to make compliments to f.1onaieur Adams" but "because. in truth, I 
believe it is his due." Recounting the incident ~o his close friend, Jenings. 
Adams hastened to assure him that he would not fall an easy prey to such com-
pliments. "They will never turn my head, I assure you." Jenings wryly 
replied that the compliment did appear to him a little too extreme. On the 
other hand, he observed that Adams deserved plaudits for recognizing the 
proper tDoment to act and seizing it to his "own honor, the public benefit, and 
the confusion of his enemies, public and private. n98 
In addition to the official visits a number of local groups planned 
public entertainments in Adams' honor. Because of the pressure of time and 
also due to the ill health which revisited him through much of May and June, 
these invitations could not be accepted, but even their rejection required 
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time and tact. 99 Among the most determined was a merchant group from Schiedam. 
In March they invited him to be guest of honor at a hundred-place dinner ten-
ta ti vely set for the second week in r·~ay. On the day that recogrii tion was 
accorded, April 19, a delegation from these merchants called upon the minister 
to renew their invitation. Because of the burden of his occupations, Adams 
requested Dumas to try to have him excused. Dumas, anxious not to alienate 
any group, personally called upon the secretary of the city regency and in-
formed him that Adams, out of thoughtfulness for the mixed emotions in the 
United Provinces, thought it better not to appear in person, but that he would 
gladly forward their compliments and the invitation in his dispatch to Con-
100 gress. 
Complete entrl to diplomatic circles was by no means granted. Frequent-
ly he met members of the court and diplomatic corps at social functions given 
by Dutch magistrates or at the homes of the French and Spanish ministers, both 
of whom were instructed to acknowled.ge him, but many doors were closed to him. 
Although he was finally invited to dine with the Prince and Princess of Orange 
101 
at their country estate, the Maison du Bois, time and prodding were re-
102 quired to elicit for Adruns an invitation to one of the Prince's receptions. 
~oJith the exception of France and Spain, the foreign embassies were loathe to 
exchange visits.103 The Russian ambassador was instructed to have nothing to 
do with him. Dana wrote from St. Petersburg that the news of recognition 
"gave a shock here, and is not well received." That court was irritated that 
the mediation had neither prevented recognition nor brought a partial peace 
104 . between Britain and Holland. Ministers of the other countries remained 
aloof. The Emperor was particularly displeased at the States General's 
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precipitancy in admitting Adame and forbade his minister to acknowledge the 
American.105 Franklin, although pleased that Adams had been recognized, en-
tertained some misgivings on the procedure. It appeared to him that America 
was harming both her credit and her standing by sending militia diplomats all 
over Europe. "begging alliances. and soliciting declarations of our independ-
106 
ence. 1t On the other hand, La Fayette gladdened the minister's heart with 
congratulations and a statement of the importance of the Dutch declaration in 
the current crisis. La Vauguyon even more generously commented that the Dutch 
had avenged themselves for "All the political and other evils which the Eng-
lish have done them since Cromwell." Louis XVI, through Vergennes, expressed 
his pleasure at the event which he predicted would permanently sever Anglo-
Dutch relations and force the English to solicit peace. When the news finally 
reached Philadelphia five months later, Livingston described it to the several 
state governors in glowing terms. He deemed it "an event which widens the 
basis of our independence and leads to our immediate connection with a power-
ful nation, whose alliance a variety of circumstances in their origin and 
government render extremely desirable. nl07 
In England the event caused a "profound sensation" and drove the cabinet 
108 to a desperate effort to regain the Dutch. On May 4 Fox dispatched to 
Simolin a second letter further explaining the communication of March 28 
which had proposed an unlimited freedom of the sea. This, in turn, was pre-
sented to the States General by the Russian ministers at The Hague. The 
Tsarina applied pressure through her ambassador at Versailles to enlist French 
co-operation in urging the Dutch to accept the English offer. To these 
Russian overtures, Louis XVI used his favorite graceful exit. He responded 
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that he was sensible of the Empress' efforts but did not desire to interfere 
109 in Dutch affairs. 
In reality, his minister, in concert with Adams and Du~s, was devoting 
considerable time to interference in the English peace project. No sooner had 
the first intimations of England's proposal to revert to the treaty of 1674 
been made than these gentlemen concerted plans to thwart it. Working through 
their friends at Amsterdam and in The Hague, they had secured on April 25 a 
resolution in the states of Holland to refuse the offer made through Russia 
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earlier in the month. When England renewed her offer in explicAted form in 
May. they again went into aotion. Unfortunately the secret interviews, con-
ferences, and negotiations kept them too busy to record their activities ade-
quately. They were conscious, too, that many of these meetings "ought not 
yet to be trusted to paper."lll As a result of all the activity the States ot 
Holland resolved not to reestablish the alliance or articles of commerce with 
England, and the States General resolved not to accept a separate peace with-
out French approval.112 
Although Adams had taken a very active part in these negotiations 
earlier, after mid-May. when they seemed safely launched, he gradually with-
drew in favor of the other two diplomats. He himself was busy moving to the 
new Hotel des itats-Unis, resisting separate peace feelers, initiating another 
loan, and ironing out differencea with the States General on a treaty of amity 
and commerce. Barely was the first round of ceremony over recognition com-
pleted than Adams proceeded to revitalize his efforts to secure a loan. He 
had consistently believed that lack of recognition was the chief obstacle to 
procuring money and, with that roadblock removed, he was prepared to go to 
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work. Encouraged by an April report from Franklin that the Paris bankers, 
Fizeaux and Grand, predicted the success of a loan for five or six million 
florins if Adams took immediate advantage of the Dutch enthusiasm over recog-
nition,l13 he drew up a s~t of alternative proposals. He immediately dis-
patched these to the banker, Hodshon, and invited that commercial house, in 
union with whatever co-operating houses Hodshon could enlist, to engage to 
furnish Congress with four or five million florins by the end of July. Al-
though ready to contract for that sum, Adams did not actually expect to ob-
tain it. Dutch profits from trade had been ruined through the past two years, 
and any money available for investment was already solicited by loans opened 
for "France, Spain, England, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and several other powers 
as well as their own national, provincial, and collegiate 10ans.
nl14 To make 
the negotiations more difficult, several of these countries were paying higher 
interest than Adams could offer, and the Dutch money lenders were not the men 
to let enthusiasm replace financial good sense. His friends assured him that 
American credit was mounting viSibly.115 He was more pessimistic and observed 
that the "prodigious" eagerness to act as the American banker was chiefly 
because of the honor involved and the opportunity of an introduction to Ameri-
can trade. None were willing to guarantee a loan, an~he enthusiasm, in spite 
of appearances, did not seem "strong enough to untie purse strings." Also 
whatever establishment he chose, a "cry and clamor" from the others was certai 
to result and led him to complain that he found the avidity of his friends as 
great an obstacle to success as the ill will of his enemies. He described his 
position as "that of a man in the midst of the ocean negotiating for his life 
116 
among a school of sharks. tt 
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Adams had scarcely engaged Hodshon as broker when his friend, Cerisier, 
warned him that Hodahon was an Anglophile at heart and could not be expected to 
devote his best efforts to the loan.ll? As this news arrived just as Hodahon 
was engaged in the financial aspects of Adams' removal from Amsterdam to the 
new American embassy building, Adams was in a delicate position. With some 
skill he managed to convince Hodshon that the party spirit and disagreeable 
altercations that would arise from continued association would be damaging to 
both Hodshon and the PUblic. llB He thus secured his release from that con-
tract. Just as he verged on the completion of another with a group of bank-
ers, a "fatal" circumstance--the opening of a loan for nine million for the 
India Company, under the warranty of the States and bearing an interest of one 
per cent above the ordinary rate--dashed his hopes by threatening to channel 
any available funds elsewhere.119 
In spite of these unfavorable conditions, Adams, with his accustomed 
pertinacity, strove to get a loan inaugurated. On Y~y 10 he met and discussed 
the affair with representatives of three major houses. At this meeting the 
Dutch bankers pressed for the best possible terms and the conferences ended 
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on a hazY agreement for 4}4% for brokerage and charges. In subsequent cor-
respondence, Adams very clearly stipulated that he understood the agreed 4}4% 
to cover all the expenses, receiving and paying to the order of the United 
states the money in the first instance, receiving and paying of the annual 
interest on the loaD.:. and receiving and paying off of the capital in the final 
instance, as well as the brokerage, the fees for the undertakers, and all 
other charges.121 The companies regarded the 4~% as the rate for receiving 
and paying out of the money and brokeral5e charges but expected to charge an 
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additional 1% annually on the amount of the interest for the work of paying it 
out and another Y4% to cover expenses on the final redemption of the obliga-
U2 / tions. Adams was prepared to compromise, but he was determined not to go 
the whole way. He accepted the 1% annually on the amount of the interest, 
raised the original 4~% to 4»% but flatly refused to pay any percentage on 
the final redemption. If the bankers were unwilling to accept these terms, 
he requested that they notify him so that he could find another house.123 In 
view of this ultimatum, they quickly agreed to his terms. 
There were some differences also on the size of the loan to be opened 
and on the possibility of America opening other loans before this one should 
be filled. Adams preferred that it be for three million florins, but the 
commercial houses preferred five million. They in turn were anxious to bind 
America against opening any other loan in the meantime. Adams entertained 
some faint hope of securing the warranty of either the Stat~s General or a 
provincial States and did not want to eliminate the possibility of accepting 
their offer. Nor did he desire to be completely bound to a house which might 
or might not make progress in the business. On these points, also, a com-
promise was worked out whereby the loan would open for five million immediate~ 
1y at 5%. but the "no other loan" clause was to be binding only on Adams 
personally and not on his successor nor on Congress. Theref.:Ore, if Congress' 
interests should so dictate, they could open further loans by replacing him 
with another minister. Similarly, the clause would not be applicable to any 
loan opened for America under the warranty of any segment of the Dutch govern-
ment as the warranters, not the American minister, would choose the commercial 
house in that case.124 If the Dutch bankers could drive a close bargain 80 
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could Adams. ',ii th the terms worked out agreeably to both parties, the pros-
pectus was published and the bonds printed.125 
By June 20 the first thousand blank bonds (face value one million 
florins) were ready for Adams' signature. Within two days they were signed 
and a second thousand in process. Meanwhile, the bankers prepared twenty-five 
Dnglish and twenty-five Dutch copies of the general bonds--five copies in 
either language of each million florins--to be forwarded to Congress by five 
different opportunities.126 Adams forwarded to Philadelphia five copies of 
the contract itself with the reminder that the commission to negotiate a loan 
had included a promise of Congressional ratification. He urged speedy action 
as his lenders were fearfUl of putting out any considerable sum until the 
ratifications arrived. These contracts and the obligations arrived in Phila-
delphia on the Heer Adams in mid-September and Congress prowptly proceeded 
to ratify and return them.127 The news had arrived at an excellent time to 
receive Congress' immediate attention. That body had been occupied with a 
resolution for a loan of fiVe million dollars on whatever terms they could 
obtain. News from Adams caused them to lower this sum to four million.128 
Livingston, aware of the necessity for a sizable sum of money, urged Adams 
to "extend every nerve to get it filled; for if the war continues it will be 
essential to our exertions; if it should terminate, it will not be less neces-
sary to enable us to discharge our army; in every view it is necessary.,~29 
Adams had not given cause for over-confidence in the loan. His cover-
ing letter to Congress stressed that he had no expectations of securing the 
five million for a long time, and that a million and a half by Christmas would 
exceed his expectations. The Heer Adams also brought his letter of June 9 
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imploring Congress not to draw on the proposed loan because the "extreme 
scarcity" of money would make it impossible to realize any great amount. l30 
Unofficially, however, Congress received from other sources the more cheering 
information that the loan was nearly one-fourth filled when the boat em-
barked.13l 
B,y July the money was coming in. Adams directed his bankers to keep 
Congress informed of the general progress of the loan but not to make state-
ments in excess of the money actually on hand. He preferred that the amount 
stated should be a '1few hundred thousand guilders under" as bills were still 
arriving which had been drawn on Henry Laurens two years previously.132 The 
bankers promised to heed Adams' advice and be cautious in the information that 
they forwarded. They, however, were inolined to take a more favorable view of 
the prospects than Adams was, and they pointed out to the minister that they 
had received nearly a million in cash within the first month.133 When prepar-
ing their report for Congress in August, they notified Adams that to date 
(August 8) they had received 1,484,000 florins and requested his advice on the 
sum to be reported.l34 Pleased to have the affair proceeding so well, Ada«~ 
suggested that they report 1,300,000 florins and then keep Congress informed 
most exaotly of everything that related to the loan.135 His part in the nego-
tiation Was more or less completed and he was anxious to devote his full en-
ergies to the realization of the seoond commission which he held in the 
~therland8--that of securing a treaty of amity and commeroe. 
His interest in this project had led him--with full intention of pre-
senting it regardless of eventualities--to prepare a draft of such a treaty 
even before the first province had voted to recognize America. l36 Scarcely 
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had Adams been received by the states General than he applied to President Van 
Citters for a oommittee to disouss the proposed treaty. In order to expedite 
the matter, he presented to the committee the project of a treaty drawn up in 
conformity to the model furnished him by Congress.137 This draft the commit-
tee immediately had translated--Adams had presented it in English--printed and 
mailed to all members of the sovereig.aty. A copy was transmitted to the Ad-
miralty for recommendations or alterations. The Admiralty reported back on 
May 21 with a list of desired changes .138 ~1a.ny of these were inconsequential, 
really, and involved nothing more profound than minor rewording, ~.t the 
change in title from the "Seven United Provinces of the Low Countries" to the 
simpler "United Netherlands. ,,139 Whenever the "most favored nation"! phrase 
appeared, they wished the additional phrase "in Europe" eliminated aa unneces-
sarr and without precedent. To both of these changes Adams was perfectly 
agreeable. Another change, which he oonsidered important and personally would 
have been willing to insert, concerned recaptured vessels and letters of 
marque. However, his instructions did not cover these points and he could 
only draw up a separate convention with the understanding that the United 
States ~hould be free to ratify the treaty either with or without this added 
~per. Another problem, which recurrently was raised in various parts of the 
sovereignty, was in reference to articles twenty-two through twenty-four. 
Article twenty-two in a very detailed manner stated that this treaty might not 
in any way derogate from the treaty of alliance or of commerce with France. 
The following article referred to the open invitation to Spain to adhere to 
the alliance at any time. The Dutch were a little leary of being subordinated 
to French or Spanish interests. But Adams insisted that these articles must 
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remain in substance. The twenty-fourth article related to the possibility of 
the United £3tates negotiating with the frubary States for security of naviga-
tion on the Hedi terranean, in which case the Dutch consuls in "those countries 
were to second the lUnerican requisition. In regard to this article, Adams 
pointed out that it bound the Dutch to nothing and was no more than an act of 
good will on their part.140 
The Admiralty report, as soon as presented to Their High Hightinesses, 
was taken ad referendum by six provinces. The seventh, Overysse1, being an 
interior province, determined to abide by the decision of Holland as the 
141 principal maritime province. Since Holland was obviously the key to ac-
ceptance of the treaty, Adams deemed it prudent to pay a special visit to the 
Grand Pensionary. He hoped to remove some of Van Bleiswick's objections and t 
explain to him the reasons for certain articles, especially those regarding 
France and Spain. To his relief, the pensionary was not difficult to con-
vince. Indeed, Van Bleiswick made light of the objections being raised and 
predicted ultimate success, but he warned that time must be allowed for the 
142 
cities to deliberate and suggested six weeks as reasonable. Adams was not 
too sanguine. After his earlier patience-wracking experiences with the com-
p1icated mechanism of the Dutch constitution, he expected the final acceptance 
of the treaties to be at least three months distant.143 His estimate proved 
to be more realistic than that of the Grand Pensionary. In the meantime, he 
applied himself to the task of answering objections and explaining his posi-
tion on the various articles to all who inquired. 
In mid-:Ju1y the first positive step was taken. 'l'he States of Holland 
and West Friesland took ad referendum a resolution to propose to the States 
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General that deputies from that body enter into discussion with Adans and work 
out with him a mutually agreeable treaty. The one firm stipula.tion was that 
t"le offensi va articles twenty-two and twenty-three either be omitted or be so 
clearly stated that the Franco-'\.merican alliance could in no way derogate from 
144 the proposed treaty between the republic and America. Van Berckel as usual 
served as Adams' right arm in Amsterdam and to him Adams sent an explanation 
of the American viewpoint on the various recommendations of the Admiralty and 
in particular on the two most troublesome articles. ;\dams expressed again his 
willingness to accept most of the changes made by the Admiralty but argued 
that it would be impossible to omit the two articles in question. Congress 
had a solemn agreement with France which must be safe~~arded. Furthermore, 
no one had yet demonstrated what possible injury these articles could cause 
the Netherlands. On the contrary, their sole purpose was no other than that 
the treaty under consideration should not derogate from the previous treaties 
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wi th J.<"rance. 
Adams was correct in his presumption that Amsterdam would again be the 
key to success or failure in the negotiation. The city hemmed and hawed until 
every other city in the province had voted approval. Finally, on August 8, 
the Amsterdam regency gave its approval and added the admonition to its depu-
ties not to retard under any pretext ,the final accomplishment of the business. 
The regency, however, submitted minor recommendations made to it by the bourse 
for discussion with Adams. As a criterion by which Adams might judge whether 
each recommendation :proposed was truly that of the bourse or only that of a 
committee member, Van Berckal informed him that the bourse recommendations 
all bore a common characteristic. They were, in every case, to supply or to 
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ask clarification rath0r than to add or to retract any essential point. In 
order to prevent any modifications which might be proposed from delaying the 
negotiations on the pretext that it must be taken ad referendum, a final 
clause was added that Their High ~ightinesses be given full power to conclude 
a treaty with whatever changes should be agreeable to the two contracting 
146 powers. 
Amsterdam's sanction received and the proposed conference with Adams 
held, the States of Holland and West Friesland approved the treaty on August 
14. The States General proposed an immediate conference with Adams to put 
the final touches to it. Another conference on the same subject was scheduled 
with Van Bleiswick as he was the most influential individual in the States 
147 General. These many conferences at every level wearied the impatient Adams 
and he complained to Mrs. Adams that she could have "no idea of the difficul-
ties" encountered, some t'too cruel" even to be committed to paper.148 
On August 22 a committee composed of deputies from each province, Van 
Bleiswick, and Seoretary Fagel met with the American plenipotentiary to pre-
sent to the latter their remarks and propositions. A compromise was shortly 
reached on the controversial twenty-second and twenty-third articles, and 
these were condensed into a single simplified article.149 A new treaty em-
bodying the compromises was then drawn up as also a convention on the subject 
of recaptured prizes. All this consumed time and it was mid-September before 
Adams could write that "all articles, words, syllables, and letters, and point 
are adjusted, and nothing remains but to write five fair copies, in Dutch and 
English, and sign, seal, and deliver th'em. f1 He wa.s plea.sed with the results 
which he described as being !las near the spirit of my instructions as I could 
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obtain, and I think it is in nothing materially variant from them." 
Finally, the signing of both treaty and convention was scheduled for 
Monday, October 7, but a last-minute delay postponed the event ~ntil the fol-
lowing day. At high noon on October 8, 1782, Adams proceeded to the state 
House where he was received with all formality by two deputies and conducted 
to the chamber of business. There the copies were properly signed and, as 
quickly as safe means of transport could be found, copies were dispatched to 
Congress for ratification.15l They arrived in Philadelphia and were read in 
Congress on January 21, 1783. Two days later the Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
with the United Provinces as also the convention was ratified.152 It was pro-
claimed the same day although ratifications were not formally exchanged with 
the Netherlands until June 23, 11~3. 
By October 8 then, John Adams had accomplished the major part of his 
assigned tasks in the Netherlands. He had secured the recognition of his coun-
try and of himself; he had inaugurated a loan that promised to be successful; 
he had negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce. The only remaining task 
was that of forming a Franco-Dutch-~merican alliance. Each time he had 
broached that subject, his efforts had been stymied by La V~uguyonts claim of 
"no instructions.tI Adams was determined to await the advice of France on this 
matter although he admittedly had gone against it on the occasion of present-
ing his memorial.153 This resolution he perhaps found the easier to make as he 
was convinced that La Vauguyon was well disposed toward an alliance and would 
154 give his acquiescence to the undertaking as soon as possible. Vergennes, 
however, continued to stall. B,y late summer the none-too-durable patience of 
Adams began to wear thin. In a dispatch to Livingston he pointed out his 
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embarrassment in not knowing what action to take. On the one hand, he was 
anxious to preserve peacefUl relations with the French ministers. On the other 
hand. the wording of the tenth article of the Franco-American 'treaty directed 
that any invitation to other countries be extended in concert. He presumed 
that the concert was settled in Philadelphia, and that his instructions, 
therefore, to make the proposal were positive. He was anxious to fUlfill his 
instructions, especially when they were so agreeable to his way of think-
ing.155 Before any further action could be taken, he was called to the peace 
convention in Paris. This convention not only superseded any negotiation on 
an alliance but nullified the commission to form one since any alliance was 
to be restricted to the duration of the war. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TRIUMPH OF MILITIA DIPLOMACY 
Long before Adams affixed his signature to the treaties of amity and 
commerce, the first serious efforts toward the long-awaited peace settlement 
were being made. Adams, with his customary impetuous distrust of English in-
tentions, refused to grant any credence to the peace emissaries sent to him. 
In mid-April, 1782. Franklin, who had also been contacted by English envoys, 
extended a first request to his co-commissioners that they come to Paris pre-
pared to aid in a projected peace settlement.l John Jay's militia efforts at 
diplomacy in Spain were not paying off as Adams' were, and so he accepted the 
invitation, arriving in Paris on June 23. Adams, in process of being received 
and of presenting his draft of a treaty of amity and commerce, had excellent 
reasons for his refusal to be drawn to Paris at that time. 
Four months later, in response to a request from Jay to come to Paris, 
Adams explained his reluctance both in terms of the uncompleted treaty of 
commerce and of his lack of belief in Lord Shelburne's sincerity. He also 
pointed out the imprudence of three American ministers converging on Paris at 
the same time unless the negotiator from England had full powers to treat with 
America. Adams adamantly refused to accept anything short of a specific 
2 
statement of American independence. He scornfully rejected all offers of 
negotiation under ambiguous commissions. England's offer to treat with all 
the "belligerent powers" was suspect since America had never been recognized 
271 
272 
as a power by England. Adams interpreted that offer as a British device to 
reserve lito themselves a place for chicane.".3 A reputed commission to treat 
with the "four powers at war with England," he described as equally ambiguous. 
It could as well refer to "Hyder Ali or the Mahrattas" as to America. Simi-
larly Oswald's commission to treat with "the said colonies or plantations, or 
any of them, or any parts thereof" proved unacceptable to him. He proudly 
declared that he was not a minister of any "fourth state" nor of any "American 
colonies.,,4 Jay and Franklin agreed with him and Oswald was forced to send 
for a furth0r, and more explicit authorization, which would be acceptable to 
the American commissioners.5 
In spite of the fact that Adams refused to come to Paris short of a 
commission explicitly to treat with the United States of America, he was not 
the man to ignore any matter affecting the well-being of his country. Con-
sequently, he regularly sought information on any progress toward a negotia-
tion. Finally, the message which the American plenipotentiaries awaited did 
arrive. Oswald received on September 27, 1782, a commission to treat with 
"the commissioners of the United States of America.,,6 These words conceded 
the explicit reoognition which the Americans had demanded and which their 
firmness had won for them. Adams received the message, accompanied by Jay's 
urgent request, on October 6, a matter of hours befor~the formal signing of 
his treaties of amity and commerce with the Netherlands.7 With great industry, 
he signed another two thousand obligations, wrote long explanatory epistles 
to Livingston and to his family, to Jenings, Dana, and other friends, turned 
" over the affairs at the Hotel des Etats-Unis to Dumas, fulfilled the ritual 
of taking leave of the numerous dignitaries, paid farewell visits to friends 
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at The Hague including La Vauguyon, and set out for Paris on October 17, 
1782.8 He was not to see The Hague again for nearly a year when he would re-
turn to solicit more money. 
As the roads were bad and travel was difficult, Adams took his time and 
indulged in sightseeing along the way. Also, he did not really believe Eng-
land was prepared to make peace and he no longer enjoyed the vigor of a young 
man. Thus, it was already October 26, when he drove up to his old lodgings 
at the Hotel de Valois. As the I1first thing to be done in Paris is always to 
send for a taylor, peruke maker, and shoemaker," he spent some time arraying 
himself suitably as a diplomatic representative of a sovereign country.9 
Finally, on Monday, the twenty-eighth, he paid his respects to Jay and learned 
from him the details of the negotiations. Delighted with the conduct of Jay 
in resisting both English and French efforts to bobtail the American claims, 
Adams spent the entire day with Jay and worked up an ever greater resentment 
at every indication, real or imagined, of Franklin's willingness to conciliate 
either France or England. 
He refused for a time to so much as call upon Franklin and declared 
that it was the Doctor's business to come and see him. A friend, arguing the 
imprudence of demonstrating a division among themselves to interested parties, 
finally prevailed upon him to go out to Pasey and see Franklin who was slowly 
recuperating from a long debilitating seige of the gout. Once there Adams 
minced no words in expressing his complete approval of Jay's conduct and 
their mutual resolve to negotiate boundaries and fisheries entirely independ-
10 
ent of France. Adams obviously was not in a tractable mood. He had too 
long felt both restricted and undermined by the Franklin-Vergennes combinatio~ 
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As he had been blessed with small ability to forget and still less to forgive, 
his previous trips to France and subsequent unpleasant "flights" to Holland 
undoubtedly rankled in his mind. On this occasion he had retarned somewhat 
as the victor and his self-esteem dictated a policy that no flight of imagina-
tion could call subservient to either Franklin or Vergennes. Franklin wisely 
heard him out and, before conferences again began in earnest, proceeded to 
announce his intention of supporting his colleagues in their resolution to 
keep their negotiations secret from the French court.ll 
Adams was still more reluctant to contact Vergennes. On previous 
visits to Paris he had called upon the Foreign Secretary at his earliest pos-
sible convenience. Now he permitted two weeks to slip past with no effort to 
see Vergennes. He excused this dilatoriness on the claim that he was "so 
constantly engaged forenoon, afternoon, and eveningTl in peace conferences 
that he could not find time to go to Versailles or nanywhere else. ,,12 Finally, 
La Fayette took him to task on the matter and pointed out that Vergennes could 
justifiably resent the neglect. When Dr. Franklin repeated the same message 
at dinner that evening, Adams resolved to pay his respects the next morning, 
November the tenth.13 
The effort was well rewarded. Vergennes' entire attitude toward Adams 
appeared to have undergone drastic change. Adams could reasonably deduot that 
this change was related to his success in the Netherlands. No other explana-
tion seemed probable. A presumption, had the Foreign Secretary entertained 
one, that treaty negotiations were beyond the point of interference from the 
"pedantry, stubbornness, and self-importance" of Adame would have been insuf-
14 ficient to induoe Vergennes to aesume a more congenial air. Aotually the 
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peace negotiations were quite unsettled and Vergennes had no accurate knowl-
edge of what progress was being made. His mind was undoubtedly relieved to 
know that Adams was restrictea by co-negotiators, but the relief could 
scarcely have been great enough to explain the new kindliness with which he 
received a former adversary. His later correspondence proved that he still 
did not trust Franco-American relations in Adams' hands any further than he 
had two years earlier. Writing to LUzerne in September, 1783, he warned his 
ambassador that there were people who would still like to destroy the bonds 
between the two countries "and chief among these is John Adams.,,15 A shrewd 
diplomat, he may have surmised that Adams would be easier to lead than to 
drive (though he was not apt to be led very far), but the Comte apparently 
made no serious effort at this period either to lead or to drive. On the 
other hand, Vergennes was eminently capable of recognizing another man's suc-
cess and ot appreciating the magnitude ot the achievement. Also, he was 
diplomat enough to know which way the wind was blowing--at the moment the air 
was laden with Adams' praises--and bend with the breezes. Something of these 
considerations may have prompted the new respect with which he received Adams. 
At any rate, he accorded the American minister considerable time and then, 
when the interview was over, invited him to dinner. 
In his diary that evening Adams gloated over the experiences of the 
day. He had been privileged to conduct the Countess to dinner where, sitting 
to her right and opposite Vergennes, he received the constant attention of 
both. "In short I was never treated with half the respect at Versailles in 
16 
my life." He was tully as pleased with the fulsome compliments of those 
whom he met at the Count's home. Various gentlemen praised him for his great 
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success in Holland and for having demonstrated that Americans "understood 
negotiation as well as war." Having been invited to take care of the war and 
leave the negotiation to France on an earlier occasion, Adams discovered a 
special appeal in these words. However, the crowning encomium was, "Monsieur, 
you are the Washington of the negotiation"--a compliment difficult to ex-
'17 
ceed. He was to hear it repeated by various persons throughout Paris in the 
next days and each repetition thrilled him anew.18 
As generous as these praises were, however, they could hardly exceed 
Adams' own estimate of the event to which they referred. Barely six weeks 
after the official presentation of his credentials in April, 1782, he wrote 
to his confidant, Jenings: 
I sometimes think that I shall die a martyr to the Dutch alliance, 
and I declare to you, if it had been the only action of my life, I 
should have thought it a life well spent. Such are my ideas of its 
importance to the cause of our country. The influence of it may not 
be soon perI~ived and may never appear in a striking light, but it 
will exist. 
From his beloved wife, he solicited both praise and sympathy. 
The American cause has obtained a triumph in this country more signal 
than it ever obtained before in Europe. It was attended with circum-
stances more glorious than could have been foreseen. • • • Your friend 
will never have leisure, he will never have the patience to describe 
the dangers, the mortifications, the distresses he had undergone in 
accomplishing this great work. It is better that some of the opposi-
tion an~ointrigues he has had to encounter should be buried in ob-
livion. 
When an admirer had a medal struck in commemoration, a pleased Adams assured 
him that the influence of April 19 "upon France, Spain, Great Britain, 
America, and all the neutral powers, has already been so great, and in the 
21 future vicissitudes of things will be so much greater. 1t 
Adams fully understood that any nation, to enjoy the full fruits of 
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sovereignty, must be recognized as a sovereign nation by other countries. 
It was to this end that he directed his struggle against "parties, factions, 
and nations." His first interest in the mynheers was expressly to make 
America less dependent upon France, more able to speak in her own behalf. 
This applied immediately to the financial assistance he hoped to procure but 
in larger measure to the diplomatic status Dutch recognition must bestow on 
the United States. The alliance with France, although eminently fair and 
even beneficent, bore more the marks of sponsorship than those of equality. 
America, France, and all of Europe were aware of this pseudo-subordination. 
Adams determined to change that. He was also convinced that by the achieve-
ment of recognition on a basis of equality the thirteen states would cease to 
be a pawn of European politics. Then, once the peace was settled, England 
and the powers of Europe would tlprefer our friendship to our enmitylf and 
gladly refrain from drawing the new country into future wars. "This," Adams 
declared, "is the object of all my wishes and the end of all my politics. 
To this end and for this reason I look upon my success in Holland as the 
22 happiest event and the greatest action of my life past or future." To an 
old friend he confided: 
Not the declaration of American independence, not the Massachusetts 
Constitution, not the alliance with france, ever gave me more satis-
faction or more pleasing prospects for our country than this event. 
It is a pledge against friends and enemies. It is an eternal bar-
rier against all dangers from the house of Bourbon as well as a 
present security against England. Perhaps every imagination does 23 
not rove into futurity as much as mine, nor care so much about it. 
One of the qualifications which marked Adams as a statesman was his 
ability to "rove into futurity" rather than to fasten his efforts to tempo-
rary contingencies. Consequently, when Livingston directed that he work in 
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"closest connection" with the French minister and "advise with him on great 
24 leading objects." Adams natly disagreed. Never niggardly with words, he 
devoted more than a thousand to the importance of insisting "upon seeing with 
our own eyes, using our own judgment, and acting an independent part." With 
true wisdom he concluded, "It is of the last importance that we do it now thus 
early, otherwise we should find it very difficult to do it hereafter.,,25 
Having used his eyes, his judgment, and his independence in full meas-
ure according to his own prescription, he rejoiced in the result. "I think 
that no opportunity will present itself for a century to come, for striking 
a stroke so critical and of so extensive importance in the political system 
of America. • • • Its consequences will not be developed for centuries. • • • 
A future war in Europe w11l show the importance of the American negotiations 
in Holland. u26 
Some of his contemporaries began to observe the results without await-
ing the clarifying experience of a future war. La Fayette dryly remarked that 
the Dutch were finally acknowledging American independence since the action 
would "neither cost them blood nor money." But he hastily drew Livingston's 
attention to the fact that considerable political advantage would accrue to 
the United States from the recognition.27 Franklin noted that the English 
stocks, which had been rising at the prospect of a separate peace with Holland, 
. 28 
fell immediately upon hearing of the Dutch recognition. Even the news of 
Rodney's victory over de Grasse and the French neet in the West Indies failed 
to revive the faltering English credit. Somewhat later Franklin cheerfully 
passed on the news that the reputation of the United states seemed to be 
rising in Europe. As proof of this he cited the interest of Sweden in forming 
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a treaty with the United States as soon as that between the Netherlands and 
America was concluded and her intention of incorporating into her treaty such 
improvements as the Dutch treaty might suggest.29 Before the Swedish treaty 
could be concluded, the war was over, but Adams was quick to note that the 
government of Gustavus III had been the first to "invite" the United .states 
to an alliance--a considerable switch from the militia style conquest re-
quired in The Hague. 3D Shortly Denmark and then Portugal requested treaties 
based on those between Congress and the States General.3l 
The exaltation with which he immediately favorably compared the Dutch 
recognition to the Franco-American alliance bespoke not only a short term 
complacency. Nor was it solely a sigh of success at a long and tedious job 
happily concluded--a reaction which would normally diminish with the passage 
of time. Throughout his life, '~dams, a man who had helped sculpture many of 
the landmarks of American history, never faltered in his estimate of this 
particular achievement. ~fter years of public office were completed and he 
could look back upon a rich and varied life, he wrote to an old collaborator. 
"Whatever you may think; I know that, if ever my name deserved to be men-
tioned, from my birth, on the l~ of October, 1775 Li7327. to this 29~ of May, 
1814; it ought to have been noted in Holland in 1780, or 1781. or 1782.,,32 
Interrogated bY:J.a correspondent as to the part he acted in public service, 
Adams reiterated the policy which had led him to the Netherlands and which had 
served as the ~~iding principle of his activities there. He had, he wrote, 
pursued "an inflexible course of studies and labors, to promote, preserve, and 
secure that independence of my country, which I early saw to be inevitable, 
against all parties, factions, and nations that have shown themselves un-
friendly to it.,,33 
2~O 
If a small addition to t1merican stature on the world scene or an in-
creased probability that Europe would not so eagerly pull the new republic 
into the next European upheaval had been the only results of Adams' activities, 
his work would have merited acclaim. But there were other benefits--diplomat-
ic and economic. 
Diplomatically, the treaty with the Netherlands may have had some ef-
feet in bringing the war to a close, and perba.ps--at least indirectly--in 
securing a remarkably favorable treaty. Of this Adams was convinced. He 
entertained no doubt that Holland would have succumbed to pressur~s from both 
home and abroad and formed a separate peace with England if he and the Pa-
triots had not consistently prevented it. Early in 1781, when Dutch spirits 
were at their lowest, he had produced his memorial, "that well-hove harpoon 
iron thrown by a Cape Cod whaleman,lt and thereby furnished a badly-needed 
rallying point. In his eyes, only this memorial and other measures taken in 
consequence of it had prevented England from a separate peace.34 Forgiven 
the natural exaggeration to which he was prone, his statement bore a strong 
relation to truth. 35 Later, when recognition was accorded and a treaty be-
tween the two republics undertaken, Adams informed Congress that a treaty 
with any country would have been as valuable to the American cause as a battle 
or seige but a treaty with the Netherlands at that time was "of as much 
weight in the war as the captivity of Burgoyne or Cornwallise,,36 Forty years 
later he was still convinced that his negotiation with the Dutch was "the 
event which ultimately turned the scale of the American Revolutionary War and 
produced the Peace of 1783.,,37 
In the course of time his opinion has been seconded by others. Among 
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his colleagues, both La Vauguyon and Thulemeyer generally agreed_ It was ob-
vious to them that The Hague's recognition of America would complicate any 
program for reconciling the United Provinces with England, and La Vauguyon 
added that England would be forced thereby to a general peace. 38 Catherine 
of R~ssia, too, realized that chances of a separate mediation were seriously 
injured by The Hague resolution. 39 To England the Dutch recognition of 
American independence constituted a physical loss as it eliminated the last 
hope of support from the continent. It was also a moral loss as it threat-
ened the commercial hegemony of Britain and forewarned that nation of an ap-
40 proaching realignment in the balance of power. 
The American plenipotentiary thought himself deserving not only of a 
generous share of the credit for bringing the war to an end but of additional 
merit for preserving his country from a wretched peace. He reasoned that 
"the House of Bourbon 50uld have beey so pressed for peace and we so de-
pendent on them that we should have lost the western country and the fisheries 
and very probably been left in a truce, i~ state of poverty and weakness, 
which would have made us long the miserable satellites of some great European 
41 planet." His analysis of France's desperate straits was reasonably accu-
rate. France was so pressed for peace that she most certainly would have 
accepted terms much less generous to America than those which were finally 
approved. The favorable terms actually drawn cannot. however, be credited 
chiefly to the Dutch negotiation. A number of other factors. centering 
around England's need for peace. her choice of negotiators, and the firmness 
and unity with which the American commissioners negotiated, deserve a major 
42 portion of the credit for the treaty. Perhaps the most that could be said 
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for Adams' point of view was that the Dutch negotiation had given America a 
firmer ground from which to bargain. A second belligerent had acknowledged 
independence and England would find it that much more difficul.t to grant less. 
Dutch recognition and the treaty of amity and commerce between the two re-
publics gave moral strength to America even as they siphoned it away from 
Jijngland. To the degree that these factors supported the American negotiators 
and weakened the British position, the Dutch negotiation aided in securing a 
generous treaty. 
Economic4l1y speaking, Adams' success hi1s never been challenged. 
Throughout his mission he was constantly reminded of the need to secure money 
"which is almost the only thing wanting to render our affairs respectable at 
home and abroad.,,43 The news of his reception brought an enjoinder to aC-
complish with all due haste the "one great object of your mission--the pro-
curing a loan--which neither the probability or the conclusion of a peace will 
44 
render unnecessary." \1hen the loan contract arrived for congressional rati-
fication, Livingston couched his congratulations in a plea that Adams "extend 
every nerve to get it filled; for if the war continues it will be essential to 
our exertions; if it should terminate, it will not be less necessary.,,45 
Robert Morris, Secretary of Finance, also congratulated Adams on successfully 
inaugurating a loan tlequally splendid and useful." And he, too, remarked on 
46 the great importance the loan would be to the country. 
Unfortunately, after a very auspicious beginning, the loan gradually 
lost momentum through the latter part of 1782 and much of 1783. Adams had 
expected this as he was all too aware that nearly every power in Europe, as 
well as the local governments and the Indies Companies, were busily floating 
loans and literally every available guilder was already destined for one loan 
or the other.47 In spite of the competition, Congress obtained a desperately-
needed $720,000 from the Netherlands in 1782 and an additionat ~584,oOO in 
1783. Although this equalled several times the entire financial support 
granted by Spain, it amounted to less than one-half of the French aid for the 
48 
same two years. Under the circumstances, however. the sum was of conse-
quenee. Toward the end of 1782, as French funds for the year were running 
low. Franklin requested Adams to pay the interest on the ten million livres 
raised in Holland on behalf of America by the French 80vernment.49 M. Grand, 
the French banker handling American funds, desired to transfer American funds 
from Holland to pay drafts on Franklin. Adams and his bankers rejected that 
proposal but assumed the obligation to pay those notes which Franklin could 
not.50 
After 1783 the French withdrew their assistance and only the Nether-
lands continued to lend to the Confederation government during the ensuing 
years, the "critical period,It--a time of serious financial strains for the 
new republic. Dutch loans to the United States totaled $l,304,()OQ in 1782 
and 1783. During 1784 that sum was supplemented by an additional $1,395.000--
the importance of which to America can hardly be overestimated. After 1784 
the yearly amounts dropped appreciably before again climbing upward. In 1785, 
$53,600 was borrowed; 1786,&47,200; in 1787, $129,000; in 1788, $270,800, 
and by 1789, ~}400,OOO a year was procured in the Netherlands from loans con-
tracted by John Adams. In all, the loans negotiated by Adams in the Nether-
lands, once he had secured the friendship of that nation, amounted to 
$3,600,000 or roughly a sum equal to one-half of the total funds lent by 
51 
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It should be remarked that there was a difference in the spirit behind 
the loans of the two countries. France lent her money for political reasons; 
the Netherlands lent hers only when American credit appeared to justify it. 
The Dutch loans are significant in evidencing the beginning of a national 
credit.52 A number of factors and a number of individuals contributed--some 
of them more than Adams--to the founding of a solid American financial system. 
But in the Netherlands, where the loans were raised, no one did so much to 
make the foundations of American credit known and understood as Adams. To 
him, therefore, must go not only the primary gratitude of his compatriots 
for the money received from the Netherlands, but, since the Dutch were noted 
for their financial acumen, the concomitantly enhanced credit rating through-
out Europe. That the loans he secured in the United Provinces were not 
greater and that the credit of America was insufficient to overcome other 
factors and thereby secure loans from other European countries were facts to 
be deplored, but they could not in any way be laid to Adams' charge. 
Obviously, therefore, America gained significantly in both the finan-
cial and the diplomatic spheres from her changed relations with the Dutch 
republic. Nevertheless, Adams frequently failed to receive full credit for 
the part he played in promoting these improved relations. He himself tersely 
explained this phenomena as a design of the French and the English, and of 
their friends in America, to ignore the importance of the Dutch negotiation 
and, thereby, cause it to fall into oblivion.53 A more accurate analysis 
could well be that negotiations for the all-important treaty of peace fol-
lowed so closely upon the Dutch negotiations that the latter tended to be lost 
in the shadows. Furthermore, the Netherlands was a small country which failed 
to oome off a viotor in the treaty of 1783, and this failure prevented its 
war diplomacy from receiving wide attention. 
On the other hand, room existed for skeptioism regarding the primaoy 
of Adams in securing the friendship of The Hague. He certainly had no share 
in the breaking of diplomatic ties between The Hague and London, nor in the 
English declaration of war on the Dutoh. Tnese transpired before he was 
well established in the Low Countries. It should also be noted that the 
Dutch were very loathe to have any oommunication with him until the spring of 
1782. By that time England apparently was not going to achieve an unqualified 
sucoess, and daily it was beooming more olear that the Court of st. James 
would be foroed to seek a negotiated peaoe. Aware of this and aoutely mind-
ful of their dependence on trade for tbeir very existence, the Dutoh revised 
their former 0001 attitude toward the Amerioan. Francis Dana quickly spotted 
the Aohilles heel. He opined that the basis of sudden Dutoh zeal for ~~erioan 
independence lay in the merchants' anxiety to form intimate commercial rela-
tions with America before England had the opportunity to readjust her com-
meroial connections. Dana was so convinced of the importance of commeroe to 
the Dutch that he believed the Netherlands, by the spring of 1782, would have 
made serious efforts to establish good commercial relations with America even 
if they had been "in profound peace with Britain, {.8.n{l even at the hazard of 
a war. ,,54 
There was a considerable amount of truth to Dana's refleotions. This 
was evidenced by the flurry of petitions from the merchant and oommeroial 
classes which immediately preoeded Adams' reoeption. On the other hand, the 
Dutoh had little reason to doubt the commeroial advantages of a renewed 
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alliance with England and the disadvantages of antagonizing the ~1istress of the 
Seas. If there were powerful interests working for alignment with America, 
there were powerful interests opposed to it. In any event, ~ Hague left to 
itself could have sought and perhaps found a means either to wait out a war 
that seemed nearly over in order to re-establish her commerce or to contract 
some form of trade relations with America short of acknowledgment and treaty. 
That it did not was largely because The Hague was not left to itself. 
A capable, energetic, pertinacious minister, whose presence had been neither 
desired nor requested, had taken up residence in the country. This unwelcome 
minister was John A.dams, 'the militia diplomat. His presence made a world of 
difference. vfuere circumstances may well have led the Dutch slowly along a 
path of good will toward America, the goading of Adams propelled them rapidly 
towar4 the extremity of that path.55 To this effect he posted his own claim: 
"In Holland, I had driven the English party and the stadho1der' s party before 
me like clouds before the wind, and had brought that party to unite cordially 
with America, France, and Spain against Eng1and.,,56 
Evidence has supported Adams. La Vauguyon directly applauded Adams 
and remarked, "Honaieur, your firmness haa had a great effect here.,,5? It 
certainly was not French diplomacy that secured American recognition. Ver-
gennes, who directed that diplomacy, firmly r.aintained almost to the eve of 
recognition that the Provinces would never turn toward the United States until 
the war was ended in order not to complicate their own quarrel with Eng1and.58 
Van der Cape1len observed that the Dutch people forced their government to 
grant recognition and form treaties of amity and commerce.59 Since the people 
encompassed the merchant and commercial classes, this was true, but the strong 
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propaganda war Adams waged to enlighten these people concerning America under-
lay their demands. In the meantime a determined opposition concentrated on 
thwarting Adams' efforts. A reasonable conclusion was that drawn by Phillip 
Mazzei who decided that success should bo attributed at least as much to 
Adams' "prudent, wise, and indefatigable endeavors H as to favorable circum-
60 
stances. 
The minister's triumph marked the one great success of militia diplo-
macy. In no other theater of Europe were the militia statesmen able to 
achieve their goal. To Adams alone was given the strategic combination of 
personality, political acumen, and opportunity to overcome all the obstacles 
in his path and to do so within the bounds of his instructions. Militia 
diplomats might practice a fine disregard of the wishes of the government to 
which they were sent. They did not advocate a disregard for the wishes of 
their own government in so far as these could be observed. Fortunately for 
Adams, his actions had been circumscribed with very few limitations. The 
only one which seriously conflicted with his procedure was the directive not 
to act without French approval, and that restriction arrived only after he 
had done that which was prohibited. 
As usual, his own words best portrayed his attitude toward the mission. 
61 Although he had frequently extolled his own patience, he was anxious that 
the militia aspect of his work be preserved for posterity. Upon learning 
that a close friend, Mercy Warren, was authoring a history, he begged her to 
celebrate his militia tactics rather than his patience. 
I had rather you should immortalize my impudence, for I rather think 
it was this quality, than the other which produced the effect in Hol-
land. I entered into the Seven United Provinces with as much impudence 
as I should have appeared in the 13 United States of ~erica. • • • 
If the word shocks you, Madam, call it modest assu~~nce, or honest 
boldness, or almost what you will except patience. . 
/ 
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